AG-Center retreats just before Bagration, avoids destruction

[sillygoose]

Not sure if anyone is even interested, but the situation for Army Group North Ukraine in this scenario is quite interesting upon further reading. If AG-Center is able to pull back and not require reinforcement to hold their new line through 1944 or at least until October or November 1944 that leaves AG-North Ukraine in a surprisingly strong position as it would have 3 extra panzer divisions (4th, 5th, and 7th) it lacked IOTL on day 1 of the Soviet offensive in July, since they were diverted to AG-Center. They would also have 6 infantry divisions that were diverted as well (per the Germany and the Second World War series 9 divisions were transferred from the Ukraine area to Belarus before the Soviet offensive in July against North Ukraine).

Not only that in the first wave of potential reinforcements the 3rd and 5th SS Panzer divisions and the Grossdeutschland division as well as the 24th panzer division would all be available within a week if needed, while in the second wave the 6th, 19th, and Hermann Goering panzer divisions plus the IV SS corps with its supporting elements would all be available in 2 weeks. Even if only part of that was made available that being made available should be enough to stop the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts in July-August. The situation in Romania gets dicey in late August if more than the 3rd SS division is removed (24th panzer and GD division also were in Romania) though. Question is whether Stalin cuts reinforcements to the 2nd Ukrainian Front if the offensive against AG-North Ukraine stalls.

 

[ATP]

Not possible given the terrain. 420km was the most they ever achieved in 1945 in much more open terrain and even then only by going wheel to wheel. Of course then they weren't trying to fight through a river line and with forests and swamps in the way.


Not going to really help given the terrain.


Terrain is a problem with identifying anything.


Didn't help from 1941- early 44.


That's nice and all, but won't really help given the swamps, forests, and river line, not to mention fortified cities. Again Bagration only worked due to a bunch of partisans behind the lines and Hitler being stupid and ordering them to hold overextended lines. Up until June 1944 such tactics just resulted in a lot of dead Russians.


Didn't prior to June IOTL and even then only due to the overextended lines resulting from the retreat in Ukraine.
They major retreat to the Beaver Line/Berezina river would entire throw off the Soviet offensive and then dramatically complicate any effort to actually breach it given the terrain, shortness of the line, reserves generated by the shortening of the line, and the resulting lack of partisans behind the line to complicate supply. Meanwhile the Soviet supply lines are made worse by the retreat, they lose all their partisan intelligence/force multiplier, and now they cannot deploy all the available forces in the first line and overload the Germans anywhere near the degree they did IOTL.


While in principle I agree, given the specific situation in Belarus had they pulled back to the Beaver Line the Soviets could be held at that line until 1945.

1.Soviets could gather even close to 1000 guns per km,and they had few lines of fieldguns wheel by wheel.It was even better for them,becouse only one crew in unit knew how to properly aim,rest only knew how to quick reload.
Terrain? no problem for them,soviets could operate on terrain impossible for germans.

2.Yes,penal bttalion would help - becouse either german start schooting and soviet artillery officers found their bunkers and destroy them in next barrage,or not and penal battalions would kill them.
And soviets ALWAYS had enough penal units to use.

3.Then,instead on one wawe of penal units,soviets would send 3 before major push.By that time there would be no much german left to fight.

4.In 1941 soviet surrender without fight,and before 1942 and 1944 they never remember to get artillery observers with infrantry and made tanks and infrantry cooperate.Only in 1944 they learned that.

5.Hitler would order german stop - and soviets need maybe 50km of good terrain to advance.To be honest,less.

6.Soviets still had Lens-Lease,which mean enough trucks to deliver stuff.And railroad brigades with american trains making new roads.With additional times they would deliver stuff from trains almost on frontlines.
And there was still enough partisants to gather info on Belarus.If not soviet,then polish Home Army - we were idiots and helped soviets with that.They thanked us in gulags.

7.If Hitler agreed to jump from one river to another,yes - but with his no retreat order,soviets would destroy germans in winter 1944 or earlier.
Only difference - part of Balkans free,becouse Sralin would send everything he have to germany through Poland.Maybe East germany would be bigger.

Good thing for Europe - free Yugoslavia,Hungary and maybe Bulgary would be stronger now,and germnas weaker.

 

[sillygoose]

1.Soviets could gather even close to 1000 guns per km,and they had few lines of fieldguns wheel by wheel.It was even better for them,becouse only one crew in unit knew how to properly aim,rest only knew how to quick reload.
Terrain? no problem for them,soviets could operate on terrain impossible for germans.

There are human limits. Infantry being able to move through swamps and forests doesn't mean the Soviets could get artillery packed in those areas. For one thing the restricted front would prevent deployment of that amount of artillery or even as much as IOTL as they focused their guns in specific bits of the front line; their ultimate artillery concentration actually achieved in the war was 420 guns per km and that was only achieved by packing them in like sardines within range of the targets and because the Germans as of January 1945 were not conducting much preemptive counter battery fire, which would have made the tactic suicidal.

When you dismiss practical limitations you're getting into Soviet-boo territory. Besides even if the Soviets did, which would take 4-5 months to achieve if the Vistula offensive is our model for such things as it was the greatest concentration of Soviet artillery ever, and the Germans kept up their tactic of withdrawing to a main resistance line before the Soviet artillery bombardment (Soviet sophistication with 'dummy bombardments' was a later innovation), it largely negates the impact as it had in Rzhev throughout 1942, Smolensk in summer 1943, and the winter 1943-44 Belorussian battles.

2.Yes,penal bttalion would help - becouse either german start schooting and soviet artillery officers found their bunkers and destroy them in next barrage,or not and penal battalions would kill them.
And soviets ALWAYS had enough penal units to use.

1942-43 demonstrates that in this area the presence of such units meant nothing to do with the success of operations. They had their uses, but hardly guaranteed success. The Bagration offensive success IOTL had more to do with the stripping of AG-Center of reserves to use elsewhere and Busch allowing his forces to get locked in fire-sacks (like Vitebsk) that in this scenario would be eliminated.

3.Then,instead on one wawe of penal units,soviets would send 3 before major push.By that time there would be no much german left to fight.

Penal units were wiped out long before German defenders were. Given that a pull back like this would force the Soviets to reset their entire offensive preparations that gives the Germans a minimum of 3 months to further dig in beyond what they had already done before the pullback (IOTL the Beaver line was already prepared). If you want a later example of when such things failed see the Courland pocket. Despite 6 major offensives to destroy it from late 1944 through 1945 it was the last army group to surrender and it did so undefeated given that they were able to use the terrain and restricted frontage to their advantage. No amount of artillery or penal battalions succeeded. It had similar terrain and restricted frontage (men per km) as Courland.

4.In 1941 soviet surrender without fight,and before 1942 and 1944 they never remember to get artillery observers with infrantry and made tanks and infrantry cooperate.Only in 1944 they learned that.

Sure, but that didn't guarantee success, see Courland from 1944-45 that resisted all Soviet offensives to crush them. Very similar situation and with a general who was considered a favorite of Hitler's.
If you can read German this link has a ton of info about that series of offensives:

Kurland-Kessel 1944/45

Informationen über die 6 Kurlandschlachten im Kurland-Kessel im Jahr 1944/45, sowie über die dort eingesetzten Divisionen. Bild und Kartenmaterial und Links zur Suche nach dort vermissten Angehörigen.

www.kurland-kessel.de

Life and Death Struggle for the Courland Bridgehead

Life and Death Struggle for the Courland Bridgehead By Ludwig Heinrich Dyck Trapped in a pocket with their backs to the Baltic Sea, the German Army Group of “Fortress Courland” fought v…

ludwigheinrichdyck.wordpress.com

Despite the utter hopeless, the hardships and the eminent collapse of the Third Reich, the soldiers of AGK were ready to fight on. During the six great battles of Courland, the Germans had inflicted 400,000 enemy casualties and destroyed 2600 tanks and 700 aircraft. They had beaten back every Soviet attack.

Or read up on Narva.

5.Hitler would order german stop - and soviets need maybe 50km of good terrain to advance.To be honest,less.

Again see Narva and Courland. Bagration worked due to special circumstances that would be eliminated by a pull back to a prepared line, even if from that point on such retreats were not allowed.

6.Soviets still had Lens-Lease,which mean enough trucks to deliver stuff.And railroad brigades with american trains making new roads.With additional times they would deliver stuff from trains almost on frontlines.
And there was still enough partisants to gather info on Belarus.If not soviet,then polish Home Army - we were idiots and helped soviets with that.They thanked us in gulags.

Sure, but there were limits to LL. The Soviets only got 1/3rd of what the British did due to limitations in port capacities, shipping availability, and transport inland within the USSR. So while the Soviets had considerable amounts of things via LL and domestic production they did not have unlimited amounts of everything. As we saw from the long breaks between major offensives for a front area even with all of the LL it still took months between major operations for Soviet front areas to be able to attack again. I cited the withdrawal from Rzhev in early 1943; after that it took the Soviets from March 31st 1943 until August 1943 to attack again. When they didn't pause after a major operation, like their autumn/winter 1943-44 offensives in Belarus right after the Smolensk operation, they were very badly defeated:

The Red Army's Operation Bagration that liberated Belorussia in June 1944 sits like a colossus in the annals of World War II history. What is little noted in the history books, however, is that the Bagration offensive was not the Soviets’ first attempt. Battle for Belorussia tells the story of how, eight months earlier, and acting under the direction of Stalin and his Stavka, three Red Army fronts conducted multiple simultaneous and successive operations along a nearly 400-mile front in an effort to liberate Belorussia and capture Minsk, its capital city. The campaign, with over 700,000 casualties, was a Red Army failure.

