Get any of Britain, France, Germany, or Italy involved in a shooting war in Europe during the 1920s that is not a civil war or colonial war, and is fought against the central government forces of another state. The PoD must be after the signature of the Versailles Treaty in 1919.
I admit that idea has crossed my mind, but based on looking at the time and context and discussion of the putsch, I don't think it had much of a chance of establishing a lasting regime even locally in Munich nor Bavaria, much less nationally in Germany.
From CanuckWingnut:
France's occupation of the Rhineland goes very bad, the Weimar Republic is pushed by public opinion into supporting the Freikorps against France.
Britain, France, and/or maybe even Germany intervene in the Polish-Soviet War in support of the Poles.
D'Annunzio's efforts to create a free city of Trieste spark an Italo-Yugoslav war.
From Ambusher11:
Two potential scenarios for a 1920s European war that I can think of off the top of my head:
1) The German government during the Occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 decides to support violent resistance to the occupation, causing a war with France (and potentially with Poland as well).
2) Turkey in 1925-26 decides to try to solve the Mosul question with military force, causing a war with Britain (France, Italy, and/or Greece could potentially get involved in this war as well).
I thought the Greco-Italian crisis over Corfu in 1923 had potential to escalate into a larger war, and could possibly interact in an escalatory manner, with the Ruhr crisis of about the same time.
Quoting myself:
I wonder how some simultaneous crises might interact with each other.
For example- what if the Greeks don't back down over the Corfu incident of Aug-Sep 1923, and Mussolini gets it in his mind to play it more aggressively. In September after a short ultimatum he invades and occupies all of the Ionian islands and coordinates the timing with a Kemalist Turkish attack on western Thrace.
Mussolini also pulls Italy out of the League of Nations.
These actions would cause a sensation throughout Europe. France anBritain would hate them, but risking war to stop them would be another matter. German nationalists would find the Italian and Turkish moves inspiring.
Wouldn't this probably create a climate of opinion in Germany so that Stresseman would not dare end the passive resistance policy?
Would the westerners think of coal sanctioning the Italians? If it were the British leading that charge, perhaps the French would auction their loyalty, and the coal supplies they export and extract from the Saar and the Ruhr, for whichever side, Italian or British, can be brought around to support them unconditionally on the Ruhr occupation issue?
To Italy: 'back us on the Ruhr question, we'll supply you'
To Britain: 'want us to comply with that embargo, support us on the Ruhr question'
Possibly prolonging Ruhr passive resistance, and seeing either the Italians get away with aggression unopposed by the French and British, or, the Italians embroiled in a war with either one, might inspire violent resistance in the Ruhr and a coup leading to a militarist govt or a burgenfried govt of national defense to oppose the occupation.
Overall, British and Dominion responses to the Chanak crisis of 1922 suggest Britain wants no part of an Italian-Greek war.
However, Britain having to witness two consecutive backdowns over two consecutive years, and over the same place- Greece, may reactivate the 'fight' part of Britain's'fight or flight' instincts. Possibly leading to Britain having its back up the rest of the decade and abandoning the 'ten year rule' for example in a world that looks more threatening.
But this timeline is my attempt to start at answering the challenge:
Down with Versailles: The Tirpitz-Von Kahr-Von Seeckt coup of November 1923
From 1922 on, Germany had been in a hyperinflationary and political violence crisis, brought on by the attempt to pay back reparations in inflated currency.
It worsened with the suspension of reparations payments and the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr mining district itself in January 1923.
Out of protest at Franco-Belgian policy and weariness of involvement the Harding Administration chose this moment to withdraw the last American troops from its Rhineland occupation zone, and the French promptly took it over.
The Ruhr occupation stirred German nationalist fervor to new heights and also boosted Communist unrest. It picked at a national trauma, providing flashbacks of defeat and revolution from November 1918, and encouraged rightest fantasizing about, in the worst case, the nation rising in arms against the French as it had during Napoleon's occupation.
The governing democratic parties, like the Social Democrats and Catholic Center who'd been catching over four year of flack and terroristic assassinations, mainly from the political right, for over four years since signing the armistice and three and a half since signing the Versailles Treaty somewhat deflected the latest current of rage from themselves this time by supporting businesses and striking workers in the policy of passive resistance and non-cooperation with the occupiers of the Ruhr as the occupation began.
