A compromise peace for World War I in 1917 had the US not entered World War I

[WolfBear]

Had the US not entered World War I and thus Britain would not have gotten unsecured loans from the US, would a compromise peace for World War I in 1917 have become very likely? Or at the very least in early 1918? Kaiser Karl was advocating one, as were both the Petrograd Soviet and the Russian Provisional Government. The German Reichstag's Peace Resolution in the summer of 1917 went in a similar direction, as did the advocacy of a lot of European socialists during this time. Could a compromise peace based on no annexations and no indemnities have been possible, or at least with plebiscites in the various disputed territories?

Here's a academic historical discussion about this topic, for what it's worth:

H-Diplo Roundtable XXIII-41 on Zelikow. The Road Less Traveled: The Secret Battle to End the Great War, 1916-1917 | H-Net

H-Diplo Roundtable XXIII-41Philip Zelikow. The Road Less Traveled: The Secret Battle to End the Great War, 1916-1917. New York: Public Affairs, 2021. ISBN: 978-1-5417-5095-1 (hardcover, $30.00).

networks.h-net.org

Would plebiscites in places such as Alsace-Lorraine, Bukovina, Transylvania, Bessarabia, Posen, Upper Silesia, Trentino, Trieste, Istria, Fiume, Bosnia, Vojvodina, Croatia, et cetera have actually been an acceptable solution to World War I-era territorial disputes?

 

[WolfBear]

@stevep Any thoughts on this?

 

[stevep]

@stevep Any thoughts on this?

The problem with a compromise peace was that it needs compromise. The allies might be willing with the fiscal situation causing them problems but the Germans leadership was still intent on a decisive military victory.

OTL this was the Kaiser's response to 'his' parliament suggesting such a peace - see the entry for the 21st July:

Germany: Kaiser Wilhelm Rejects Reichstag Peace Resolution, Promises “Second Punic War” Against England

Peacemaking efforts took some degree of precedence in the summer of 1917 as all sides began to fret that more harm was staring to come of this war than good. While the British tried to bribe Enver Pasha, the socialist-dominated German Reichstag finally abandoned its truce with the Kaiser and passed a resolution calling for peace. The motion passed by 212 votes to 126. It asked for a “peace by agreement and a permanent reconciliation.”

Germany’s new chancellor, Dr. Michaelis, who had succeeded Bethmann-Hollweg a week before, vowed that he would never seek peace. “I do not consider that a body like the German Reichstag is a fit one to decide about peace and war on its own initiative during the war.” The Kaiser agreed, and remarkably visited Reichstag representatives to tell them in person. It was the first time the monarch had deigned to meet his representative government in two decades.

The Kaiser made a relentless speech calling for a “Second Punic War.” Once England, that modern Carthage, had been defeated, Germany would rise to its place in the sun. Wilhelm called attention to German’s recent great victory on the Eastern Front, but he made his biggest impact when he commented that “When my guards appear, there is no room for democracy.”

Note this was in July 1917 OTL, with Russia still fighting albeit weakly, Britain pressing on the western front, Germany's allies weakening and the US already in the war. Now consider a situation where its 1918, Russia has totally collapsed and Germany has a vast new empire in the east, the US is ignoring events in Europe and Britain and France are restricted, possibly badly by the US refusing to trade with them?

The best option is some version of OTL with Germany making a last offensive in the west which drains their lasts reserves and morale and a last gasp allied counter attack forces a final collapse of the CPs. In that case expected a seriously harsh peace with Germany because with no counterbalancing forces to the east or across the Atlantic and the allies weaker that would be even more necessary. Which may or may not be more stable than OTL.

Quite possibly more likely is some sort of social break down across much of Europe, quite possibly including Britain which would likely follow the path set by Lenin in Russia. How much of the continent would fall into such a state I don't know but it could be a hell of a lot of it.

 

[History Learner]

Had the US not entered World War I and thus Britain would not have gotten unsecured loans from the US, would a compromise peace for World War I in 1917 have become very likely?

