I wonder what Bismarck's approach to the socialist "problem" in 1890 would have resulted in. A much earlier German Revolution?
Alternate History Ideas and Discussion
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I wonder what Bismarck's approach to the socialist "problem" in 1890 would have resulted in. A much earlier German Revolution?
Skallagrim
Well-known member
He proposed making all anti-socialist measures permanent, and expanding some. He had a majority for 99% of his plan, but one party opposed one of the laws being made permanent, and then he tried to blow up his own coalition & form a new coalition.
It didn't work, in part because Wilhelm II was like "no, fuck you, Bismarck". (Which, granted, was also because Bismarck had just imploded the government without properly consulting the Kaiser first.)
Anyway, although Wilhelm II support moderate reform, he still detested the socialists -- as did a political majority. Bismarck could've gotten his way. The result of a "German revolution" happening then is a left-wing illusion. In reality, there would be socialist uprisings, but these would fail, and their violence would turn even more people against them. (Even the social democrats wanted the socialists curb-stomped, because the socialists were their rivals.)
So the real outcome would be: lots of socialists get a bullet or the noose, and socialism is completely broken in Germany, except as a fringe terrorist movement that will be universally hated by the wider population.
And a lot of the surviving German socialists will also flee abroad, such as to the Anglosphere, right?
BTW, what were Bismarck's thoughts on the Social Democrats?
Skallagrim
Well-known member
Probably, same thing happened after the 1848 revolutions.
Of course, more socialist agitation in various countries, combined with a successful "solution for the socialist problem" in Germany might plausibly inspire various other countries to also crush their own socialist movements.
This was an era when far-left terrorists frequently threw bombs at important people, after all. More socialists = more terrorism = more eagerness to get rid of socialists = looking at how Germany solved this = imitating that approach with great enthousiasm.
At least, that's a plausible outcome.
"What useful idiots. We'll get rid of them once we're done getting rid of the socialists."
Yes, very possible. Though the Anglosphere did possibly have more protections for free speech even during this specific time period. But of course bomb-throwing is not covered under free speech.
Off-topic, but I previously used the 1893 Barcelona opera house bombing to demonstrate that even non-Muslims can engage in terrorist attacks against populous civilian targets:
That said, though, in this specific day and age, targeting civilians in terrorist attacks is in large part a Muslim problem (with other Muslims themselves often suffering the most from this).
As for the Social Democrats, Bismarck seems to have viewed them as a threat to the existing conservative Prussian and German political order, especially with him being a Prussian Junker. It's good to see that Kaiser Bill was at least a bit more open-minded towards the Social Democrats than Bismarck was.
Eparkhos
Well-known member
To stir the pot/further discussion:
More notes from the Hunno-Gothic TL:
The primary regional political unit in the HGE is the stem duchy, which are basically Germanic tribes that are more formalized/structured. These stem duchies are largely structured along clan lines (which should be noted are not undermined by the Church’s rules on cousin-marriage: thus the Germanic/North European people retain strong clan identities like the modern Middle East), and with no late Roman proto-feudalism to copy from, OTL feudalism is supplanted by a sort of patron-client relationship which is ~kinda~ feudalistic, in that the people lower down pay their higher-up taxes and other such homage, but are functionally free.
This has a number of major knock-on effects. This massive body of free peasantry is much more mobile, resulting in higher urbanization rates as peasants move to the cities in search of work/easier lives and an accelerated process of east-settling as free peasants migrated eastward to settle underpopulated lands. This free peasantry also has a much greater deal of buying power than their serf counter-parts, and the combination of a large empire with free internal trade, a large food surplus and a population with high buying power results in a period of increasing trade and subsequently increasing urbanization: these two factors combined give rise to a significant trading/crafting middle class.
This middle class is a natural ally of the central state, as it benefits from internal stability and cohesion which is threatened by the aristocracy’s attempts to reduce central power, and given trends in similar OTL circumstances I imagine there is significant overlap between the middle class and the state bureaucracy, as they can afford the education needed to do those jobs and don’t see it as a downgrade like much of the aristocracy would. The end result is that trading cities become bastions of support for the central government in opposition to the more rural regions: I imagine this goes a good way to ensuring the survival of the HGE by creating population centers dependent/allied with the central state, counterbalancing the centrifugal efforts of the landed nobility.