Glantz describes in detail the series of offensives, with their markedly different and ultimately disappointing results, that, contrary to later accounts, effectively shifted Stalin’s focus to the Ukraine as a more manageable theater of military operations. Restoring the first Belorussian offensive to its place in history, this work also reveals for the first time what the later, successful Bagration operation owed to its forgotten precursor.

7.If Hitler agreed to jump from one river to another,yes - but with his no retreat order,soviets would destroy germans in winter 1944 or earlier.

Again if that were true they should have been able to wipe out the Courland pocket easily or Narva. Bagration was able to succeed due to special circumstances, circumstances that would have been eliminated by the withdrawal to the Beaver line shown in the map in earlier posts. At that point the terrain, removal of major partisan forces to the rear, shortening of the line to concentrate troops and free up reserves, and restricting of deployment areas for Soviet troops and artillery plus of course forcing them to cross a major river to be able to even attack would have all prevented an easy Soviet victory leaving them only the option of another series of extremely costly frontal assaults without opportunity to launch a 'deep battle' that was so successful IOTL.

That doesn't mean they couldn't create the circumstances progressively by a series of offensives like they did from August 1943-April 1944 IOTL, but the cost of such operations would have been so horrible that it is unlikely that the Soviets have enough reserves left to get to the Vistula via the routes north of the Pripyat Marshes given that they aren't getting access to the fighting age male population under German occupation to conscript replacements.

Only difference - part of Balkans free,becouse Sralin would send everything he have to germany through Poland.Maybe East germany would be bigger.

Good thing for Europe - free Yugoslavia,Hungary and maybe Bulgary would be stronger now,and germnas weaker.

That's the thing, if the Belorussian route is stymied in summer 1944 Stalin would do what he did the pervious Autumn-Winter 1943-spring 1944: attack in Ukraine. That is where my last post comes into play, because with AG-North and Center able to hold their lines through the summer of 1944 then reserves aren't needed there and they can all be focused on the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts attacking AG-North Ukraine. IOTL due to Bagration they were stripped of 9 divisions and left with only 4 German panzer divisions and 1 Hungarian armored division.

As pointed out in that last post they'd have had 3 more German panzer divisions and 6 infantry divisions, including the very powerful 5th panzer division with it's tiger battalion and full panzer battalions just on day 1 of the Soviet offensive. The first wave of reinforcements that could arrive in a week if needed would be 2 ss panzer divisions, 1 Heer panzer division, and the GD division. After that a 2nd wave arriving within 2 weeks would be another 3 panzer divisions including the HG division from Italy plus the IV ss corps. That should all be enough to stop a Soviet breakthrough anywhere in AG-North Ukraine's area, which would allow them to retreat to another defensive line (Hitler did allow that IOTL) if needed. So the Soviets don't reach the Vistula in 1944, no Warsaw Uprising, the Baltic states remain unoccupied, etc. in 1944.

The question is Romania; if forced to strip it out of reserves like IOTL to counter the major Soviet offensive in Ukraine and then potentially needing reserves to help AG-Center/North in Autumn Romania could fall per OTL, while then leaves the situation in Hungary and the Balkans like OTL except with extra Axis forces not destroyed ITTL who could be used to launch more effective counter offensives at Debrecen.

However if after the Ukraine operation over summer reserves are able to return to Romania then the Axis troops there might have a chance to retreat in good order rather than being trapped per OTL, which changes the Balkan situation considerably even if Romania still tries to change sides. I'm thinking the divisions that would be able to come back would the GD division and 2 Heer panzer divisions. The IV ss corps and its two divisions would likely be needed to defend Poland in the Lublin area, the HG division would be needed to form the HG panzer corps that was set to be ready later in 1944 and was forming in Poland but could well end up deployed to support AG-Center if needed, and most of the rest of the Heer panzer divisions would probably have to stay with AG-North Ukraine to make up for infantry divisions losses during the Soviet offensive.

So that should leave AG-NU with 2nd Hungarian armored divisions, 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 16th, and 17th Panzer divisions, and the IV SS panzer corps (3rd and 5th ss panzer), aka more than double what they had IOTL, while the 19th and 24th panzer divisions and GD division could return to Romania. That isn't counting panzergrenadier divisions. Then the HG corps could end up with AG-Center. It is possible then that they could hold the line through 1944, especially if the powerful units they were forming in summer 1944 in the east get to finish forming (feldherrenhalle division, HG corps, IV ss panzer corps, Russian 29th ss division). Plus if the Ukrainian SS division aren't wiped out that summer and west Ukraine is held then there is an important recruiting ground for manpower going forward. Given manpower shortages if the RONA SS division is able to form without having to be diverted to fight in Warsaw they too could end up being a significant force as there were 2 Russian ss divisions being formed. IOTL after the Warsaw situation was under control they were dispersed elsewhere, but ITTL they'd probably end up formed into a corps and used in the East where desertion would be much tougher than in France where one of the divisions ended up and parts defected to the French resistance. Of course without the defeats of summer 1944 their morale would have been much higher and they'd be less likely to defect given that there would be hope of actually surviving on the Axis side.

If the line holds that would deprive the Soviets of vital replacements in occupied territory, while preventing Balkan Axis allies to defect, Finland might remain in the war which would tie down vital Soviet manpower, while plans to start using Russian and Ukrainian manpower would have a chance to work. Plus Baltic manpower could be tapped even more without having those states lost to the Soviets in 1944. Not only that but without losing large amounts of territory or having units wiped out wholesale equipment losses would actually be manageable, which is a massive gain over OTL. Not only that, but production centers in Poland and Hungary, which had been built up to be out of range of Wallied bombers, would still be active as would the production of raw materials from their deposits in those countries, which means going into late 1944/early 1945 the Axis would have a lot more equipment, firepower, and supplies they lacked IOTL.

The situation in the west is a whole other discussion in this scenario, but if the eastern front holds that changes the situation in the west considerably.

 

[ATP]

There are human limits. Infantry being able to move through swamps and forests doesn't mean the Soviets could get artillery packed in those areas. For one thing the restricted front would prevent deployment of that amount of artillery or even as much as IOTL as they focused their guns in specific bits of the front line; their ultimate artillery concentration actually achieved in the war was 420 guns per km and that was only achieved by packing them in like sardines within range of the targets and because the Germans as of January 1945 were not conducting much preemptive counter battery fire, which would have made the tactic suicidal.

When you dismiss practical limitations you're getting into Soviet-boo territory. Besides even if the Soviets did, which would take 4-5 months to achieve if the Vistula offensive is our model for such things as it was the greatest concentration of Soviet artillery ever, and the Germans kept up their tactic of withdrawing to a main resistance line before the Soviet artillery bombardment (Soviet sophistication with 'dummy bombardments' was a later innovation), it largely negates the impact as it had in Rzhev throughout 1942, Smolensk in summer 1943, and the winter 1943-44 Belorussian battles.


1942-43 demonstrates that in this area the presence of such units meant nothing to do with the success of operations. They had their uses, but hardly guaranteed success. The Bagration offensive success IOTL had more to do with the stripping of AG-Center of reserves to use elsewhere and Busch allowing his forces to get locked in fire-sacks (like Vitebsk) that in this scenario would be eliminated.


Penal units were wiped out long before German defenders were. Given that a pull back like this would force the Soviets to reset their entire offensive preparations that gives the Germans a minimum of 3 months to further dig in beyond what they had already done before the pullback (IOTL the Beaver line was already prepared). If you want a later example of when such things failed see the Courland pocket. Despite 6 major offensives to destroy it from late 1944 through 1945 it was the last army group to surrender and it did so undefeated given that they were able to use the terrain and restricted frontage to their advantage. No amount of artillery or penal battalions succeeded. It had similar terrain and restricted frontage (men per km) as Courland.


Sure, but that didn't guarantee success, see Courland from 1944-45 that resisted all Soviet offensives to crush them. Very similar situation and with a general who was considered a favorite of Hitler's.
If you can read German this link has a ton of info about that series of offensives:

Kurland-Kessel 1944/45

Informationen über die 6 Kurlandschlachten im Kurland-Kessel im Jahr 1944/45, sowie über die dort eingesetzten Divisionen. Bild und Kartenmaterial und Links zur Suche nach dort vermissten Angehörigen.

www.kurland-kessel.de

Life and Death Struggle for the Courland Bridgehead

Life and Death Struggle for the Courland Bridgehead By Ludwig Heinrich Dyck Trapped in a pocket with their backs to the Baltic Sea, the German Army Group of “Fortress Courland” fought v…

ludwigheinrichdyck.wordpress.com

Or read up on Narva.


Again see Narva and Courland. Bagration worked due to special circumstances that would be eliminated by a pull back to a prepared line, even if from that point on such retreats were not allowed.


