French unity, persistence, and strategy in a Germany goes east WWI- Union Sacree?

Buba

A total creep
As to Modlin:
1 - the inner ring of forts was from the late 1880s - minimally modernised, these were useless in 1915;
2 - the construction of the outer ring of forts began in 1912. By 1914 these were in various stages of completion - some barely touched upon, some half way through, some almost complete - all were lacking equipment;
3 - the garrison of the fortress - the men who knew where the forts were, where the roads between them were, etc. etc. all had been "combed out" in late 1914 to make good losses of the field troops. By the summer of 1915 most of the defenders were fresh conscripts, barely trained and who could lose their way between the forts (or inside them). 1915 Modlin was in no way a "combat ready" fortress.
BTW - I live 3km away from the outside ring :)

Dęblin:
- it was stood down in 1907/8 and reactivated in 1912. The officers and men who knew the fortress had been dispersed across the armed forces. By 1915 replacing equipment moved out/stolen during the "inactive years" was in no way complete. Same as Modlin, come the summer of 1915 Dęblin was not a fortress ready for combat.

What I wrote does not contradict what you did, that in 1915 fortresses as such could not resist modern siege artillery, that Verdun held out by virtue of being part of the frontline and being defended from trenches, foxholes and ruins.
French don't have the money to fight a long war
In 1914 France was financially much stronger than Germany or A-H. Nevertheless the CP managed four years without any US loans. So France could easily had fought the war without any US loans too, simply it would have to finance it differently than in OTL. Same applies to Britain, BTW.
The "no US entry in February 1917=financial collapse of Entente inside weeks" is a myth.
 
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sillygoose

Well-known member
As to Modlin:
1 - the inner ring of forts was from the late 1880s - minimally modernised, these were useless in 1915;
2 - the construction of the outer ring of forts began in 1912. By 1914 these were in various stages of completion - some barely touched upon, some how way, all were lacking equipment;
3 - the garrison of the fortress - the men who knew were the forts were, where the roads were, etc. etc. all had been "combed out" in late 1914 to make good losses of the field troops. By the summer of 1915 most of the defenders were fresh conscripts, barely trained and who could lose their way between the forts (or inside them). 1915 Modlin was in no way a "combat ready" fortress.
BTW - I live 3km away from the outside ring :)
Thanks for the info. So where were the modernized Russian forts they had spent so much money on?

Dęblin:
- it was stood down in 1907/8 and reactivated in 1912. The officers and men who knew the fortress had been dispersed across the armed forces. By 1915 replacing equipment moved out/stolen during the "inactive years" was in no way complete. Same as Modlin, come the summer of 1915 Dęblin was not a fortress ready for combat.

What I wrote does not contradict what you did, that in 1915 fortresses as such could not resist modern siege artillery, that Verdeun held out by virtua of being part of the frontline and being defended from trenches, foxholes and ruins.
Yeah, sounds like a disaster waiting to happen. Even if without the 1914 losses.

In 1914 France was financially much stronger than Germany or A-H. Nevertheless the CP managed four years without any US loans. So France could easily had fought the war without any US loans too, simply it would have to finance it differently than in OTL. Same applies to Britain, BTW.
Not really what Hew Strachan says. France had so much of its money tied up in Russia it was cash poor as of 1914 even if theoretically it had a lot of 'on paper' investments. Germany and A-H weren't nearly as cashed up as Britain, but were not poor either. Really without British finance the Entente would have been very cash poor vs the CPs.

The CPs had access to resources in Central Europe that France lacked, namely coal, iron, and oil. France had to import everything IOTL, though ITTL they wouldn't lose the limited resources around Longwy and the other areas taken by Germany. However even with those resources they had to import coal from Britain on loan, not to mention a huge amount of steel, oil, gun cotton, and food from the US. So no, without British cash they aren't able to buy what they need given the low quality of French iron (a lot of which was actually in German Lorraine). Certainly France could fight a limited war without its full strength on the German border, but it would be a limited war with limited numbers of troops so that they could actually be financed. Of course that's assuming no political problems for France in doing so.