This trading class is also a vector for soft power, with trading networks extending far beyond the HGE’s frontiers spreading Gothic culture and Arian Christianity in a manner roughly analogous to how Hindu-Buddhism or Islam spread via trade in Asia and Africa--basically, local chiefs convert for prestige/ease of trading and influence spreads throughout society from there. As the Baltic will be the center vector for this trade, I imagine that many of the Norse, Balts and Finns would become at least nominally Arian, with the upper class practicing Arian Christianity and the lower classes practicing a mixture of folk-Christianity and local paganism. Influence in Slavic-speaking regions further east is lesser but still impactful. The environmental/demographic trends that led to the Viking Age still exist, but I imagine that with much more extensive Northern European trading networks a great deal of the raiding is redirected into trading, and with the HGE too strong to be realistically raided, most of the raiding/migration is redirected into the British Isles/Russia. Once the chaos dies down, I imagine a string of tributary/vassal/ally chieftains dotting the rim of the Baltic, with some isolated trading colonies of Goths in places such as Gotland or the Estonian Islands.
Finally, there’s the church. OTL Arian Christianity seems to have been very disunified, but any HGE emperor with two brain cells to rub together can see its value as a unifying force and a means of ‘othering’ the post-Romans and Suebians so that none of his subject dukes try to break away. With the structure of the Chalcedonian Church and the papacy right next door, it’s rather simple to copy the southerner’s notes and use them in the HGE. The ‘head’ of the Arian Church is the Bishop-of-Bishops in Regensburg, who is elected by his fellows but presides at the discretion of the emperor: beneath him is a network of bishoprics that are organized to cross as many ducal lines as possible to prevent any of the dukes from using them as a power base, and below that the individual churches. As many Early Medieval states did OTL, the church is effectively welded to the bureaucracy, with many priests acting as functionaries and helping to keep the state running. With the Arian Church a caesaropapist organ, missionary efforts are encouraged as a way of bringing peripheral states into line with Regensburg.
On a final note, the combination of a semi-meritocratic church/bureaucracy drawing from all parts of the HGE, a powerful and widespread trading class (copying elite culture as trading classes are want to do), an increasingly centralized state because of the above and a migration of peasantry into (relatively) empty lands are all factors that push for the creation of a new, pan-imperial identity, likely centered on Arian Christianity and some sort of ‘Imperial Gothic’ language, and while regional identities remain strong they are gradually worn away over the generations. In short, with an increasingly culturally unified populace and most of society having an interest in preserving the HGE, I see the foundations for a dynastic cycle a la Persia or China. The Attilids are extinct? Long live the Balti.
Thoughts?
More notes from the Hunno-Gothic TL:
The primary regional political unit in the HGE is the stem duchy, which are basically Germanic tribes that are more formalized/structured. These stem duchies are largely structured along clan lines (which should be noted are not undermined by the Church’s rules on cousin-marriage: thus the Germanic/North European people retain strong clan identities like the modern Middle East), and with no late Roman proto-feudalism to copy from, OTL feudalism is supplanted by a sort of patron-client relationship which is ~kinda~ feudalistic, in that the people lower down pay their higher-up taxes and other such homage, but are functionally free.
This has a number of major knock-on effects. This massive body of free peasantry is much more mobile, resulting in higher urbanization rates as peasants move to the cities in search of work/easier lives and an accelerated process of east-settling as free peasants migrated eastward to settle underpopulated lands. This free peasantry also has a much greater deal of buying power than their serf counter-parts, and the combination of a large empire with free internal trade, a large food surplus and a population with high buying power results in a period of increasing trade and subsequently increasing urbanization: these two factors combined give rise to a significant trading/crafting middle class.
This middle class is a natural ally of the central state, as it benefits from internal stability and cohesion which is threatened by the aristocracy’s attempts to reduce central power, and given trends in similar OTL circumstances I imagine there is significant overlap between the middle class and the state bureaucracy, as they can afford the education needed to do those jobs and don’t see it as a downgrade like much of the aristocracy would. The end result is that trading cities become bastions of support for the central government in opposition to the more rural regions: I imagine this goes a good way to ensuring the survival of the HGE by creating population centers dependent/allied with the central state, counterbalancing the centrifugal efforts of the landed nobility.