This provided some ephemeral unity against French bullying, but it didn't last. Times were hard, strike funds started to run low, people were profiteering.
The Communists were making moves or gains electorally or on the streets in some places, including using street militias, in Thuringia, Saxony, and eventually Hamburg.
Right-wing brownshirts from the NSDAP and other rightist groups were agitating elsewhere.
The German right-wing generally dismissed the legitimacy of the Weimar Republic, Constitution, the democratic parties, the Versailles Treaty and all its restrictions and terms.
The main difference among right-wing groups was among those who wanted an open, blunt putsch seizing power by their militias, as they imagined that Mussolini's Fascist 'Blackshirts' had done in his march on Rome. Adolf Hitler's Nazis represented this tendency par excellence.
Other right wingers preferred to subvert and take over the state by quasi legal means. Essentially they wanted the involvement of the Reichswehr, regular police and administration, endorsement of substantial numbers of party politicians, less blood and disorder than the hotheaded brownshirts. This latter group included people like DNVP politician Helfferich, Admiral Tirpitz, Bavarian politician Gustav von Kahr, and even the chief of the Reichswehr, Hans Von Seeckt.
The latter group was not insisting on following the letter of the law or constitution, nor was it above leveraging pressure from right-wing street thugs to gain politicians' acquiescence to handing over power to right-leaning 'deep state' institutions, it did though want to morally/politically weaken its opposition, broaden its tent, and project itself as the party of order rather than the party of riot.
We arrive now at late September 1923. Chancellor Gustav Stresseman, bowing to economic pragmatism, has unleashed a political bombshell on Germany, announcing an end to the the policy of passive resistance in the Ruhr and resuming mining operations.
The letdown is enormous among German patriots even though there's an unspoken hope for some normalcy of pay and business.
In the meantime, Hjalmar Schacht is hard at work preparing to launch, within weeks, a currency stabilization to also bring inflation under control.
But German right-wingers, even some of their business backers like Hugo Stinnes, in September and October 1923, are putting political considerations and national pride ahead of economic ones and are enraged at giving the French the satisfaction of mining the Ruhr's coal for them.
Right-wing militias in towns across Germany, especially Bavaria, have angry rallies and bonfires.
In Bavaria, Gustav Von Kahr gets reappointed to emergency executive powers through his GSK executive organization, suspending parliament and civil liberties.
From Berlin, Alfred Von Tirptiz is working the phones and pressing the flesh with his wide network of right-wing contacts crying in their beer about what looks like a second imminent surrender by weak politicians near the fifth anniversary of when the 'November Criminals' last did it.
Tirpitz consults with these contacts, and with Seeckt, agreeing that the national situation, and the Stresseman policy of appeasement, are intolerable, as are, fundamentally, the Socialist Party, the Center Party the Weimar constitution, democracy, social change ushered in since the end of the war, and the Versailles Treaty order.
They are in agreement however that the situation and solution are delicate however. The solution must be quasi-legal, have 'national' backing, and be 'German' in style, not 'South American' or 'Russian' looking.
So they are in agreement that any outright putsch attempts or terroristic acts by militia leaders like Ehrhardt or Hitler would spoil the moment.
Tirpitz comes to the view that von Kahr, the Bavarian, would be the best dictator, even though some of Tirpitz staff actually see Hitler as being more reliably energetic. Tirpitz by contrast has found Hitler's expressions of anti-semitism too crude and his brownshirts too irritating to the Reichswehr. But he sees von Kahr's Bavarian-ness as an asset, because with him as national dictator, it removes at a stroke the potential for Bavarian separatism to split the country, and broadly pleases the particularist 'states rights' tendencies among right-wingers in many parts of the country.
Having assumed extraordinary powers in Bavaria, von Kahr by the end of October is already in a tense stand-off with the Berlin government of Stresemann and President Ebert.
Von Kahr and his supporters are implicitly and explicitly threatening or hinting at a 'march on Berlin' to depose the 'weak government' but not actually doing it. The Reich government is getting its ducks in a row, hesitating before actually demanding the Reichswehr move against von Kahr's GSK regime in Bavaria
Socialist members of Cabinet and Reichstag (or maybe just Cabinet) and President Ebert, also a Socialist, have already just granted Reichswehr and Seeckt greater powers for enforcing internal order around this time to suppress the Socialist-Communist coalition governments of Thuringia and Saxony, which had established a worker's militia independent of former Reich and state structures and chain of command.