The last chance for that was in the fall-winter of 1916-1917. The U.S. seemed open to the demands the Germans were putting forward, which reflected their superior position at the time while still being sufficiently moderate. Once that window passed, the question became whether or not the U.S. would continue to supply with credit/enter the war. If they don't, there isn't going to be a compromise peace because the Germans will be able to enforce a peace they desire.

 

[stevep]

The last chance for that was in the fall-winter of 1916-1917. The U.S. seemed open to the demands the Germans were putting forward, which reflected their superior position at the time while still being sufficiently moderate. Once that window passed, the question became whether or not the U.S. would continue to supply with credit/enter the war. If they don't, there isn't going to be a compromise peace because the Germans will be able to enforce a peace they desire.

Which is going to be pretty extreme given what their been talking about since September 1914.

 

[WolfBear]

The last chance for that was in the fall-winter of 1916-1917. The U.S. seemed open to the demands the Germans were putting forward, which reflected their superior position at the time while still being sufficiently moderate. Once that window passed, the question became whether or not the U.S. would continue to supply with credit/enter the war. If they don't, there isn't going to be a compromise peace because the Germans will be able to enforce a peace they desire.

Is the 1918 German Western offensive going to succeed in this TL? Also, any chance of getting the Western Allies to moderate their war aims in 1917 if the US isn't in the war, as per Russian encouragement?

 

[stevep]

Is the 1918 German Western offensive going to succeed in this TL? Also, any chance of getting the Western Allies to moderate their war aims in 1917 if the US isn't in the war, as per Russian encouragement?

On the 1st I suspect he would assume its a certainty. Far from certain as the allies are still producing far more equipment that Germany - and also not equipping the US army here. Even with less production because of economic problems their going to be a tough nut to crack and the Germans could well break their army trying as OTL.

Possibly but as HL says the Germans won't. They rejected the US approach because they wanted more then so if they think the advantage is with them and the overwhelming victory their been desiring from the start is still possibly the current leadership isn't going to be interested in compromise. You need two to tango. - Of course after another fruitless year of bloodshed and worsening conditions at home the leadership might change.

 

[History Learner]

Which is going to be pretty extreme given what their been talking about since September 1914.

Too Proud to Fight: Woodrow Wilson's Neutrality by Patrick Devlin on Page 576, states that the German peace notes in late 1916 were favorable in Wilson's opinion and he hoped the Entente would agree to them, so we know the U.S. would be accepting of such a peace deal based on them. What exactly did they say, however?

They called for the restoration of the German border in the West but with the annexation of Luxembourg and undefined border adjustments with France (Presumably Briey-Longwy and the Vosges brought under German control), "guarantees" from Belgium about its future neutrality/military posture, annexations in the Baltics and the creation of the Kingdom of Poland under a Habsburg. Reparations from France were discussed but undefined in context and clearly were meant as a simple starting position to be hammered out in an actual peace conference.

The September Program, which I assume you are referencing, was not official policy and was more of a consulting framework.

Is the 1918 German Western offensive going to succeed in this TL? Also, any chance of getting the Western Allies to moderate their war aims in 1917 if the US isn't in the war, as per Russian encouragement?

I don't think there is going to be a 1918 offensive because if the Allies don't cut a deal, they're going to collapse on their own in 1917. It was basically understood by all the U.S. was leveraging its influence to force a moderate German victory and bring peace, thereby forcing the Entente to accept it and Germany to limit its demands.

 

[stevep]

Too Proud to Fight: Woodrow Wilson's Neutrality by Patrick Devlin on Page 576, states that the German peace notes in late 1916 were favorable in Wilson's opinion and he hoped the Entente would agree to them, so we know the U.S. would be accepting of such a peace deal based on them. What exactly did they say, however?