Sure, but there were limits to LL. The Soviets only got 1/3rd of what the British did due to limitations in port capacities, shipping availability, and transport inland within the USSR. So while the Soviets had considerable amounts of things via LL and domestic production they did not have unlimited amounts of everything. As we saw from the long breaks between major offensives for a front area even with all of the LL it still took months between major operations for Soviet front areas to be able to attack again. I cited the withdrawal from Rzhev in early 1943; after that it took the Soviets from March 31st 1943 until August 1943 to attack again. When they didn't pause after a major operation, like their autumn/winter 1943-44 offensives in Belarus right after the Smolensk operation, they were very badly defeated:




Again if that were true they should have been able to wipe out the Courland pocket easily or Narva. Bagration was able to succeed due to special circumstances, circumstances that would have been eliminated by the withdrawal to the Beaver line shown in the map in earlier posts. At that point the terrain, removal of major partisan forces to the rear, shortening of the line to concentrate troops and free up reserves, and restricting of deployment areas for Soviet troops and artillery plus of course forcing them to cross a major river to be able to even attack would have all prevented an easy Soviet victory leaving them only the option of another series of extremely costly frontal assaults without opportunity to launch a 'deep battle' that was so successful IOTL.

That doesn't mean they couldn't create the circumstances progressively by a series of offensives like they did from August 1943-April 1944 IOTL, but the cost of such operations would have been so horrible that it is unlikely that the Soviets have enough reserves left to get to the Vistula via the routes north of the Pripyat Marshes given that they aren't getting access to the fighting age male population under German occupation to conscript replacements.


That's the thing, if the Belorussian route is stymied in summer 1944 Stalin would do what he did the pervious Autumn-Winter 1943-spring 1944: attack in Ukraine. That is where my last post comes into play, because with AG-North and Center able to hold their lines through the summer of 1944 then reserves aren't needed there and they can all be focused on the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts attacking AG-North Ukraine. IOTL due to Bagration they were stripped of 9 divisions and left with only 4 German panzer divisions and 1 Hungarian armored division.

As pointed out in that last post they'd have had 3 more German panzer divisions and 6 infantry divisions, including the very powerful 5th panzer division with it's tiger battalion and full panzer battalions just on day 1 of the Soviet offensive. The first wave of reinforcements that could arrive in a week if needed would be 2 ss panzer divisions, 1 Heer panzer division, and the GD division. After that a 2nd wave arriving within 2 weeks would be another 3 panzer divisions including the HG division from Italy plus the IV ss corps. That should all be enough to stop a Soviet breakthrough anywhere in AG-North Ukraine's area, which would allow them to retreat to another defensive line (Hitler did allow that IOTL) if needed. So the Soviets don't reach the Vistula in 1944, no Warsaw Uprising, the Baltic states remain unoccupied, etc. in 1944.

The question is Romania; if forced to strip it out of reserves like IOTL to counter the major Soviet offensive in Ukraine and then potentially needing reserves to help AG-Center/North in Autumn Romania could fall per OTL, while then leaves the situation in Hungary and the Balkans like OTL except with extra Axis forces not destroyed ITTL who could be used to launch more effective counter offensives at Debrecen.

However if after the Ukraine operation over summer reserves are able to return to Romania then the Axis troops there might have a chance to retreat in good order rather than being trapped per OTL, which changes the Balkan situation considerably even if Romania still tries to change sides. I'm thinking the divisions that would be able to come back would the GD division and 2 Heer panzer divisions. The IV ss corps and its two divisions would likely be needed to defend Poland in the Lublin area, the HG division would be needed to form the HG panzer corps that was set to be ready later in 1944 and was forming in Poland but could well end up deployed to support AG-Center if needed, and most of the rest of the Heer panzer divisions would probably have to stay with AG-North Ukraine to make up for infantry divisions losses during the Soviet offensive.

So that should leave AG-NU with 2nd Hungarian armored divisions, 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 16th, and 17th Panzer divisions, and the IV SS panzer corps (3rd and 5th ss panzer), aka more than double what they had IOTL, while the 19th and 24th panzer divisions and GD division could return to Romania. That isn't counting panzergrenadier divisions. Then the HG corps could end up with AG-Center. It is possible then that they could hold the line through 1944, especially if the powerful units they were forming in summer 1944 in the east get to finish forming (feldherrenhalle division, HG corps, IV ss panzer corps, Russian 29th ss division). Plus if the Ukrainian SS division aren't wiped out that summer and west Ukraine is held then there is an important recruiting ground for manpower going forward. Given manpower shortages if the RONA SS division is able to form without having to be diverted to fight in Warsaw they too could end up being a significant force as there were 2 Russian ss divisions being formed. IOTL after the Warsaw situation was under control they were dispersed elsewhere, but ITTL they'd probably end up formed into a corps and used in the East where desertion would be much tougher than in France where one of the divisions ended up and parts defected to the French resistance. Of course without the defeats of summer 1944 their morale would have been much higher and they'd be less likely to defect given that there would be hope of actually surviving on the Axis side.

If the line holds that would deprive the Soviets of vital replacements in occupied territory, while preventing Balkan Axis allies to defect, Finland might remain in the war which would tie down vital Soviet manpower, while plans to start using Russian and Ukrainian manpower would have a chance to work. Plus Baltic manpower could be tapped even more without having those states lost to the Soviets in 1944. Not only that but without losing large amounts of territory or having units wiped out wholesale equipment losses would actually be manageable, which is a massive gain over OTL. Not only that, but production centers in Poland and Hungary, which had been built up to be out of range of Wallied bombers, would still be active as would the production of raw materials from their deposits in those countries, which means going into late 1944/early 1945 the Axis would have a lot more equipment, firepower, and supplies they lacked IOTL.

The situation in the west is a whole other discussion in this scenario, but if the eastern front holds that changes the situation in the west considerably.

I hope that you are right,becouse that mean free Poland when A bomb drop on Berlin.But,highly unlikely,becouse :
1.Kurland could hold thanks to german navy - no such thinh on Belarus.
2.Soviets need 50km or less good terrain to attack - and i am sure they would found it on 420km front
3.Soviets had ALWAYS new penal units.
4.In 1944 they could destroy AG center,becouse german infrantry dyvisions used foot,and soviet used Studebackers.You do not change that - one breakthrough would be made,infrantry dyvisions would be destroyed.
5.Soviets in OTL wasted their troops for nothing,but in that situation Sralin would not allow it.He would amass artillery,and keep sending penal units tll all german bunkers would be knew.Then final barrage would destroy it and front would be crushed.And soviets would repeat it on every river.
6.Add Hitler forbidding any retreat,and german infrantry dyvisions would be destroyed just like in OTL,only 3-4 month later.
Which would save part of Balkans,but nothing more.

Althought i would be happy,if you are right and things progressed as you said.

 

[sillygoose]

I hope that you are right,becouse that mean free Poland when A bomb drop on Berlin.

In this scenario the war wouldn't last long enough for an A-bomb...which would mean Poland remains under Hitler's boot.

But,highly unlikely,becouse :
1.Kurland could hold thanks to german navy - no such thinh on Belarus.

What does that have to do with anything? The German navy was too far away for bombardment of frontline targets in Courland, I think you're thinking of Memel, which only held due to naval gun support.

2.Soviets need 50km or less good terrain to attack - and i am sure they would found it on 420km front

If you use google maps satellite view you'll see just how many swamps and forests were in the way preventing artillery from being deployed in huge swaths of the front. They'd have to deploy in the open in view of German artillery observation.

3.Soviets had ALWAYS new penal units.

And? Cannon fodder is simply cannon fodder and a very small part of the Soviet cannon fodder pools. Check out that Glantz book and you'll see how the penal units didn't matter. Besides they could use artillery or indirect first HMGs/mortars to deal with them rather than exposing their infantry positions.

4.In 1944 they could destroy AG center,becouse german infrantry dyvisions used foot,and soviet used Studebackers.You do not change that - one breakthrough would be made,infrantry dyvisions would be destroyed.

If you're defending on very well prepared defensive lines mobility isn't the issue, especially when you have rail supply, which is now closer for the Germans and further for the Soviets. Also the Soviets had a lower truck per man ratio than the Germans did in 1944; only mechanized/tank units had sufficient truck usage, the vast majority of the Soviet army (aka infantry divisions) used horses and rail supply with very limited truck support.

It would see the point of our disagreement is on the achievability of a breakthrough on this shorter line; it is simply not possible without the overextended line held IOTL on June 22nd 1944. It would be a rerun of the Smolensk and/or October 1943-April 1944 battles that cost the Soviets over 1 million casualties only to gain limited ground and achieve 0 breakthroughs, since the Germans just kept falling back to the next prepared defensive line.

5.Soviets in OTL wasted their troops for nothing,but in that situation Sralin would not allow it.He would amass artillery,and keep sending penal units tll all german bunkers would be knew.Then final barrage would destroy it and front would be crushed.And soviets would repeat it on every river.

Again they did just that throughout 1943 and in early 1944 without success. The only thing that changed the operational picture by June 1944 was the entire German strategic reserve being sent to France, AG-Center being stripped of divisions and reserves to support AG-North Ukraine after April, and the Soviet advance in Ukraine in early 1944 that added something like 200km of new frontage that had to be covered and overextended AG-Center. Couple that with Hitler demanded highly exposed 'fortified places' be held strongly at the expense of the flanks and it was like Hitler was begging for AG-Center to be annihilated.