Seeckt had pressed the case for empowering the Reichswehr with reluctant Socialists by arguing that it was a vital precedent needed to use to also suppress right-wing militias as needed.
Now we zero in, in the first week of November 1923, on the discussions between Tirpitz, von Kahr, and von Seeckt. Von Kahr is flattered and gratified to have Tirpitz support and then things become a matter of tactics. Von Kahr wants to do a march to Berlin, but only if the Army will clear a path for him, not if his supporters, his state troops, would step up to get slaughtered en route. Von Kahr is also in communication with Hitler and Ludendorff that they need to wait just a little longer, he is working with other formidable folks to solve Germany's Streseman and Ebert and 'related' problems. Von Kahr also relays back to Tirpitz that he can't wait forever to start marching, if he doesn't move soon, some brownshirt group will set off on their own and try to start 'a brown October' by themselves, which would be bad and strengthen the Weimar parties. He notes that the next 10 days will be critical because of the impending fifth anniversary of the armistice.
Von Kahr's intuition is indeed sound. Hitler is indeed worried that this moment of right-wing enthusiasm will either pass if not acted upon, or will get away from him, with brownshirt lieutenants doing their own thing.
Von Seeckt and Tirpitz remain in contact, thoroughly briefing each other. Von Seeckt reiterates his wish for a better political alignment to arise before acting against the Republican politicians, and reiterates his belief that a brownshirt rightist putsch would be an unwanted mess.
Von Seeckt is consumed with only negative futures going forward. An indefinite Ruhr occupation would be horrible. Indefinite Ruhr occupation would be horrible. A brownshirt putsch would inject new life and support into the Weimar politicians and trade unions. There's no winning.
Here, Helfferich from the DNVP comes into the conversation. He describes the currency stabilization reform he has been working on with Hjalmar Schact and voices his strongest confidence. Once that is adopted in a matter of couple weeks, Germany will turn the corner on inflation. He says he's so confident he's staked his and his family's personal fortunes on the arrival of monetary stability. He says, 'whatever your fears for German honor, defense and kultur, you can feel secure in the new mark and Germany's financial ledger, our people will be unable to miss the transition to stability and a more comfortable life in comparison to the economic nightmare of today, and they will give credit to the government of the day.'
Tirpitz and Von Seeckt take a few moments computing that surprisingly upbeat news, in terms of its implications for their own finances and for the country's situation.
Tirpitz then broadens out the implications, looking at them from many angles and comes to an insight he decides to share.
"Von Seeckt- you lay out some ugly scenarios with some hardship and struggle, no matter what road we take ahead. Premature actions by brownshirts, or even by von Kahr, or by us, may face challenges like red uprisings, or general strikes. Continuation of today's conditions threatens to ruin our mittelstand and great houses alike and proletarianize our people. But at least record numbers of our people today are aware of what is at stake. The German people are far less naïve now than when the November Criminals stabbed us in the back. We agree, yes, that fundamentally, the German nation must choose, choose between God, Country, Army, and Navy of course, authority, Kultur, and society, or Socialism, democracy, degeneracy, and weakness among nations.
This choice needs be made sooner or later. I fear one thing more than the scenarios and obstacles you laid out as prudent and thorough military planner like myself. Based on the currency stabilization and its impact, within months, the German people will feel their material situation turning from night into day. They will associate the government of the day with that sunshine.
If we allow the likes of Ebert and Stresemann, the November Criminals of '18 and the Center Party and Red Peace Resolvers of '17 and their democratic parliament to continue the government while this happens, it could validate them with the German people, with German youth, with German capitalists, for years to come! It could validate democracy, socialist trade unionism, cultural degeneracy and laxity and breed complacency about national honor and defense. I do not want to live in that country!
I much prefer to live in a country, where this Christmas, we have authority instead of democracy, kultur instead degenerate license, patriotism instead of appeasement, respect for property instead of socialism, where the people see they have been given these by leaders who share these values and that they are prospering every day because of it.