The "no US entry in February 1917=financial collapse of Entente inside weeks" is a myth.
That is flat out wrong, no offense.
IT was April for one thing, the other and more important factor was the US wasn't accepting anything but dollars as a payment and all the US banks cut off further loans to Britain as the Entente ran out of collateral and Wilson's Fed advised banks the US government wouldn't backstop further loans. So no more loans means no more US oil, food, steel, gun cotton, etc. without which the Entente war effort implodes.


"on 1 April 1917 Britain's cash in the United States was all but exhausted. In New York, against an overdraft of $358 million and a weekly spend of $75 million Britain had $490 million in securities and $87 million in gold. At home the Bank of England and the joint stock banks could command a reserve of £114 million in gold. But just at the point when the exhaustion of Britain's finances was about to cut the Entente's Atlantic trade Germany declared unrestricted U-boat warfare, with the intention of achieving the same result. The effect was finally to precipitate the United States's entry into the war."
 

Buba

A total creep
So where were the modernized Russian forts they had spent so much money on?
After the Japanese War all fortresses east of the Bug and Niemen were deactivated, the sole exception being Modlin.
Reactivation c.1912 and some breaking ground for new forts that year, but mostly 1913.
Besides Modlin and Dęblin, there was Ossowiec, Warsaw - where by 1912 some forts had disappeared as the local populace (with almost certain collusion of corrupt military) had stolen the bricks (these are 1880s forts, remember, no concrete) - and whch was to make part of a gigantic fortified triangle including Modlin, then Brest, Kovno, Rovne, Lutsk ...
If you look at the map, starting from Dęblin the entire line of the Vistula, Bug, Narew, Biebrza and then Nieman up to Kovno was to be fortified, fortresses on top of all bridges and passages through swamps. Not a Maginot Line, naturally, but late XIXth century style.

The fortresses in 1915 Poland were all pretty much a work in progress, they'd be complete near the end of the decade 1916 or even later. E.g. one of my nearby forts from 1912/13 had the moats dug, earthworks done and concrete poured, but no armoured cupolas nor artillery installed.
For scale - Modlin had six forts from the 1880s and was adding over twenty forts to that. Plus modernisation of the old ones, with concrete on top of brick/earth, armoured cupolas, new artillery, electricity ...
Roads, light railways, powerplants, wells with drinking water etc. etc. - building all that takes time and money. It really is impressive how much of Modlin was built in 2-3 years time - the amount of digging and construction is astonishing!
Look at the map of the Warsaw Triangle - Modlin's outer ring was all new. Warsaw's forts needed to be rebuilt or refurbished. The connecting works - all new.
The caption is wrong - the works marked in grey were either built, in the process of being equipped, or under construction. It are the forts with names in italics which never saw any work done.

The Entente had gold and collateral to last at least until end of 1917.
Besides oil everything could be sourced from elsewhere than the US. And there was money for oil even under the system in place. And both the UK and France could change the financing the war.
I did not know about France having liquidity problems due to investment in Russia.
 
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sillygoose

Well-known member
After the Japanese War all fortresses east of the Bug and Niemen were deactivated, the sole exception being Modlin.
Reactivation c.1912 and some breaking ground for new forts that year, but mostly 1913.
Besides Modlin and Dęblin, there was Ossowiec, Warsaw - where by 1912 some forts had disappeared as the local populace (with almost certain collusion of corrupt military) had stolen the bricks (these are 1880s forts, remember, no concrete) - and whch was to make part of a gigantic fortified triangle including Modlin, then Brest, Kovno, Rovne, Lutsk ...
If you look at the map, starting from Dęblin the entire line of the Vistula, Bug, Narew, Biebrza and then Nieman up to Kovno was to be fortified, fortresses on top of all bridges and passages through swamps. Not a Maginot Line, naturally, but late XIXth century style.

The fortresses in 1915 Poland were all pretty much a work in progress, they'd be complete near the end of the decade 1916 or even later. E.g. one of my nearby forts from 1912/13 had the moats dug, earthworks done and concrete poured, but no armoured cupolas nor artillery installed.
For scale - Modlin had six forts from the 1880s and was adding over twenty forts to that. Plus modernisation of the old ones, with concrete on top of brick/earth, armoured cupolas, new artillery, electricity ...
Roads, light railways, powerplants, wells with drinking water etc. etc. - building all that takes time and money. It really is impressive how much of Modlin was built in 2-3 years time - the amount of digging and construction is astonishing!
Look at the map of the Warsaw Triangle - Modlin's outer ring was all new. Warsaw's forts needed to be rebuilt or refurbished. The connecting works - all new.
The caption is wrong - the works marked in grey were either built, in the process of being equipped, or under construction. It are the forts with names in italics which never saw any work done.
Thanks for all the info! That definitely explains why some fell so fast and the Russians abandoned the rest, some with up to 1 million artillery shells in storage! So how long do you think it would have taken to break through what was completed in 1914 with the Russians preparing their defenses due to the Germans and Austrians coming in force? Do you think the Russians still attack in Galicia? I'm thinking they would just because they think the Austrians are the easy meat.