They called for the restoration of the German border in the West but with the annexation of Luxembourg and undefined border adjustments with France (Presumably Briey-Longwy and the Vosges brought under German control), "guarantees" from Belgium about its future neutrality/military posture, annexations in the Baltics and the creation of the Kingdom of Poland under a Habsburg. Reparations from France were discussed but undefined in context and clearly were meant as a simple starting position to be hammered out in an actual peace conference.

Well until it was discovered that German plans were for annexation of parts of Belgium - as well as colonial territory - and indirect control of the rest. Also Wilson for all his arrogance didn't accept the idea of territorial aggrandizement by either side, let alone against innocent neutrals.

The September Program, which I assume you are referencing, was not official policy and was more of a consulting framework.

Which was widely accepted by the war hawks who increasingly dominated the German military.

I don't think there is going to be a 1918 offensive because if the Allies don't cut a deal, they're going to collapse on their own in 1917. It was basically understood by all the U.S. was leveraging its influence to force a moderate German victory and bring peace, thereby forcing the Entente to accept it and Germany to limit its demands.

Unlikely. They will suffer a lot of the US decides to end trade - which of course will affect the US somewhat as well - but given their in for a fight for national survival the population will be willing to bear a lot faced with the continually escalating demands from Berlin. By 1918 Germany is on its last legs and its allies are exhausted.

Plus what does the US do when it realises that German ideas of a moderate German victory is major annexations and control of what's left of the continent?

 

[History Learner]

Well until it was discovered that German plans were for annexation of parts of Belgium - as well as colonial territory - and indirect control of the rest. Also Wilson for all his arrogance didn't accept the idea of territorial aggrandizement by either side, let alone against innocent neutrals.

The terms listed are what the Germans themselves proposed; they did not intend to annex Belgium or parts of it. Wilson was personally favorable of these terms and historically accepted territorial aggrandizement at Versailles, so there's no need to speculate on this.

Which was widely accepted by the war hawks who increasingly dominated the German military.

Except it wasn't, and there's considerable debate in the history field on the subject of if it even existed in the sense of being a cohesive, formalized plan; certainly, it was never approved by German officials in any capacity.

Unlikely. They will suffer a lot of the US decides to end trade - which of course will affect the US somewhat as well - but given their in for a fight for national survival the population will be willing to bear a lot faced with the continually escalating demands from Berlin. By 1918 Germany is on its last legs and its allies are exhausted.

Every single department of the British Government said fighting on past the middle of 1917 was impossible, as it would involve mass starvation of the British Isles themselves and the collapse of industrial production needed to fight the war. The French President in late 1917 directly said American oil supplies alone were vital, as necessary as blood in the conflict. All of this is documented and I've cited it before to you.

National will on the homefront breaks as millions die from starvation, while on the Front the Soldiers die as they are left to fight with spears against modern artillery and machine guns. At that point, Germany can enforce whatever it wants and the United States will accept it, given the Anglo-French stubbornness engendered the situation.

Plus what does the US do when it realises that German ideas of a moderate German victory is major annexations and control of what's left of the continent?

Except there was not to be major annexations and the entire point of the U.S. intervention was to trigger a situation where the latter could be mitigated by keeping the Anglo-French-Russians around as viable, albeit defeated, powers.

 

[WolfBear]

Wilson was personally favorable of these terms and historically accepted territorial aggrandizement at Versailles, so there's no need to speculate on this.

Technically speaking, though, Versailles was supposed to be based on the principle of national self-determination. There were exceptions, no doubt, but that was the general guiding principle.

 

[stevep]

The terms listed are what the Germans themselves proposed; they did not intend to annex Belgium or parts of it. Wilson was personally favorable of these terms and historically accepted territorial aggrandizement at Versailles, so there's no need to speculate on this.

Untrue

Except it wasn't, and there's considerable debate in the history field on the subject of if it even existed in the sense of being a cohesive, formalized plan; certainly, it was never approved by German officials in any capacity.

So all the statements by German leaders are to be ignored.