Were it simply 'concentrate more artillery' then Rzhev would have fallen in 1942, Belarus in 1943, Narva in 1944, and Courland in 1944-45. The reality is took Hitler making exceptionally stupid decisions to overextend his limited forces that enabled Soviet success. That happened in front of Moscow in 1941, Stalingrad in 1942, Belgorod in 1943, various others areas in Ukraine in 1943-44, and of course Belarus in June 1944 and the Baltic area in September 1944.

If the Soviets were simply forced to fight through fortified lines over and over rather than exploit exposed flanks they'd run out of men well short of the Vistula.

6.Add Hitler forbidding any retreat,and german infrantry dyvisions would be destroyed just like in OTL,only 3-4 month later.
Which would save part of Balkans,but nothing more.

That only really was an issue when there were exposed flanks like at Vitebsk and a variety of other 'fortified places'. When the line was relatively straight and concentrated line, as would be the case with the Beaver Line pictured above, the Soviets would have to fight through position by position and run out of men as they had throughout the 1943 and early 1944 offensives in Belarus (or throughout 1942 in Rzhev) or the 6 offensives to try to crush the Courland pocket in 1944-45.
They knew how to deal with concentrated artillery fire the Soviets used by establishing a zone defense and withdrawing ahead of Soviet bombardment, as they could tell when it was coming in part thanks to Soviet deserters (they were still deserting even as late as January 1945). The Soviets preceded attacks with a 'surprise' bombardment, then sent in the infantry with artillery spotters in support. Still that didn't work all that often:

Bobruysk offensive - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Rokossovsky's attack, as with the other initial offensive operations of Operation Bagration, was preceded by a heavy artillery bombardment. The first assault, against strong German defences, was however repulsed with heavy casualties. Rokossovsky ordered further artillery preparation for July 24, which eventually resulted in a collapse of the 134th Infantry Division to the north of the sector, as the Soviet 3rd Army pushed forward; the 20th Panzer Division began to counter-attack, but Jordan then ordered it to turn southwards and confront a new breakthrough by the Soviet 65th Army under Batov.[6]

So the heavy concentration of artillery failed on the 22nd and it took until 24th to try again. It took repeated and heavy assaults before a single German division finally failed.

What caused it to eventually worked was this:

Rokossovsky had bravely staked his reputation on a plan for a complex double-envelopment of the German forces at Babruysk, in opposition to Joseph Stalin's preferred plan of a single breakthrough in the sector.[5]

They pressed the German lines at more points then it could contend with given it's overextended sector and very weak infantry forces, an issue that wouldn't exist if they fell back to the Beaver Line, while Soviet forces wouldn't be able to deploy their full numbers given the restricted frontage. They'd have to wait in echelon for their turn and advance over the wreckage of the ones that went before.

 

[Atarlost]

6.Soviets still had Lens-Lease,which mean enough trucks to deliver stuff.And railroad brigades with american trains making new roads.With additional times they would deliver stuff from trains almost on frontlines.
And there was still enough partisants to gather info on Belarus.If not soviet,then polish Home Army - we were idiots and helped soviets with that.They thanked us in gulags.

I'm not entirely sure they would still have lend-lease in this scenario. Russian victory was the second to last thing the Western Allies wanted. If the front stabilized somewhere west of the original Ukraine-Poland border I think they might have started throttling the pipeline.

In this scenario the war wouldn't last long enough for an A-bomb...which would mean Poland remains under Hitler's boot.

The war lasts until Japan surrenders. Even if they think that switching to a Pacific First plan means Pacific Only the Brits want Malaysia and Singapore back so they'll stay in. Hitler was crazy enough to declare war on the US, he's not going to abandon solidarity with Japan when he thinks he's winning. And by that point nukes are on the table. Possibly Berlin gets the Nagasaki bomb to drive home to the Japanese that their allies are also helpless.

Even if they do make a separate peace with Germany, there's ample precedent that a peace treaty signed by Hitler isn't worth the paper it's printed on. There's nothing stopping the UK from reopening the war if it gets nukes before Germany, and fear of a Hitler with nukes is a pretty good reason for the US to make sure the UK gets nukes promptly instead of holding back until the Russians had already stolen the designs.

 

[sillygoose]

I'm not entirely sure they would still have lend-lease in this scenario. Russian victory was the second to last thing the Western Allies wanted. If the front stabilized somewhere west of the original Ukraine-Poland border I think they might have started throttling the pipeline.

Oh no, it certainly was. Rather it was the US government's position that they wanted a Soviet victory both in Europe and Asia. James Forrestal's (Secretary of the Navy) unredacted diaries even show Truman saying it was probably a good thing that the Russians would dominate Europe for a few generations. Plus the US prioritized L-L shipments to the Soviets over their own needs so much so that they were short hundreds of tanks in late 1944 in Europe so had to beg 400 Shermans from the British. If they weren't interested in the Soviets winning they would have throttled L-L in late 1944 to the end of the war.

The war lasts until Japan surrenders. Even if they think that switching to a Pacific First plan means Pacific Only the Brits want Malaysia and Singapore back so they'll stay in. Hitler was crazy enough to declare war on the US, he's not going to abandon solidarity with Japan when he thinks he's winning. And by that point nukes are on the table. Possibly Berlin gets the Nagasaki bomb to drive home to the Japanese that their allies are also helpless.

The war in Asia. Hitler had no problem making a separate peace deal.
The DoW on the US was due to miscalculation about the US being focused in Asia and Japan being a way to draw them off of supporting the British and hopefully get the Japanese to attack the Soviets from the East. If anything Japan was viewed very utilitarianly by Hitler (and vice versa). Plus AFAIK neither signed a treaty that they wouldn't make a separate peace (the Germans certainly tried repeatedly only to be rebuffed by the Allies).

The issue is US public will to continue; if casualties get bad enough they will demand an end to unconditional surrender as a policy, especially if Stalin nopes out of the war due to repeated defeats sapping morale and manpower. Don't forget IOTL there were several negotiations between the Nazis and Soviets from 1941-44 to try to work out a peace deal. If the Soviets exit the war the Wallies are definitely going to cut a deal because they would lack the numbers to take German on their own (they were already seriously short of manpower in late 1944 and Britain was not only disbanding divisions to keep the rest up to strength, but even cutting the number of companies per battalion).

Even if they do make a separate peace with Germany, there's ample precedent that a peace treaty signed by Hitler isn't worth the paper it's printed on. There's nothing stopping the UK from reopening the war if it gets nukes before Germany, and fear of a Hitler with nukes is a pretty good reason for the US to make sure the UK gets nukes promptly instead of holding back until the Russians had already stolen the designs.

Everyone likes to claim that, but there really is no evidence the politicians of the period actually thought that by the end of the war. After all they allied with Stalin who had a similarly poor track record of honoring treaties. People forget when they attacked Poland in 1939 they had a non-aggression treaty still in force and in fact that is why the Poles thought they could deal with Germany since it should have simply been a 1-on-1 deal with the Allied powers attacking from the west. Or the unprovoked attack on Finland, the Baltic states, or strong arming of Romania all while supplying Hitler's war machine with oil and food right through 1941. Or how he had negotiated with the Allies before the invasion of Poland with no intention of actually siding with them only to work out a deal with Hitler at the same time.

So the Allies really didn't care about how honorable the people they signed treaties with were, it was more a function of whether they thought they needed to or could keep going until they eliminated a rival.

Yes there was a major factor stopping the UK from reopening the war: it was a democratic society that didn't attack unprovoked. They'd have to have a pretty damn good reason to start another war.

The US never helped the UK get nukes even after the Soviets got one. Same with France. Hitler was no more threatening with nukes than Stalin, especially given that Hitler had the nastiest nerve gasses that existed in the world at the time and a bio-weapons program, but never used them. And Britain had weaponized Anthrax ready to use on Germany during the war, but never used them either:

Operation Vegetarian - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[ATP]

In this scenario the war wouldn't last long enough for an A-bomb...which would mean Poland remains under Hitler's boot.


What does that have to do with anything? The German navy was too far away for bombardment of frontline targets in Courland, I think you're thinking of Memel, which only held due to naval gun support.


If you use google maps satellite view you'll see just how many swamps and forests were in the way preventing artillery from being deployed in huge swaths of the front. They'd have to deploy in the open in view of German artillery observation.


And? Cannon fodder is simply cannon fodder and a very small part of the Soviet cannon fodder pools. Check out that Glantz book and you'll see how the penal units didn't matter. Besides they could use artillery or indirect first HMGs/mortars to deal with them rather than exposing their infantry positions.


If you're defending on very well prepared defensive lines mobility isn't the issue, especially when you have rail supply, which is now closer for the Germans and further for the Soviets. Also the Soviets had a lower truck per man ratio than the Germans did in 1944; only mechanized/tank units had sufficient truck usage, the vast majority of the Soviet army (aka infantry divisions) used horses and rail supply with very limited truck support.

It would see the point of our disagreement is on the achievability of a breakthrough on this shorter line; it is simply not possible without the overextended line held IOTL on June 22nd 1944. It would be a rerun of the Smolensk and/or October 1943-April 1944 battles that cost the Soviets over 1 million casualties only to gain limited ground and achieve 0 breakthroughs, since the Germans just kept falling back to the next prepared defensive line.