…and those party politicians?…failed, failed, failed."
To which Von Seeckt replies, 'so we need to act now to drive the prosperity omnibus, so that red clowns like Ebert, and paper shufflers like Stresseman can't drive it forever? I get it. But how do we get this done, and justify it?'
From there, Tirpitz ponders for awhile.
A short while later, he begins to describe his plan to Von Seeckt, it involves a viral campaign of messages to the right-wing and centrist press and radio alleging that Ebert, and all the Socialists in government, en bloc, were *extremely* resistant to giving the Army authority to clean up the Saxony and Thuringia leftist militia mess, and them their Reichstag members were cheering for the Reichswehr to fail.
It also involves a campaign of false-flag and rumored Communist attacks, alleged assassinations, and militia organizing activities.
Within 48 hours there non-brownshirt demonstrators in many cities in Berlin calling for order and the Army.
Also, Gustav von Kahr is speaking with sympathetic media and making appearances and writing joint circular letters with other like minded right wing state leaders saying the federal government is failing at the task of national defense and keeping order and continually suggesting, perhaps initially posing it as a question – isn't time Germany had a Chancellor, or a Reichpresident who could implement nationally some of our great order-keeping techniques from Bavaria?
A day after that, von Kahr is invited by the Reichswehr troop commanders in Saxony and Thuringia to address his 'support to the troops' and make some remarks disparaging those who did not support them, and advertise the 'Bavarian way' to meetings with local middle and upper class or clergy folk.
Days before the OTL Beer Hall putsch, this therefore takes him out of town as a target, and shows him to be taunting and challenging the current government to the cheers of all right-wingers.
Cue forward to a couple more days of strikes, but also right wing demonstrations, the military telling politicians they 'can't guarantee safety', continued false flag and now real Communist activity, and then the Reichswehr under Seeckt secures resignations, gets a compliant group to hand over temporary emergency powers, and von Kahr is installed as the leading figure of the new dictatorial junta, with von Tirpitz and Helfferich as other leading figures.
They retain the economic services of Hjalmar Schact and implement currency reform.
Both "moderate" and extreme right-wingers start having celebrations while left-wingers have riots and have police and military force used in full against them.
In their exuberance, two Prussian members of the inner circle suggest a ceremony a couple nights into the new regime when the streets are relative calm and secure.
It involves Gustav von Kahr, with other regime figures and an honor guard driving down to the Bismarck memorial to handpicked supportive crowds, giving a speech about the new era for Germany, holding up a German language version of the Versailles Treaty, and lighting it on fire, and clapping while it burns. Tirpitz, to everyone's surprise misses the affair, complaining of sudden intestinal influenza.*
*This ceremony was modeled after Martin Luther's burning of a Papal order – Prussians came up with it, remember. Tirpitz was frankly embarrassed by it. It was too showy. He also frankly thought it would fall flat with Germany's Catholics or be outright offensive. Von Kahr actually was cool with the idea. Maybe he didn't get the historic reference. Nobody saw fit to explain to him. Tirpitz didn't want to pick an argument over this of all things, but he didn't want to be there.
Multiple plans for rightist quasi-legal takeover (Beer Hall putsch [fall 1923] & the Buchrucker putsch [slightly later] was one of the cruder events)
[but there were many assassinations and gangs at this time]
Scheming continued after those into winter and spring of 1924. [ie, a recovering, stabilizing Germany wasn't out of the woods yet]
Also, right-wing was not *just* trash-talking, even 'sober nationalists', more 'mainstream' figures or 'non-kooks' like Tirptiz or the DNVP's Karl Helfferich were contemplating war with France and its eastern allies [which at the time must have meant Poland and the Little Entente].
Were ready to do high-risk confrontations and bluffs to get rid reparations and Allied controls in the short-run.
Right disagreed on whether domestic regime change or foreign confrontation had to happen first. Hitler believed domestic regime change first, Tirpitz thought foreign confrontation would help domestic regime change.
Tirpitz papers were much of the source – he was DNVP's May 1924 candidate
Datapoint – Reichswehr Chief of Staff Von Seeckt had extraordinary powers granted to him in fall 1923 [My note – in Japan, the military used suppression of an extremist coup, in a roundabout way, to concede to their extremist foreign and defense policy preferences]
Dates severest crisis from 1922-24 – because inflation?