This trading class is also a vector for soft power, with trading networks extending far beyond the HGE’s frontiers spreading Gothic culture and Arian Christianity in a manner roughly analogous to how Hindu-Buddhism or Islam spread via trade in Asia and Africa--basically, local chiefs convert for prestige/ease of trading and influence spreads throughout society from there. As the Baltic will be the center vector for this trade, I imagine that many of the Norse, Balts and Finns would become at least nominally Arian, with the upper class practicing Arian Christianity and the lower classes practicing a mixture of folk-Christianity and local paganism. Influence in Slavic-speaking regions further east is lesser but still impactful. The environmental/demographic trends that led to the Viking Age still exist, but I imagine that with much more extensive Northern European trading networks a great deal of the raiding is redirected into trading, and with the HGE too strong to be realistically raided, most of the raiding/migration is redirected into the British Isles/Russia. Once the chaos dies down, I imagine a string of tributary/vassal/ally chieftains dotting the rim of the Baltic, with some isolated trading colonies of Goths in places such as Gotland or the Estonian Islands.
Finally, there’s the church. OTL Arian Christianity seems to have been very disunified, but any HGE emperor with two brain cells to rub together can see its value as a unifying force and a means of ‘othering’ the post-Romans and Suebians so that none of his subject dukes try to break away. With the structure of the Chalcedonian Church and the papacy right next door, it’s rather simple to copy the southerner’s notes and use them in the HGE. The ‘head’ of the Arian Church is the Bishop-of-Bishops in Regensburg, who is elected by his fellows but presides at the discretion of the emperor: beneath him is a network of bishoprics that are organized to cross as many ducal lines as possible to prevent any of the dukes from using them as a power base, and below that the individual churches. As many Early Medieval states did OTL, the church is effectively welded to the bureaucracy, with many priests acting as functionaries and helping to keep the state running. With the Arian Church a caesaropapist organ, missionary efforts are encouraged as a way of bringing peripheral states into line with Regensburg.
On a final note, the combination of a semi-meritocratic church/bureaucracy drawing from all parts of the HGE, a powerful and widespread trading class (copying elite culture as trading classes are want to do), an increasingly centralized state because of the above and a migration of peasantry into (relatively) empty lands are all factors that push for the creation of a new, pan-imperial identity, likely centered on Arian Christianity and some sort of ‘Imperial Gothic’ language, and while regional identities remain strong they are gradually worn away over the generations. In short, with an increasingly culturally unified populace and most of society having an interest in preserving the HGE, I see the foundations for a dynastic cycle a la Persia or China. The Attilids are extinct? Long live the Balti.
Thoughts?
Zyobot
Just a time-traveling robot stranded on Earth.
‘Magitek Antiquity’.
Which is to say, the Classical World acquires various "futuristic" technologies that are powered by magic (as opposed to, y'know, science). For instance, imagine Carthage employing droid armies animated by magic or an Antikythera mechanism imbued with Greek sorcery, allowing it to forecast astronomical events with perfect accuracy. (Yes, I know I just unleashed a swarm of pterodactyl-sized butterflies here that may very well prevent the civilizations we're familiar with from arising, but let’s just assume there’s a “butterfly net” that preserves Rome and the other big kahunas of Antiquity to keep things simpler.)
Which is to say, the Classical World acquires various "futuristic" technologies that are powered by magic (as opposed to, y'know, science). For instance, imagine Carthage employing droid armies animated by magic or an Antikythera mechanism imbued with Greek sorcery, allowing it to forecast astronomical events with perfect accuracy. (Yes, I know I just unleashed a swarm of pterodactyl-sized butterflies here that may very well prevent the civilizations we're familiar with from arising, but let’s just assume there’s a “butterfly net” that preserves Rome and the other big kahunas of Antiquity to keep things simpler.)
Eparkhos
Well-known member
Here's another idea: The Romans get roflstomped in a different Second Punic War, creating a Rome-shaped hole in Classical Antiquity.
The Barcas become the dominant family in Carthage, which sets off a great deal of tension between them and everyone else while Carthage expands its influence across the Western Med, and generally I'd say that Carthage becomes more military-influenced and more...fractuous, if you would.
Philip V reunifies Macedonia/Greece and then reduces the Seleukids, with the Antigonids gradually wearing down the Ptolemaids in a Greek-on-Greek rivalry that ends with the Antigonids dominating the Eastern Med.
Increasing trends towards centralization in Gaul allows Massalia to establish a merchant/vassal empire in the hinterland and boosts them to a regional rival of Carthage, while northern Gaul is overrun by the Germans.
The Barcas become the dominant family in Carthage, which sets off a great deal of tension between them and everyone else while Carthage expands its influence across the Western Med, and generally I'd say that Carthage becomes more military-influenced and more...fractuous, if you would.
Philip V reunifies Macedonia/Greece and then reduces the Seleukids, with the Antigonids gradually wearing down the Ptolemaids in a Greek-on-Greek rivalry that ends with the Antigonids dominating the Eastern Med.