Again they did just that throughout 1943 and in early 1944 without success. The only thing that changed the operational picture by June 1944 was the entire German strategic reserve being sent to France, AG-Center being stripped of divisions and reserves to support AG-North Ukraine after April, and the Soviet advance in Ukraine in early 1944 that added something like 200km of new frontage that had to be covered and overextended AG-Center. Couple that with Hitler demanded highly exposed 'fortified places' be held strongly at the expense of the flanks and it was like Hitler was begging for AG-Center to be annihilated.

Were it simply 'concentrate more artillery' then Rzhev would have fallen in 1942, Belarus in 1943, Narva in 1944, and Courland in 1944-45. The reality is took Hitler making exceptionally stupid decisions to overextend his limited forces that enabled Soviet success. That happened in front of Moscow in 1941, Stalingrad in 1942, Belgorod in 1943, various others areas in Ukraine in 1943-44, and of course Belarus in June 1944 and the Baltic area in September 1944.

If the Soviets were simply forced to fight through fortified lines over and over rather than exploit exposed flanks they'd run out of men well short of the Vistula.


That only really was an issue when there were exposed flanks like at Vitebsk and a variety of other 'fortified places'. When the line was relatively straight and concentrated line, as would be the case with the Beaver Line pictured above, the Soviets would have to fight through position by position and run out of men as they had throughout the 1943 and early 1944 offensives in Belarus (or throughout 1942 in Rzhev) or the 6 offensives to try to crush the Courland pocket in 1944-45.
They knew how to deal with concentrated artillery fire the Soviets used by establishing a zone defense and withdrawing ahead of Soviet bombardment, as they could tell when it was coming in part thanks to Soviet deserters (they were still deserting even as late as January 1945). The Soviets preceded attacks with a 'surprise' bombardment, then sent in the infantry with artillery spotters in support. Still that didn't work all that often:

Bobruysk offensive - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

So the heavy concentration of artillery failed on the 22nd and it took until 24th to try again. It took repeated and heavy assaults before a single German division finally failed.

What caused it to eventually worked was this:

They pressed the German lines at more points then it could contend with given it's overextended sector and very weak infantry forces, an issue that wouldn't exist if they fell back to the Beaver Line, while Soviet forces wouldn't be able to deploy their full numbers given the restricted frontage. They'd have to wait in echelon for their turn and advance over the wreckage of the ones that went before.

Sorry for late answer.
1.FDR would fight as long as Sralin wonted,and Sralin wonted separate peace with Hitler,but dude was not interested.You want separate peace - kill Hitler first.
2.German would not use navy to get supplies on Belarus - that is difference.Fire support was less important.
3.And still there is 420km to find good spot for artillery.
4.Penal units are important,becouse they let soviet check where german bunkers were.And in gulags there always was enough volunteers for that.Becouse working on Magadan was death sentence,when you could survive penal unit.
5.Soviets after 2-3 months waiting would have train depots 20km from front.
6.In 1944 soviet tactic worked,becose BEFORE THAT soviet do not used artillery observers on front lines and send infrantry and tanks without supporting each others.In 1944 they finally undarstandt that firing in genering direction of enemy without observers on front is wasting ammo,and that tanks and infrantry must cooperate.
Once they started it,german were finished.
7.Yes,germans were smart - but once soviet used new tactic,and Hitler ordered NO RETREAT,game was over.

@Atarlost - you are mostly right,but FDR was Sralin useful idiot - he would support him no matter what.And Hitler would never agreed to separate peace with soviets in OTL,so you need kill him to change that.
There would be no peace as long as Hitler and FDR lead their countries.

 

[sillygoose]

Sorry for late answer.

No worries, we all get busy.

1.FDR would fight as long as Sralin wonted,and Sralin wonted separate peace with Hitler,but dude was not interested.You want separate peace - kill Hitler first.

FDR would want to, but America is a democracy and labor strikes did cause the US a lot of problems during WW2; if the American people get pissed off enough a general strike would end US participation real quick. Hitler did want peace, but not at the terms Stalin offered; Stalin in fact did not want peace per se, his offers in 1943 (and apparently 1941) were all gambits to leverage the Wallies to help him. The 1942 negotiations were more legit but they couldn't agree to terms either would accept. Hitler wasn't really the issue, because no one who would have been conceivable as a replacement would have accepted Stalin's terms in 1943. 1942 though is a different story, but well outside the scope of this scenario. In 1944 IOTL Stalin was winning so wasn't interested in peace however if his forces are stymied throughout the summer of 1944 and casualties are unsustainable for no or at least very limited gains then he might seriously start considering a viable offer of peace. Hitler in 1944 after the collapse in France would probably be much more willing to accept a fair offer.

2.German would not use navy to get supplies on Belarus - that is difference.Fire support was less important.

Sure, but they didn't have crippling issues using the rail lines IOTL, while the withdrawal to the Beaver Line would remove most of the partisan threat from behind German lines in Belarus and make supplies flow much more easily. Plus taking a step back then also shortens their supply lines by something like 10%, which made supply substantially easier for them. Especially without the partisan ambushes and sabotage (and spying).

Remember that the Germans were able to hold Rzhev and Belarus with these rail lines from 1942-April '44 despite the heaviest of Soviet assaults and from what I can tell in that period managed to inflict well over 3 million casualties on the Soviets.

3.And still there is 420km to find good spot for artillery.

Not if that is filled with swamps and forests. Or is within sight of German artillery spotters. Again look at google maps of the region around the Berezina river, very little open ground for massing artillery. And check out Glantz's book I mentioned earlier about the fighting in Belarus from October 1943-April 1944. They had serious issues massing artillery and forces for attacks due to the swamps; those swamps were good for infiltration if the lines were thin enough (they weren't in the period mentioned), but terrible for launch major assaults in or trying to actually place artillery in.

4.Penal units are important,becouse they let soviet check where german bunkers were.And in gulags there always was enough volunteers for that.Becouse working on Magadan was death sentence,when you could survive penal unit.

Again why didn't they work in 1942-April 1944? The only thing that really changed was the southern flank of the German lines in Belarus was turned in early 1944 when the Ukrainian front was pushed back to the Polish/Hungary/Romanian border, which lengthened the lines needed to be defended and created major gaps, while AG-Center had to dispatch all of its reserves to Ukraine to help with the situation there. Unlike in pervious periods where AG-Center was able to hold the line despite the heaviest imaginable assaults they now had hundreds of kilometers more in front to defend while having fewer divisions to do it with. So simply based on troop density per km of front they were at all time lows and individual division frontages were so high that their artillery didn't even have enough range to cover all of it. So it wasn't really Soviet improvements that changed the situation in Belarus, it was having much fewer troops than ever to do so with.

If they withdrew to the line in question the Soviets couldn't deploy all their manpower at once, terrain was against them in ways it wasn't even in 1943, and the front is short enough to be held with what forces were at hand and even would have allowed for a reserve to be created to check Soviet break-ins. Penal Battalions had little to nothing to do with the situation, especially as they only had like 3 such battalions per Front.

5.Soviets after 2-3 months waiting would have train depots 20km from front.

Ok, doesn't change the practical reality of having to break through the Beaver line. 2-3 months for the Germans to build it up and even more rearward positions, not to mention rest their forces, train up replacements, fix equipment, etc.

But let's say your point is correct for a moment. A 3 month delay in Bagration still means AG-North Ukraine can hold its position as reserves can be focused there. When the Soviets do launch their attack in Belarus that means the Germans would have reserves to counter that and probably in between would be able to transfer enough back to Romania to prevent the collapse there. Also even if the Soviets do break through in Belarus against the shorter line due to the terrain there the Soviets won't be able to exploit as easily if they face resistance, so will rerun the Battle of Smolensk or the Autumn/Winter/Spring 1943-44 battles and just push the German lines back rather than be able to conduct major encirclements. So the Soviets just get worn down badly at 4:1 loss ratios like they did in earlier battles rather than the 2:1 success of the OTL Bagration.

6.In 1944 soviet tactic worked,becose BEFORE THAT soviet do not used artillery observers on front lines and send infrantry and tanks without supporting each others.In 1944 they finally undarstandt that firing in genering direction of enemy without observers on front is wasting ammo,and that tanks and infrantry must cooperate.
Once they started it,german were finished.

I'd check out Glantz's book on the 1943-44 fighting in Belarus. The Soviets did do that before Bagration. The big things that changed was the increased length of front the Germans had to defend and the transfer of their reserves to Ukraine, plus the increased support the Soviets gave into the partisans to the rear to gather intel and sabotage and integrate them into the overall battle plan. All of that would not be the case if there was a pull back to the Beaver Line for reasons I listed above.

7.Yes,germans were smart - but once soviet used new tactic,and Hitler ordered NO RETREAT,game was over.

Again the No Retreat order was present in Rzhev and in 1943-44 in Belarus without it being fatal. What changed that allowed Bagration to succeed where previous attempts failed were the factors listed above. To sum it up here: declining numbers German division per kilometer of front. Retreating solves that problem, so even if the Soviets do breach the line in 2-3 months they cannot rapidly advance like they did during Bagration due to the terrain and concentrated German forces as well as the creation of reserves that would result from shortening the line.

 

[ATP]

No worries, we all get busy.