Every single department of the British Government said fighting on past the middle of 1917 was impossible, as it would involve mass starvation of the British Isles themselves and the collapse of industrial production needed to fight the war. The French President in late 1917 directly said American oil supplies alone were vital, as necessary as blood in the conflict. All of this is documented and I've cited it before to you.

So Germany can produce miracles without any external support but France and Britain, with access to the rest of the world, multiple allies and large empires are doomed to collapse as soon as the US decides to stop trading with them.

National will on the homefront breaks as millions die from starvation, while on the Front the Soldiers die as they are left to fight with spears against modern artillery and machine guns. At that point, Germany can enforce whatever it wants and the United States will accept it, given the Anglo-French stubbornness engendered the situation.

Again untrue as its the Germans who have forced the issue by their demands. However if the US is that misguided they have themselves to blame for the mess their helped create.

Except there was not to be major annexations and the entire point of the U.S. intervention was to trigger a situation where the latter could be mitigated by keeping the Anglo-French-Russians around as viable, albeit defeated, powers.

Again that is contradicted by all the plans made by Germany for after the war.

 

[WolfBear]

Again that is contradicted by all the plans made by Germany for after the war.

I think that HL is arguing that creating vassal states is different from outright annexation.

 

[History Learner]

Technically speaking, though, Versailles was supposed to be based on the principle of national self-determination. There were exceptions, no doubt, but that was the general guiding principle.

For Wilson, yes, but none of the rest deluded themselves and Wilson still tried to get the Treaty signed in the U.S. regardless.

 

[History Learner]

Untrue

I have provided the citation with page number; if you feel I am misquoting or misrepresenting the work, you have all the power at the fingertips to prove such. If you feel the source is wrong, then the onus is on you to provide a competing source. Your personal disagreement is not a valid argument in of itself.

So all the statements by German leaders are to be ignored.

Given you have not defined or cited any, yes.

So Germany can produce miracles without any external support but France and Britain, with access to the rest of the world, multiple allies and large empires are doomed to collapse as soon as the US decides to stop trading with them.

Yes, according to the British and French Governments. To re-quote what I have shown you elsewhere, The Command of Gold Reversed: American Loans to Britain, 1915-1917 by John Milton Cooper, Jr., Pacific Historical Review, May, 1976, Vol. 45, No. 2 (May, 1976), pp. 209-230:

The American retaliatory legislation also prompted the British government in September and October 1916 to initiate its first comprehensive inquiry into dependence upon American trade. Up to that time, the Treasury, War Trade Advisory Council, and Ministry of Munitions had separately studied the situation. The suggestion for a broad review of British dependence first came on September 5, 1916, from Richard Sperling, a clerk in the American Section of the Foreign Office. Sperling proposed the review as a preliminary step toward counterretaliatory measures. The suggestion found favor with his superiors, and on September 13, the Foreign Secretary asked for representatives of other ministries to meet with members of his department in order to "ascertain definitely how far this country is dependent financially and commercially on the United States... ." Delays ensued, and not until October 3 did an interdepartmental committee from the Foreign Office, Treasury, Board of Trade, Admiralty, Board of Agriculture, Ministry of Munitions, War Office, and Colonial Office meet to review the American situation.'3​

​

The interdepartmental committee made a shocking discovery. The chairman, Lord Eustace Percy of the Foreign Office, reported, ". .. it developed at once at the conference that there was really nothing to deliberate about because our dependence was so vital and complete in every respect that it was folly even to consider reprisals." The committee had found that in food, raw materials, and particularly steel, "American supplies are so necessary to us that reprisals, while they would produce tremendous distress in America, would also practically stop the war." Even worse, in order to finance the war orders, the Treasury had to "find something over ?2,000,000 sterling a day in New York." By March 1917, British reserves of gold and securities would be gone. "Now, in these circumstances," wrote Percy, "our job is not merely to maintain decently friendly relations with the United States, but to keep sentiment in America so sweet that it will lend us practically unlimited money." No record was kept of the discussion that produced those conclusions, but it is not hard to guess what happened at the meeting. The Treasury representative to the committee was Keynes, and Percy's comments on finance recapitulated views that Keynes had often expressed. Not only was Keynes the best in-formed person about the American situation on the committee, but throughout his adult life the economist's quick mind and ready turn of phrase made him excel in swaying small groups of experts. The interdepartmental committee, it would seem, furnished an ideal forum for the Treasury's brilliant Cassandra.'4​