Increasing trends towards centralization in Gaul allows Massalia to establish a merchant/vassal empire in the hinterland and boosts them to a regional rival of Carthage, while northern Gaul is overrun by the Germans.
sillygoose
Well-known member
If they tried to take it, which I'm not sure they would, the only benefit taking Verdun would have to offer is the extra rail line into the St. Mihiel salient. Not sure that was enough to make a difference there, while Toul didn't offer the same advantages of being a fire sack the way Verdun did. Plus there was a fair bit of open ground and forest to grind their way through before getting there from St. Mihiel and without Verdun the French lines would be straighter, so with the potential for greater reserves.@sillygoose If the Germans manage to capture Verdun in 1914, how would a 1916 German attack on the fortress of Toul further to the south have looked like and fared?
The logic here would still be the same: To try bleeding the French dry.
However the bigger result from an early fall of Verdun would be the loss of some of the fortress guns, which provided a major boost to French heavy artillery in 1915 until they could get their production lines up and running in 1916. They had to build a build of carriages for the older guns taken from the forts, but it was better than nothing despite the low rate of fire due to having to re-aim the guns after each shot. That impacts the fighting in 1914-15 before this ATL offensive would even happen.
As you can see the retreat over the Meuse would not really offer all that much of a benefit from attacking toward Toul other than a rail line and some observation posts on the high ground north of St. Mihiel. Well that and a shortened line that wouldn't require many men to hold. Plus it would have to be a wide front attack south of St. Mihiel to make sure the flanks were enfiladed. It is certainly possible to pull off, but I'm not sure it would offer the benefits of the OTL Verdun operation (at least in conception) for OHL to try it.
Skallagrim
Well-known member
A convincing outline. I have some doubts about the (perceived) ease with which the support for central government develops. In reality, trade cities were also quite fond of their freedoms, albeit sometimes different specific freedoms than the ones most favoured by the aristocracy. Additionally, it's implausible that the arisocrats would just stand by and let things develop like this. There would be a series of major internal wars, in which the power of the arisocracy would have to be repeatedly and thoroughly broken, for a central government to really prevail thoroughly and lastingly.
(Indeed, this happened in OTL, in many a country. In this ATL, it could happen earlier, but it'd still have to happen.)
In any event, I'd find a much slower process, with many a compromise, more plausible. This may well be what you have in mind, but the current outline doesn't really paint that picture.
I'd also note that centralism is a notorious force stagnation and calcification, whereas decentralism (which has its own draw-backs) is consistently an engive for shake-ups, competition, and evolution. (If you have one empire with one tax regime, that tends to fuck over the economy. If you have a thousand states with separate tax regimes, plenty are bound to be friendly to economic pursuits, which enriches them and rewards their policies while exploitative governments are duly punished by the market for their foolishness. Similarly, if you have one central code of law and it's turned to a mory tyrannical bent, everybody is crewed. If you have a thouand countries with separate codes of law, plenty will be safe havens to the persecuted, often being rewarded by scientific excellence and other such boons.)
Obviously, since the idea here is "European China", the draw-backs of centralism may well be feature of the TL, rather than a bug. I'm just saying... this Europe isn;t going to be very classically "European" (as we understand that term) in its outlook.
A final note here: I have doubts about an Arian "bishop-of-bishops". It doesn't make sense from the Arian perspective, and centrainly not from the perspective of a temporal ruler. Instead, the Church would be ruled by a council of Bishops/Patriarchs/Cardinals/Whatevers. And the Emperor would explicitly be the one presiding over all their gatherings, and he'd have veto power over both all decisions and all appointments.
Skallagrim
Well-known member
Well, that's ultimately quite similar to what I outlined in post 2477, just now on Saturday.
I prefer my own earlier "Pyrrhic" POD, which handily allows for Northern Italy to be pretty strongly influenced by migrating Celts, who'd establish Italo-Celtic states in the peninsula. (Megale Hellas, meanwhile, would be drawn into the Hellenic world.) With Massalia having strong trade ties to the Gauls and the Celtiberians already, similar connections to the Italo-Celts seem the logical outcome.
This provides a great set-up for a North-Western "Celto-hybridised" Med, in which Massalia could be a key player, opposite to a Carthaginian South-Western Med. (And Carthage growing more militarist is almost a given, in the scenario of a long-standing face-off against an ever-more-imperial Hellenic world, and many a proxy conflict being waged on Sicily...)