FDR would want to, but America is a democracy and labor strikes did cause the US a lot of problems during WW2; if the American people get pissed off enough a general strike would end US participation real quick. Hitler did want peace, but not at the terms Stalin offered; Stalin in fact did not want peace per se, his offers in 1943 (and apparently 1941) were all gambits to leverage the Wallies to help him. The 1942 negotiations were more legit but they couldn't agree to terms either would accept. Hitler wasn't really the issue, because no one who would have been conceivable as a replacement would have accepted Stalin's terms in 1943. 1942 though is a different story, but well outside the scope of this scenario. In 1944 IOTL Stalin was winning so wasn't interested in peace however if his forces are stymied throughout the summer of 1944 and casualties are unsustainable for no or at least very limited gains then he might seriously start considering a viable offer of peace. Hitler in 1944 after the collapse in France would probably be much more willing to accept a fair offer.


Sure, but they didn't have crippling issues using the rail lines IOTL, while the withdrawal to the Beaver Line would remove most of the partisan threat from behind German lines in Belarus and make supplies flow much more easily. Plus taking a step back then also shortens their supply lines by something like 10%, which made supply substantially easier for them. Especially without the partisan ambushes and sabotage (and spying).

Remember that the Germans were able to hold Rzhev and Belarus with these rail lines from 1942-April '44 despite the heaviest of Soviet assaults and from what I can tell in that period managed to inflict well over 3 million casualties on the Soviets.


Not if that is filled with swamps and forests. Or is within sight of German artillery spotters. Again look at google maps of the region around the Berezina river, very little open ground for massing artillery. And check out Glantz's book I mentioned earlier about the fighting in Belarus from October 1943-April 1944. They had serious issues massing artillery and forces for attacks due to the swamps; those swamps were good for infiltration if the lines were thin enough (they weren't in the period mentioned), but terrible for launch major assaults in or trying to actually place artillery in.


Again why didn't they work in 1942-April 1944? The only thing that really changed was the southern flank of the German lines in Belarus was turned in early 1944 when the Ukrainian front was pushed back to the Polish/Hungary/Romanian border, which lengthened the lines needed to be defended and created major gaps, while AG-Center had to dispatch all of its reserves to Ukraine to help with the situation there. Unlike in pervious periods where AG-Center was able to hold the line despite the heaviest imaginable assaults they now had hundreds of kilometers more in front to defend while having fewer divisions to do it with. So simply based on troop density per km of front they were at all time lows and individual division frontages were so high that their artillery didn't even have enough range to cover all of it. So it wasn't really Soviet improvements that changed the situation in Belarus, it was having much fewer troops than ever to do so with.

If they withdrew to the line in question the Soviets couldn't deploy all their manpower at once, terrain was against them in ways it wasn't even in 1943, and the front is short enough to be held with what forces were at hand and even would have allowed for a reserve to be created to check Soviet break-ins. Penal Battalions had little to nothing to do with the situation, especially as they only had like 3 such battalions per Front.


Ok, doesn't change the practical reality of having to break through the Beaver line. 2-3 months for the Germans to build it up and even more rearward positions, not to mention rest their forces, train up replacements, fix equipment, etc.

But let's say your point is correct for a moment. A 3 month delay in Bagration still means AG-North Ukraine can hold its position as reserves can be focused there. When the Soviets do launch their attack in Belarus that means the Germans would have reserves to counter that and probably in between would be able to transfer enough back to Romania to prevent the collapse there. Also even if the Soviets do break through in Belarus against the shorter line due to the terrain there the Soviets won't be able to exploit as easily if they face resistance, so will rerun the Battle of Smolensk or the Autumn/Winter/Spring 1943-44 battles and just push the German lines back rather than be able to conduct major encirclements. So the Soviets just get worn down badly at 4:1 loss ratios like they did in earlier battles rather than the 2:1 success of the OTL Bagration.


I'd check out Glantz's book on the 1943-44 fighting in Belarus. The Soviets did do that before Bagration. The big things that changed was the increased length of front the Germans had to defend and the transfer of their reserves to Ukraine, plus the increased support the Soviets gave into the partisans to the rear to gather intel and sabotage and integrate them into the overall battle plan. All of that would not be the case if there was a pull back to the Beaver Line for reasons I listed above.


Again the No Retreat order was present in Rzhev and in 1943-44 in Belarus without it being fatal. What changed that allowed Bagration to succeed where previous attempts failed were the factors listed above. To sum it up here: declining numbers German division per kilometer of front. Retreating solves that problem, so even if the Soviets do breach the line in 2-3 months they cannot rapidly advance like they did during Bagration due to the terrain and concentrated German forces as well as the creation of reserves that would result from shortening the line.

1.Still,as long as Hitler lived,there would be no peace with soviets,becouse he wonted peace with Alliess.Which would be impossible as long as democrats ruled,which mean at least till 1946.By that time,germany would glow in night.
And Sralin started WW2 to get part of Europe,not hold his own - so as long as FDR ruled,he would fight,too.

2.Germans could hold,becouse soviets do not learn to combine arms and use artillery observers.Once they did so,it was matter of time when they go through.
And polish partisants were ordered to help soviets attacking germans.soviets would send them to gulags,but they still do that.
I knew,we were idiots.

3.That made things harder for soviets,but they would win eventually.Remember,they really do not cared how many of their soldiers die.

4.Soviets learned how to fight finally - so they would win.Becouse when both sides fight well,numbers always win.

5.It not worked,becouse they do not cooperate properly.Now,when they did so,they would win.But - they would not destroy AG center,only push it our from Belarus.
It mean longer war,but still lost by germans.And few free balkan states.

6.They did so,but still made more mistakes.In 1944 they would made less mistakes and with bigger forces available.Which mean their victory.Costly and after few months,but still victory.

7.Yes,AG Center would survive.But,it not matter,becouse when they would be attacked with 10:1 advantage in guns,planes and tanks,and 4:1 in infrantry,they would widraw.
But - MAYBE germans attack in 1945 from Bug river,not Wisła. It would save Hungary,but not Poland or Romania.Still - better Europe now.

 

[sillygoose]

We're really going round and round, saying the same things to one another. Unless there is some sort of different argument in your next reply we're just going to have to agree to disagree.

1.Still,as long as Hitler lived,there would be no peace with soviets,becouse he wonted peace with Alliess.Which would be impossible as long as democrats ruled,which mean at least till 1946.By that time,germany would glow in night.
And Sralin started WW2 to get part of Europe,not hold his own - so as long as FDR ruled,he would fight,too.

The historical record doesn't bear that out. He apparently repeatedly said he'd prefer peace with Stalin rather than the Wallies after they rebuffed his peace offers repeatedly, especially in the 1943-44 period.
So Stalin, if he thinks his forces have been stopped and the Wallies are going to take Central Europe instead of him, could well make peace in 1944 rather than waste his forces in Europe. Because you're right Stalin wanted some expansion and if Europe was not where he would get it he'd turn to Asia because the Japanese were easier pickings than Germany ITTL.

2.Germans could hold,becouse soviets do not learn to combine arms and use artillery observers.Once they did so,it was matter of time when they go through.
And polish partisants were ordered to help soviets attacking germans.soviets would send them to gulags,but they still do that.
I knew,we were idiots.

Problem is even as late as April 1945 the Soviets still displayed basic tactical mistakes that cost them a lot of unnecessary casualties. See Seelowe Heights. So whatever lessons they learned were quite uneven and that doesn't take into consideration the lessons the Germans learned about countering Soviet tactics. You're right that in the long run Soviet resources would allow them to push the Germans back, though I think that would take longer than you think, they wouldn't be able to pull off a Bagration encirclement without the Germans holding overextended lines with too few troops, they'd just push bulges in the German lines at great cost and grind them back. By 1944 the Soviets could not afford 'victories' like that given their declining replacement pool, since they both needed to reconquer occupied territory to get replacements from the population there and really wear down German manpower and equipment in major pocket battles at the same time.

As to Polish Partisans they weren't really that big of an issue until the Soviets got close; if the Soviets are stymied in central Belarus the Poles would keep their resources husbanded for the decisive battles later on.

3.That made things harder for soviets,but they would win eventually.Remember,they really do not cared how many of their soldiers die.

They did. Stalin repeatedly freaked out about casualties because he did have an eye toward the post-war period. That's why a lot of Soviet losses even later in the war were hidden in the paper work. Boris Sokolov has found some interesting discrepancies in Soviet strength and loss reporting for Kursk and even the 1945 battles in Poland. He goes way too far extrapolating that for the entire war, but he has some basis for the claims he makes. Interestingly it is also the Polish communist forces that expose some of the reporting issues, as modern Poland reported much higher casualties of their troops in 1945 than what the Soviets claimed they took during the war, like 300% higher losses. Commanders were much less interested in the cost of war, especially Zhukov, than getting results that would please Stalin; Stalin however was concerned about his forces' post-war strength and of course what the labor pool would be to run the economy. Question is whether he actually knew how bad losses were or whether he accepted the reports he was given as factual.

If Soviet forces could not advance significantly or destroy major German formations as they did in Summer 1944 while the Wallies advance through France then I think there is a good chance that Stalin starts thinking about his options regarding peace deals, because his forces would be relatively much weaker than they were IOTL at the end of the 1944 campaigns due to the lack of reconquered territory and population as well as lack of prestige victories that would match with the Wallies. IOTL he waited to make any deals about the post-war situation in Europe until he had all the bargaining chips in his pocket he could get before agreeing to the Yalta conference; until then he kept rebuffing FDR and Churchill's desire for a conference to hammer these things out. Which means Stalin was quite concerned about his standing before even thinking of signing any treaties and that if he felt he wouldn't be able to get what he wanted, control over half of Europe, due to his forces being stymied east of the 1941 border, then he very well could cut a deal to spare what manpower was remaining and perhaps gain some territory at the peace table rather than in war. Stalin definitely had zero concern about screwing over the Wallies if it got him what he wanted.