Open versus quasi-legal putschism divide in the right
Quasi-legal model was bullying appointment of Gustav Von Kahr to be in charge of Bavaria in 1920.
All rightists opposed Stresseman's Fall 1923 approach
Plan – suspend payments and inspections and rearm for a few years, get France to see writing on the wall, and they will leave Rhineland. Deter France with prospect of guerilla war. If invaded, fight a guerrilla war.
Optimistic assumptions –
Covert British aid for Germany!
Soviets and Lithuanians would tie down joint Polish action with claims, threats, or offensive action against Warsaw government
Risky but desparate.
Tirpitz saw Kahr as a good champ for a right-wing order, a good dictator.
Some of his staff preferred Hitler. Kahr's desire was unclear.
Tirpitz didn't like what he got from meeting Hitler nor the anti-semistism.
-Key date – Ruhr occupation begins, 11 January, 1923
Boosted nationalism, but government deflected rage from itself by supporting passive resistance
Reichswehr paramilitary preps; Tirpitz put contingency warplans ahead of takeover plans for the moment.
Sept 26, 1923 – Stresseman calls off passive resistance – should expect that to be a moment of national rage/frustration – Communists and Bavaria did flip out
Between October Buchrucher putsch and November Beer Hall putsch there was a DVP plot to join the DNVP and Army for a quasi-legal putsch – [this could be the key moment] [PoD avoid the hesitation of some key players, see endnote 27].
Tirpitz still saw Kahr as the best & he was indeed reempowered and started defying Stresseman in October. Stinnes agreed (he hadn't quite been onboard before). Tirpitz goal – new govt in Berlin, limit parliamentary power, defiant foreign policy, restore federal rights (esp for patriotic states like Bavaria).
Early November, Tirpitz thought he was winning over middle parties in Prussia. [But Tirpitz was insistent that Hitlers were spoilers not icebreakers]
Tirpitz had people check with Seeckt to confirm he shared dictatorial goal, which the latter said he did, but he said be careful, and a Hitler move could spoil things.
Basically in early Nov 1923, Kahr was slowly trying to pick the right moment in coordination with Berlin players while Hitler wanted to seize the moment while it was still a moment and make it his own. (endnote 33 – Adolf worried it would pass or his own guys would go their own ways)
Gap – Did Kahr & GSK consider joint march with Ludy, Adolf and others to Berlin? Seemed to prefer Berlin collaborators (did it have to be binary choice?)
Kahr probably liked to leverage threat of unified march to threaten/restrain/pressure both sides.
But Beer Hall happened 8-9 November.
Quasi-legal schemes still survived the Hitler trial.
Seeckt handed supreme executive powers November 8th. Considered his own regime.
He told somebody he waiting for Wilhelm Marx govt to fail, then move.
New Prussian plot – two Prussian rightists proposed the new dictator hold a rally publicly burning the treaty – Idea forwarded, Seeckt noncommittal, Tirpitz refused to consider. Kahr took it seriously, but had been discredited.
Seeckt increasingly saw takeover as inopportune after November 1923 currency stabilization.
President revoked army emergency powers in March 1924.
Winter 23-24 – Italians discussed supporting German rearmament
The Italian rep interviewed DNVP boys, Cramon and Helfferich, who thought Seeckt would pressure for right-wing Chancellor in early 1924, maybe Tirpitz. Mussolini sent Capello as a rep. The right-wing coalition expected to do well in elections, exclude the left, curtail democracy. Saw French intervention as a risk but thought it could be overcome by military, paramilitary, popular resistance & foreign aid.
Mussolini did give arms. But he also may have snitched to British about rearmament effort.
Industry and agribusiness lobbies switched from being pro-coup and came down on cooling international tensions in return for obtaining foreign credits and not screwing that up rather than risking that, in spring 1924.
Next- Tirpitz March-April 1924 plot – Prussian landed elite wanted Reichswehr support to place him as Chancellor. Seeckt said he wouldn't force anything. Tirpitz continued political bid through May 1924, wanted Army support. That failed.
Author's conclusion – unrealistic hopes for success against foreign opposition. In Feb 1924, the author of the people's war plan admitted the concept wouldn't be practical until before 1926.