If they tried to take it, which I'm not sure they would, the only benefit taking Verdun would have to offer is the extra rail line into the St. Mihiel salient. Not sure that was enough to make a difference there, while Toul didn't offer the same advantages of being a fire sack the way Verdun did. Plus there was a fair bit of open ground and forest to grind their way through before getting there from St. Mihiel and without Verdun the French lines would be straighter, so with the potential for greater reserves.
However the bigger result from an early fall of Verdun would be the loss of some of the fortress guns, which provided a major boost to French heavy artillery in 1915 until they could get their production lines up and running in 1916. They had to build a build of carriages for the older guns taken from the forts, but it was better than nothing despite the low rate of fire due to having to re-aim the guns after each shot. That impacts the fighting in 1914-15 before this ATL offensive would even happen.
As you can see the retreat over the Meuse would not really offer all that much of a benefit from attacking toward Toul other than a rail line and some observation posts on the high ground north of St. Mihiel. Well that and a shortened line that wouldn't require many men to hold. Plus it would have to be a wide front attack south of St. Mihiel to make sure the flanks were enfiladed. It is certainly possible to pull off, but I'm not sure it would offer the benefits of the OTL Verdun operation (at least in conception) for OHL to try it.
What do you mean by Verdun being a fire sack? Is that why the Germans attacked it in 1916? No other reason? And I was thinking of having the Germans perform better at the opening battles of 1914, such as by encircling the French Fifth Army and the BEF, and thus having the French decide to withdraw from Verdun in an attempt to use the troops there at the Battle of the Marne.
@raharris1973 Do you want to know just how far I think that Germany will advance in a Notzi-Polish War in a no-Nazis TL?
Well, I think that something between Map A and Map B is the most likely outcome here:
Map A:
Map B:
Specifically, I think that the final post-war borders, assuming that Germany wins this war due to Britain not directly intervening, would look like in Map B other than for the fact that Poland would keep Gdynia itself. Gdynia won't have an actual land connection to the rest of Poland, but it will be connected to the rest of Poland by an extraterritorial road that goes through the now-German Corridor. There's also the possibility that Germany could seek to impose a more pro-German border in Upper Silesia, with it arguing that the border drawing there was excessively done in Poland's favor. However, that's much riskier due to post-1921 Upper Silesian population movements and thus Germany might instead prefer to use eastern Upper Silesia as a bargaining chip: As in, recognize the German annexation of the Polish Corridor, minus Gdynia, and Poland gets eastern Upper Silesia back and also gets Gdynia back as well as an extraterritorial road connecting Gdynia to the rest of Poland. This seems like a compromise that everyone could get behind, other than of course the Poles, who might also have to suffer the loss of the Kresy to the Soviet Union in this TL.
Plausible German gains in a "Notzi"-Polish War in 1930 or early 1940s?
Professional historian Henry Ashby Turner, and countless others have speculated on the Hitler and the Nazi party failing to come to power with some alternative military, monarchical or democratic regime in its place. Turner, for his part, elaborates on what he sees as the likely foreign policy...
www.alternatehistory.com
Well, I think that something between Map A and Map B is the most likely outcome here:
Map A:
Map B:
Specifically, I think that the final post-war borders, assuming that Germany wins this war due to Britain not directly intervening, would look like in Map B other than for the fact that Poland would keep Gdynia itself. Gdynia won't have an actual land connection to the rest of Poland, but it will be connected to the rest of Poland by an extraterritorial road that goes through the now-German Corridor. There's also the possibility that Germany could seek to impose a more pro-German border in Upper Silesia, with it arguing that the border drawing there was excessively done in Poland's favor. However, that's much riskier due to post-1921 Upper Silesian population movements and thus Germany might instead prefer to use eastern Upper Silesia as a bargaining chip: As in, recognize the German annexation of the Polish Corridor, minus Gdynia, and Poland gets eastern Upper Silesia back and also gets Gdynia back as well as an extraterritorial road connecting Gdynia to the rest of Poland. This seems like a compromise that everyone could get behind, other than of course the Poles, who might also have to suffer the loss of the Kresy to the Soviet Union in this TL.
How does one stop the stagnation in Russian life expectancy that began in the late 1960s and continued for several decades afterwards?
Obviously stopping the alcoholism epidemic in Russia would significantly help in regards to this, but how exactly would one actually go about doing this?