4.Soviets learned how to fight finally - so they would win.Becouse when both sides fight well,numbers always win.

WW1 says otherwise vis-a-vis Russia. They learned how to fight by 1916 and still lost. Plus really when you analyze the campaigns of 1944 the Soviets really hadn't learned to fight all that much better relative to 1943, casualties after all had sapped their experience, it is that the Wallies had gotten more involved, destroyed and drew off German reserves, and Hitler got increasingly stupid with his decisions. So if one general was willing to disobey and remove one of the very worst mistakes Hitler made it would really screw up Soviet plans at the decisive moment in the war. Stalin was not willing to win a Pyrrhic victory that would just see his regime collapse post-war while the Wallies get all the rewards.

5.It not worked,becouse they do not cooperate properly.Now,when they did so,they would win.But - they would not destroy AG center,only push it our from Belarus.
It mean longer war,but still lost by germans.And few free balkan states.

Ok, I see now we're getting to the point of common ground. Yes I agree that with time the Soviets could push the Germans out of Belarus, but they'd run out of manpower in the process given that it would be slow and not decisive, so if AG-Center can drag out the campaign into 1945 and keep the Soviets only at the 1941 border by then then the Soviets are really screwed manpower-wise. That's when peace was possible, because even the Soviets have their limits and if the Germans can keep their industrial areas in Poland, Silesia, Hungary, and the Czech areas without disruption in all of 1944 plus avoid massive manpower and equipment losses in pocket battles then the Wehrmacht is going to be a LOT more powerful by that point.

If the Balkan area remains free of Soviets into 1945 then Stalin is really going to be in a bad position because the several hundred thousand men in reinforcements they got from the Romanians, Bulgarians, Yugoslavs, and even to some degree Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians will effectively leave them extremely short of manpower while the Germans will have an enormous pressure taken off of them in 1944-45. Soviet manpower reserves were simply not good enough by that point. Not only that, but if the Germans can remain within range of Ukraine they have the ability to continue to supply and support the UPA behind Soviet lines, which remained a dangerous bleeding sore for them even after WW2 into the 1950s.

Ukrainian Insurgent Army - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The Soviets only really were able to deal with them because WW2 ended and they could then dedicate all the necessary resources to finishing off the organization, but even then it took years to achieve and a lot of bloodshed. Not unlike Vietnam.

6.They did so,but still made more mistakes.In 1944 they would made less mistakes and with bigger forces available.Which mean their victory.Costly and after few months,but still victory.

Soviet success on the scale they had was highly dependent on Hitler's mistakes, all through 1943-44 (and before and after of course). Soviet forces were large, but manpower was declining, which is why the field forces were 1.5 million men smaller at the end of the war than in January 1945. They had effectively run out of replacements. So if they avoid their successes of Summer 1944 they'd be in an even worse situation sooner if they couldn't conscript liberated POWs and various occupied peoples plus get the Romanians and Bulgarians to switch sides and add several hundred thousand men to the Soviet military (and act as cannon fodder to spare the Soviets casualties). More costly than OTL is not something the Soviets could afford. As it was demographically they've never recovered from WW2 and Russia today is in a particularly tough situation given the gaps in babies born as a result. Stalin did not allow censuses from 1939-1953 for a reason, for it would expose the enormous damage he had inflicted on his people.

7.Yes,AG Center would survive.But,it not matter,becouse when they would be attacked with 10:1 advantage in guns,planes and tanks,and 4:1 in infrantry,they would widraw.
But - MAYBE germans attack in 1945 from Bug river,not Wisła. It would save Hungary,but not Poland or Romania.Still - better Europe now.

AG-Center withdrawing intact is exactly the worst situation for the Soviets. They simply could not afford the losses they'd take slowly shoving AG-Center back to the 1941 border, especially if it meant they couldn't get ahold of the local population before the Germans removed the military age males first and the fighting wrecked the infrastructure and economy of reconquered territories. Plus such slow 'victories' shove back the enemy tended to result in worse losses than a major victory that involved encirclements. As it was the Soviets took 2 losses for every one the Germans suffered during OTL Bagration. If they suffered losses on the scale they had in previous less successful battles in Belarus like the Smolensk campaign of 1943, they'd have suffered 4:1 losses, which was utterly unsustainable especially if they didn't gain a lot of ground, territory was wrecked, civilian population was evacuated except for the elderly and children, and the next enemy line was waiting for them to have to fight through.

If the Soviets are still on the Bug River by 1945 they are seriously screwed, since that means AG-North is still in place as well and intact and Baltic manpower still can be exploited. It also buys time for Vlasov's forces to be set up as well, not to mention industry set up in the eastern areas (Poland, Hungary, Czech territory, Baltic areas) to be brought online out of range of bombers. As I said above it likely also means the Soviets cut a deal since they wouldn't be able to get the gains they wanted at a cost that would be acceptable. After all you need manpower post-war to hold your gains and run the economy.

 

[ATP]

We're really going round and round, saying the same things to one another. Unless there is some sort of different argument in your next reply we're just going to have to agree to disagree.


The historical record doesn't bear that out. He apparently repeatedly said he'd prefer peace with Stalin rather than the Wallies after they rebuffed his peace offers repeatedly, especially in the 1943-44 period.
So Stalin, if he thinks his forces have been stopped and the Wallies are going to take Central Europe instead of him, could well make peace in 1944 rather than waste his forces in Europe. Because you're right Stalin wanted some expansion and if Europe was not where he would get it he'd turn to Asia because the Japanese were easier pickings than Germany ITTL.


Problem is even as late as April 1945 the Soviets still displayed basic tactical mistakes that cost them a lot of unnecessary casualties. See Seelowe Heights. So whatever lessons they learned were quite uneven and that doesn't take into consideration the lessons the Germans learned about countering Soviet tactics. You're right that in the long run Soviet resources would allow them to push the Germans back, though I think that would take longer than you think, they wouldn't be able to pull off a Bagration encirclement without the Germans holding overextended lines with too few troops, they'd just push bulges in the German lines at great cost and grind them back. By 1944 the Soviets could not afford 'victories' like that given their declining replacement pool, since they both needed to reconquer occupied territory to get replacements from the population there and really wear down German manpower and equipment in major pocket battles at the same time.

As to Polish Partisans they weren't really that big of an issue until the Soviets got close; if the Soviets are stymied in central Belarus the Poles would keep their resources husbanded for the decisive battles later on.


They did. Stalin repeatedly freaked out about casualties because he did have an eye toward the post-war period. That's why a lot of Soviet losses even later in the war were hidden in the paper work. Boris Sokolov has found some interesting discrepancies in Soviet strength and loss reporting for Kursk and even the 1945 battles in Poland. He goes way too far extrapolating that for the entire war, but he has some basis for the claims he makes. Interestingly it is also the Polish communist forces that expose some of the reporting issues, as modern Poland reported much higher casualties of their troops in 1945 than what the Soviets claimed they took during the war, like 300% higher losses. Commanders were much less interested in the cost of war, especially Zhukov, than getting results that would please Stalin; Stalin however was concerned about his forces' post-war strength and of course what the labor pool would be to run the economy. Question is whether he actually knew how bad losses were or whether he accepted the reports he was given as factual.

If Soviet forces could not advance significantly or destroy major German formations as they did in Summer 1944 while the Wallies advance through France then I think there is a good chance that Stalin starts thinking about his options regarding peace deals, because his forces would be relatively much weaker than they were IOTL at the end of the 1944 campaigns due to the lack of reconquered territory and population as well as lack of prestige victories that would match with the Wallies. IOTL he waited to make any deals about the post-war situation in Europe until he had all the bargaining chips in his pocket he could get before agreeing to the Yalta conference; until then he kept rebuffing FDR and Churchill's desire for a conference to hammer these things out. Which means Stalin was quite concerned about his standing before even thinking of signing any treaties and that if he felt he wouldn't be able to get what he wanted, control over half of Europe, due to his forces being stymied east of the 1941 border, then he very well could cut a deal to spare what manpower was remaining and perhaps gain some territory at the peace table rather than in war. Stalin definitely had zero concern about screwing over the Wallies if it got him what he wanted.


WW1 says otherwise vis-a-vis Russia. They learned how to fight by 1916 and still lost. Plus really when you analyze the campaigns of 1944 the Soviets really hadn't learned to fight all that much better relative to 1943, casualties after all had sapped their experience, it is that the Wallies had gotten more involved, destroyed and drew off German reserves, and Hitler got increasingly stupid with his decisions. So if one general was willing to disobey and remove one of the very worst mistakes Hitler made it would really screw up Soviet plans at the decisive moment in the war. Stalin was not willing to win a Pyrrhic victory that would just see his regime collapse post-war while the Wallies get all the rewards.