Even had the establishment of a rightist dictatorship succeeded, civil war and increased communist unrest would most likely have resulted, hardly an auspicious beginning of a war of liberation.
A Spanish Civil War type situation?
Why did they do it? Caught up in the emotion and pride. The ideas were put aside, into eclipse, but they became realistic again later on.
Get any of Britain, France, Germany, or Italy involved in a shooting war in Europe during the 1920s that is not a civil war or colonial war, and is fought against the central government forces of another state. The PoD must be after the signature of the Versailles Treaty in 1919.
England elites supported after 1918 germany against France,and wonted Poland gone.
So,you could imagine germany +England against France + Poland + Italy.
Soviets would wait to attack winner.
So, before I decide what the next moves are by the new rightist German regime, whether they limit themselves to internal purges, rearmament on land they control and symbolic anti-Versailles, anti-Allied actions, or go further, for example in resuming the Ruhr passive resistance and sit-down strikes, or further than that to guerrilla war and sniping in the occupied Ruhr and possibly French zones of the Rhineland, and then consider how the French would react to any new level of rhetorical, symbolic, or physically violent level of German pushback in late 1923 and 1924, I would like to consult others opinions, including those who have weighed in on scenarios of the Germans being more stubborn at other points, like rejecting Versailles in the first place, in my Scheideman Groener scenario - @Skallagrim, or the Germans not suing for an armistice in 1918 at all - Cool-headed Ludy - @Buba.
Basically some factors to keep in mind are that some of these right-wing German figures in 1923 thought they could get away with a 'war of resistance' against the French over the Ruhr and rally the nation, and tire the French out, forcing the latter to walk out empty-handed, sort of like Turkey's performance against the Greeks a few years prior.
Whether they were completely mistaken in their estimate or not, is a different question.
The optimistic estimation/assumption they made for why the German side could prevail in confrontation with the Franco-Belgians at the time, despite the presence of their occupation forces in German industrial zones (Rhine and Ruhr) with forces armed with heavy weapons and the grossly underarmed and undermanned German forces was their low estimation of French national unity and morale, and importantly, their belief that Franco-British relations were ruptured beyond repair by this point.
They (the Germans) had it in their heads that not only would the British (and the Americans) not support the French and Belgians in a fight over the Ruhr, but that Britain would secretly support the German side, to curb France from getting too strong as an imperial rival.
In this connection, I wonder if it ever occurred to these German rightists in the 1920s that it might have been an Achilles heel of theirs, or at least 'bad advertising' to have *Admiral Tirpitz* as one of their leading public figures and candidates. Might his presence make London think that this new German triumvirate would be just no good for Britain?
The Germans also thought that they could count out effective Polish support for the French from the east in any confrontation, because the Soviets would both be better disposed toward Germany, and use the occasion to press for border revisionist claims against Poland, and Lithuania would also use the occasion to push for border revisionist claims against Poland.
Now once again, how would attempting to overthrow the Versailles order in November 1923, during the Ruhr crisis, compare with rejecting the treaty, in June 1919. On the one hand, Germany is even further disarmed. On the other, French wartime vigilance is further relaxed. On yet another hand, both sides have gotten a couple years comparative respite to sleep and eat with more regularity. France has had a longer period to drift apart from the UK. The US has gotten out entirely. @Skallagrim:
Now here's the crux: occupying Germany is impossible at this stage. There is no manpower to do it, there is no will to do it, the Entente is ruined, too...
Which means that the Entente might actually lose, if they perpetuate the war. So they have no choice. They keel over. They offer Germany a better proposal, and they invite Germany to the table.
The scenario of renewed conflict in the (early) '20s is, of course, quite different from the scenario that I talked about. Also much harder to predict.
Very long story short: it comes down to a willingness to act. If France says "fuck it... and fuck you", then the Germans are screwed. They were not in a good position. If France fears a return to the horrors of war too much, and fears standing alone too much, then they hesitate and hem and haw too much, and Germany presents them with a fait accompli. Disarmed French soldiers return home in disgrace after being paroled, and France agrees to drop any reparation claims it has against Germany. (Nothing much beyond that, but it's a huge triumph for Germany, and they'll be emboldened for... future ventures.)