Obviously stopping the alcoholism epidemic in Russia would significantly help in regards to this, but how exactly would one actually go about doing this?
sillygoose
Well-known member
Avoid WW2. IMHO the psychological-social fallout of WW2 (or really any major war in any country) played out through multiple generations. See the 'golden age of serial killers' or the violence epidemic in the US during the 1960s-90s. Even factoring in the impact of pollution the amount of psychological trauma in society from massive wars screws up not just the people that fought in the wars, but also their children and to some degree the grandchildren as well, as abuse, physical and emotional, and experiencing the PTSD flashbacks and alcoholism of (and probably violence between) parents has a major impact on the psychological health of households. Alcoholism then is simply a coping mechanism for having had to deal with lots of psychological trauma. It is said combat vets lost about 20 years of life due to the resulting psychological issues and coping mechanisms after wars on average. Seeing the suicide rates among Iraq war vets I'm willing to bet things were just as bad or worse for WW2 vets.How does one stop the stagnation in Russian life expectancy that began in the late 1960s and continued for several decades afterwards?
Obviously stopping the alcoholism epidemic in Russia would significantly help in regards to this, but how exactly would one actually go about doing this?
Germany also heavily suffered as a result of World War II and yet did not suffer anything comparable to Russia's life expectancy problems during the late 20th century.
sillygoose
Well-known member
Probably because of how many combat vets that had died and the low birthrates after the war. The psychologically harmed elements of society either died out or didn't have kids. That and I bet since a lot of kids were sired by Allied soldiers after the war who left and didn't impart their combat trauma, the children that grew up in single mother households didn't develop the same issues. Also Germany per capita became a lot richer than the Soviet Union by the 1960s if the revised post-Soviet economic data is accurate, so there is that.
Since the Russians were victorious they had a lot more combat vets return home, so there would be a big difference there. I'm sure the Soviet army didn't really foster an environment that was conducive to creating psychologically healthy individuals, especially given the encouragement of atrocities and rape during and after the war, so they were bringing home a lot of bad habits, while German men who survived had spent a lot of time in prison camps and being restricted by the Allies, so had a different mentality. Still I've heard alcoholism was rampant among German combat vet survivors after the war.
sillygoose
Well-known member
Look at a map, the part over the Meuse was surrounded on 3 sides, which let the Germans pour fire into it while the bulk of French artillery was on the west bank of the river and having to fire into the area. Yes that is exactly why the Germans attacked. You should check out that book about German strategy and Verdun I linked in another thread, it covers all this and more. Basically the battle of Verdun was screwed up by the Crown Prince (and his CoS) who instead of fighting exactly as the Russians are in the Donbass now (very short advances, lots of artillery fire to inflict heavy losses on the enemy, sparring the infantry by never letting them outside of artillery support range), which was the plan, after the initial success had cracked the French lines he ordered his troops to advance as far and as quickly as possible and leave the artillery behind. That left the German infantry exposed to French artillery without support and defeated the purpose of the entire operation, since now they were left in very unfavorable defensive terrain with lagging artillery. Falkenhayn didn't call off the offensive because faulty intel convinced him that despite the screw up it seemed the plan was working and the French were suffering much heavier losses than they actually were. Petain's rotation system that put new divisions in the meat grinder every two weeks (75% of the army rotated through Verdun) was new and made it seem like French divisions were being destroyed within two weeks; in reality they were being rotated out not due to crippling losses, but due to Petain wanting to spare them having to spend in indefinite amount of time in the Meuse Mill and get wrecked in the process. It spread out the pain so no division was too badly impacted. The Germans meanwhile kept the same units in place and just replaced losses, so had a very different experience of the battle.
If that is your POD losing Verdun is the least of the Allies worries.
sillygoose
Well-known member
If you look at the data the German and Russian charts aren't actually all that different:
German:
Russian:
Both had dips in the 1960s for men, though the Russian one was worse. What I said before is still probably the reason, especially coupled with the material success of Germany relative to Russian by the 1960s. However the East life expectancy being higher than the West is surprising, but perhaps that is the consequence of so many men fleeing west before the Berlin wall went up?
If you look at the data the German and Russian charts aren't actually all that different:
German:
Russian:
Both had dips in the 1960s for men, though the Russian one was worse. What I said before is still probably the reason, especially coupled with the material success of Germany relative to Russian by the 1960s. However the East life expectancy being higher than the West is surprising, but perhaps that is the consequence of so many men fleeing west before the Berlin wall went up?
Even in 1990, East German male life expectancy was around five years higher than Russian male life expectancy. And it's quite interesting how the economic improvements in East Germany after 1990 resulted in the near-convergence of life expectancy in East vs. West Germany by 2000.