Ok, I see now we're getting to the point of common ground. Yes I agree that with time the Soviets could push the Germans out of Belarus, but they'd run out of manpower in the process given that it would be slow and not decisive, so if AG-Center can drag out the campaign into 1945 and keep the Soviets only at the 1941 border by then then the Soviets are really screwed manpower-wise. That's when peace was possible, because even the Soviets have their limits and if the Germans can keep their industrial areas in Poland, Silesia, Hungary, and the Czech areas without disruption in all of 1944 plus avoid massive manpower and equipment losses in pocket battles then the Wehrmacht is going to be a LOT more powerful by that point.

If the Balkan area remains free of Soviets into 1945 then Stalin is really going to be in a bad position because the several hundred thousand men in reinforcements they got from the Romanians, Bulgarians, Yugoslavs, and even to some degree Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians will effectively leave them extremely short of manpower while the Germans will have an enormous pressure taken off of them in 1944-45. Soviet manpower reserves were simply not good enough by that point. Not only that, but if the Germans can remain within range of Ukraine they have the ability to continue to supply and support the UPA behind Soviet lines, which remained a dangerous bleeding sore for them even after WW2 into the 1950s.

Ukrainian Insurgent Army - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The Soviets only really were able to deal with them because WW2 ended and they could then dedicate all the necessary resources to finishing off the organization, but even then it took years to achieve and a lot of bloodshed. Not unlike Vietnam.


Soviet success on the scale they had was highly dependent on Hitler's mistakes, all through 1943-44 (and before and after of course). Soviet forces were large, but manpower was declining, which is why the field forces were 1.5 million men smaller at the end of the war than in January 1945. They had effectively run out of replacements. So if they avoid their successes of Summer 1944 they'd be in an even worse situation sooner if they couldn't conscript liberated POWs and various occupied peoples plus get the Romanians and Bulgarians to switch sides and add several hundred thousand men to the Soviet military (and act as cannon fodder to spare the Soviets casualties). More costly than OTL is not something the Soviets could afford. As it was demographically they've never recovered from WW2 and Russia today is in a particularly tough situation given the gaps in babies born as a result. Stalin did not allow censuses from 1939-1953 for a reason, for it would expose the enormous damage he had inflicted on his people.


AG-Center withdrawing intact is exactly the worst situation for the Soviets. They simply could not afford the losses they'd take slowly shoving AG-Center back to the 1941 border, especially if it meant they couldn't get ahold of the local population before the Germans removed the military age males first and the fighting wrecked the infrastructure and economy of reconquered territories. Plus such slow 'victories' shove back the enemy tended to result in worse losses than a major victory that involved encirclements. As it was the Soviets took 2 losses for every one the Germans suffered during OTL Bagration. If they suffered losses on the scale they had in previous less successful battles in Belarus like the Smolensk campaign of 1943, they'd have suffered 4:1 losses, which was utterly unsustainable especially if they didn't gain a lot of ground, territory was wrecked, civilian population was evacuated except for the elderly and children, and the next enemy line was waiting for them to have to fight through.

If the Soviets are still on the Bug River by 1945 they are seriously screwed, since that means AG-North is still in place as well and intact and Baltic manpower still can be exploited. It also buys time for Vlasov's forces to be set up as well, not to mention industry set up in the eastern areas (Poland, Hungary, Czech territory, Baltic areas) to be brought online out of range of bombers. As I said above it likely also means the Soviets cut a deal since they wouldn't be able to get the gains they wanted at a cost that would be acceptable. After all you need manpower post-war to hold your gains and run the economy.

I agree that german could stop soviets for 6-9 months,but not longer.And as long as Hitler lived he would never agree to peace,becouse in canon he always wonted from Sralin too much.
1.Sralin wonted Europe,not Asia.
2.It was Zhukow mistake.Other generals did not made them
3.Sralin wont screw allies - but Hitler do not gave him chance.
4.Both sides with ammo.Russian during WW1 forget about making enough ammo factory and,as result,fought after 1914 almost without artillery.
5.Then Sralin would fire Zhukow,who wasted most soviet soldiers.He promoted him becouse of it - he feared russian Napoleon who finish revolution,and best option was have butcher hated by his own soldiers.
But,in this scenario,he would fire him.
And soviets,thanks to american traitors,knew about A bomb - so they would not make peace,becouse they knew it would be used.
6.Sralin do not agreed to census,becouse it would show how many died before 1941.And he had commanders who do not wasted lives for no reason,like butcher Zhukow.Rokossowski,Koniew,many others.He would use them more.
7.Sralin thought about next war,not peace.And he need borders as far west as possible for that.Loses could be smaller with smarter generals - which he had - and new soldiers would grow till next war.

I think,that you would be right - if not for Hitler greed.In his dealing with Sralin He always wonted so much then Sralin could not agree with that.
If soviet agent Bormann killed Hitler,it would change.

 

[sillygoose]

I agree that german could stop soviets for 6-9 months,but not longer.And as long as Hitler lived he would never agree to peace,becouse in canon he always wonted from Sralin too much.

If they could stop the Soviets that long it would be a huge game changer. Because at that point Soviet forces would have been bleed out without similarly bleeding out the Axis forces.

Hitler wasn't necessarily the obstacle to peace, Stalin wanted more than Hitler would give up in 1943. However if Stalin is stymied and his forces are being bled out for shoving back the line a few dozen KM per huge offensive he could well end up cutting a deal rather than pay the blood price beyond what the victories being achieved were worth.

1.Sralin wonted Europe,not Asia.

He wanted both to have a major security zone at his borders. Europe was more important obviously, but there is a limit to the price Stalin wanted to pay given that he had to have a work force AND army left by the time it was over.

2.It was Zhukow mistake.Other generals did not made them

David Glantz says otherwise. He has a great series of books on the 'forgotten battles' of the Eastern Front, which gets into all the failed operations the Soviets launched; far more generals, even late in the war, made major mistakes too, not just Zhukov. Zhukov was simply the most famous of Stalin's butchers.

3.Sralin wont screw allies - but Hitler do not gave him chance.

Stalin would screw anyway. He did after WW2.

4.Both sides with ammo.Russian during WW1 forget about making enough ammo factory and,as result,fought after 1914 almost without artillery.

Pardon? Not sure what you're referring two with the first part.

Russia had plenty of artillery and ammo in 1914, they had probably in 1915 due to hoarding ammo for their forts in Poland.

5.Then Sralin would fire Zhukow,who wasted most soviet soldiers.He promoted him becouse of it - he feared russian Napoleon who finish revolution,and best option was have butcher hated by his own soldiers.
But,in this scenario,he would fire him.
And soviets,thanks to american traitors,knew about A bomb - so they would not make peace,becouse they knew it would be used.

Maybe, Zhukov had fucked up repeatedly earlier in the war (Rzhev...) and kept his job. Also during Bagration all he did was coordinate the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts, he didn't command them, so really Rokossovsky and who ever the other Front commander was would pay the price.

6.Sralin do not agreed to census,becouse it would show how many died before 1941.And he had commanders who do not wasted lives for no reason,like butcher Zhukow.Rokossowski,Koniew,many others.He would use them more.

That too, but definitely war losses were more concerning to Stalin, as he only publicly acknowledged 7 million deaths in the war, not the 20 million that reports to the Politburo said. Many more Soviets died in WW2 than the pre-war period.

He did use them more. Zhukov mostly just coordinated Fronts between 1941-44. From November 1944-June 1945 he commanded the 1st Belorussian Front, his first Front command of the war. Remember he was on the STAVKA staff since 1939 and didn't leave until November 1944.

Georgy Zhukov - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

There was a brief period where he took over after Vatutin got killed by the UPA, but went back to his coordinate/STAVKA representative role shortly after.

7.Sralin thought about next war,not peace.And he need borders as far west as possible for that.Loses could be smaller with smarter generals - which he had - and new soldiers would grow till next war.

He wasn't thinking just about war, but about having enough people left to run the country after the war. With being stymied in the East for months with high losses, only minor gains, and limited damaged inflicted on the Axis forces, he'd really have to consider whether it would be worth it to keep fighting out the war if the cost would cripple the USSR postwar. IOTL it was clearly worth it because of the massive victories racked up throughout 1944 into 1945, but without those victories from June through December 1944 and the Wallies advancing in the west Stalin might have second thoughts about things, because as I said before he explicitly held off on the Yalta agreement until he had sufficient bargaining chips (Budapest being a big one) in his pocket to make an agreement with the US and UK about the post-war political situation.

There were no different generals at stake here, Zhukov wasn't leading most of the battles anyway, just coordinating Fronts; commanders like Rokossovsky ran his front his way even when Zhukov coordinated part of Bagration.

As to 'growing new soldiers' that helps in 18 years, but until then you need a work force and troops left to man your army. Especially if it looks like the US and UK would take Germany themselves and leave Stalin out in the cold in the 2nd half of 1944 he could well say screw it, bargain for the best deal he could get from Hitler (which would probably be decent given the situation in France), to preserve manpower and get back prisoners, both civilian and military.

 

[ATP]

I think tha without Hitler ,or without Sralin knewing everything about USA,you would be right.

But Sralin knew about A bomb,so he could not made peace,when USA would take all otherwise.And Hitler would help him making no retreat order again and firing anybody who disobey.
Soviets would just rid of butchers like Zhukow and advance under generals who do not spend lives of their soldiers for nothing.
In OTL they could waste their soldiers,but they were capable of not doing so.