That's it. That's the essential matter. Same as what I talked about, but the other way around. Here, it's France that must not blink.
Remember, a "resumed Great War" in the face of the draconian edicts of Versailles is a matter where Germany fights because it perceives the alternative as functional annihilation-- or at least permanent loss of status as a power of consequence. It's precisely because Versailles was so evidently unfair that it's plausible that the Germans could be made to believe that. And if they believe it, then it's an existential struggle for them... while it's a horrible interminable occupation duty for the bone-tired enemy.
A few years later, in OTL, Versailles has been imposed. "We must stop this-- or perish!" is no longer a credible thesis. The German drive, now, is to rise again... by whatever means may be available. They're not fighting like lions with nothing left to lose, pushed to the edge of an abyss. They're in the abyss, and the drop wasn't fatal. That's a different perspective.
For France, too. At the war's end, they were exhausted. But now, a few years have passed. The immediacy of the horrors has been reduced. They have achieved their goal. Now... to keep their gains! That's tricky. OTL shows that the Western powers wanted to avoid renewed war at all costs. They were willing to make deals with Hitler to avert hostility. They were willing to blink. But on the other hand: Hitler played it cleverly. And his moves were all in the thirties, when Germany had started to rebuild, and the wider world had faced an economic crash of significant proportions.
The early twenties are another story. Germany has been rather... dismantled. It was spared the destruction of the war, but its military has been neutered. It's dealing with internal unrest. The paramilitary entities that will eventually restore some form of structure have not yet been properly organised. Germany is a mess. If Germany goes directly against France at this point, the Frenxh consideration might be: "if we don't stop them now... they'll do it all again."
Because this isn't Hitler making false promises. This isn't Germany nibbling away in the East. This is Germany going against France directly, a few years after the last war. The French have good reason to fear that if Germany is just allowed to fuck around again, there will be a new war on short notice. They also have good reason to think that the longer they wait to stop Germany, the harder it'll be.
On the other hand, they're afraid of another fight. They may also think: "if we just end the occupation and agree to call it quits on the reparations, maybe that'll be the end of it."
Those two impulses will be going toe-to-toe, and the outcome decides the fate of Europe.
We must keep in mind that Britain, being more removed, will almost certainly go for the latter notion, and stay out. Britain will not be on Germany's side -- that's delusional nonsense, same way the Germans fooled themselves into thinking Britain wouldn't really mind about Belgium -- but I don't see them landing armies to help France out. Britain will support the idea of "renegotiating" Versailles to avert war. France shouldn't count on Poland, either. Poland is a basket case at the time, and also justifiably paranoid about the USSR. They won't risk it.
So, that's where we are, right back at the beginning. France, by its lonesome, can beat Germany here. They can crush the German militarists early, and disgrace their whole movement forever. The question is: does France have the stomach for it? What do they fear more: the risk of a winnable war right now, or the risk of a potentially unwinnable war but later?
One of the biggest things that any of the Germany fights on or Germany comes back scenarios, whether the PoD is 1918, 1919, or 1923, is that Russia is pretty much a non-factor in the outcome. This is a huge, world-changing difference compared with our WWII in OTL 1940s or one in the 1930s after Soviet industrialization.
Germany either gets lucky and keeps it sovereignty and freedom of action and ability to go for more rounds, possibly before the Depression, or more likely, it loses, by western hands alone, possibly just French, and we are looking at German militarism discredited into the 50s, 60s or beyond.
One of the biggest things that any of the Germany fights on or Germany comes back scenarios, whether the PoD is 1918, 1919, or 1923, is that Russia is pretty much a non-factor in the outcome. This is a huge, world-changing difference compared with our WWII in OTL 1940s or one in the 1930s after Soviet industrialization.
Germany either gets lucky and keeps it sovereignty and freedom of action and ability to go for more rounds, possibly before the Depression, or more likely, it loses, by western hands alone, possibly just French, and we are looking at German militarism discredited into the 50s, 60s or beyond.
1918 - germans would have chance,if they do not launch their offensive against Allies this year.After that,they were screwed.
1919 - the same.
1923 - Poland alone could beat them.And smart enough to undarstandt,that german "freedom of action" mean enslaved Poland.
People then were no traitors,and most was smart.