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At the end of October 1916, the Foreign Office circulated three sets of documents from the committee to the Cabinet. These included a resolution against reprisals, a memorandum by Percy urging conciliation toward the United States, and papers on British dependence by different departments. The most incisive arguments came in the Treasury paper prepared by Keynes. Dwindling stocks of gold and securities could meet less and less of the financial requirements, he noted. More and more money would therefore have to come from loans. But loans carried great dangers. "A statement," Keynes warned, "from the United States executive deprecating or disapproving of such loans would render their flotation in sufficient volume a practical impossibility." Even official approval, he further warned, might not be enough. "The sums which this country will require to borrow in the United States of America in the next six to nine months are so enormous, amounting to several times the national debt of that country, that it will be necessary to appeal to every class and section of the investing public." Keynes's conclusion was chilling: "It is hardly an exaggeration to say that In a few months time the American executive and the American public will be in a position to dictate to this country on matters that affect us more dearly than them.""5​

Again untrue as its the Germans who have forced the issue by their demands. However if the US is that misguided they have themselves to blame for the mess their helped create.

The demands were not considered unreasonable by the United States, which is all that is relevant. If the Anglo-French refused to accept them, then the U.S. was clear it would wipe its hands of the situation and the Germans could enforce harsher demands later. Whether you like it or not on a personal level, welcome to Geopolitics.

Again that is contradicted by all the plans made by Germany for after the war.

You've stated this, yes, but that alone does not constitute evidence. Indeed, you have yet to define what these are; I brought up the September Program because that is what I assumed you were talking about, but once again those were not the definitive German plan and there's doubt on if they even constituted a cohesive plan rather than a packet of options.

 

[WolfBear]

For Wilson, yes, but none of the rest deluded themselves and Wilson still tried to get the Treaty signed in the U.S. regardless.

Well, I mean, the post-WWI settlement did contain numerous plebiscites, and even when it didn't borders were often determined based on ethnic lines. The main exceptions often involved strategic/defensive concerns (such as South Tyrol and the Sudetenland) or economic considerations (Alsace-Lorraine and Romania getting a western border slightly farther than the ethnic line would allow). And of course the occasional border was determined on the battlefield, as with Poland's 1921 border with the Soviet Union, which was located significantly farther to the east than the Curzon Line was.

 

[History Learner]

Well, I mean, the post-WWI settlement did contain numerous plebiscites, and even when it didn't borders were often determined based on ethnic lines. The main exceptions often involved strategic/defensive concerns (such as South Tyrol and the Sudetenland) or economic considerations (Alsace-Lorraine and Romania getting a western border slightly farther than the ethnic line would allow). And of course the occasional border was determined on the battlefield, as with Poland's 1921 border with the Soviet Union, which was located significantly farther to the east than the Curzon Line was.

Most of which is applicable to what the Germans wanted; the modifications with France being strategic, the creation of buffer states in the East, etc.

 

[WolfBear]

Most of which is applicable to what the Germans wanted; the modifications with France being strategic, the creation of buffer states in the East, etc.

Yeah, FWIW, I don't have a problem with Brest-Litovsk. The post-1991 reality in that part of the world shows that Brest-Litovsk was right. Eastern Europe should have been given more autonomy, though.

AFAIK, Germany wanted Briey and Longwy for economic reasons (specifically due to their iron ore). Which other parts of France and Belgium did Germany want during World War I? Liege? Was that for strategic reasons? And any other territories?