The Entente had gold and collateral to last at least until end of 1917.
Quote already provided from the book about financing the war proves otherwise. They had a $75 million per week burn rate and were already over $350 million in debt. Sure the $490 million in securities covers that debt plus 2 weeks and the gold covers another week and a few days. I highly doubt the BoE wants to liquidate their last gold reserves though, which will buy them less than 2 weeks of spending. France and Russia were already tapped out. That was on April 1st. How do they make it to June? They could cut spending but then think how badly that impacts their war effort. If they go to extreme rationing for the public support for the war collapses and France, already having peace riots, certainly is finished especially in the wake of the mutinies. Britain won't keep going without France and Russia was not going to continue without financial support from Britain.

Besides oil everything could be sourced from elsewhere than the US. And there was money for oil even under the system in place. And both the UK and France could change the financing the war.
I did not know about France having liquidity problems due to investment in Russia.
Actually no it could not given the distances. Oil was 400% further, which means that your tanker fleet is reduced to 25% of its capacity. Same reason the British had to rely on US oil (and everything else) in WW2, shipping constraints especially given the Uboat threat and losses. 25% of oil is a death blow to the RN. Mexican and Venezuelan oil are owned by US companies, so you need dollars to buy from them. Iran is the only source and like I said 400% further away than the US.

You can't change financing of foreign purchasing. Sorry, doesn't work that way; it was US dollars or nothing and as you see above British finances (they handled all loans and purchasing since they could borrow at the best rate) they had only enough until mid-May without massive cuts in purchasing. Also Wilson was already considering forcing the British blockade of the CPs because he was so furious with them for rebuffing his negotiation efforts, so that would be a political death blow to the continue Entente war effort.

All the info is in the book if you want to know more. I'd highly recommend it if you can handle dry financial history.
 

Buba

A total creep
All the info is in the book if you want to know more. I'd highly recommend it if you can handle dry financial history.
I'll read it some day :)
I can't quote figures against it as what I've read was online, on boards like this. The arguments I've seen is that "no US loans means end of current modus operandi", there being alternatives.

So how long do you think it would have taken to break through what was completed in 1914 with the Russians preparing their defenses due to the Germans and Austrians coming in force?
In all armies 1914 was all about attack. Also, Russia was treaty bound to attack Germany (the politicians demanded, the military was unhappy though).
I imagine the strike against A-H starting off as in OTL.
The PODs begin with the 2nd Army being slaughtered to the north of Warsaw. The 9th Army is thrown against the Germans advancing from East Prussia towards Warsaw or through Ossowiec (IIRC there were exactly THREE railways between Germany and Russia east of the Vistula - Mława (Danzig-Warsaw line), Grajewo (East Prussia-Belostok) and Kovno - to Koenigsberg). With fewer reserves sent south against A-H forces I expect the pressure from both south and north to make the Russians fall back to the Bug-Nieman line (the idea en vigour between 1905 and 1912).
Modlin - and everything else - holds out for as long as the 305mm Skoda mortars by Porsche do not make an appearance. Modlin, however, performs better than in OTL as it held by trained fortress troops who know the layout.

I'd not be surprised if the front is on the Niemen-Bug line by end of September.
 

stevep

Well-known member
Sorry it has taken so long to get back to you, real life gets busy.

No problem. I have the advantage of being retired which helps a lot in the amount of time I can spend on-line.

They didn't think about it like that, so the way you're framing the situation is already a problem.
French independence wouldn't be threatened if the country stayed out of the war and the French Left was pretty anti-war especially if it meant their participation would involved invading Germany to help Russia. Whether or not the majority of the public supported the general strike so long as the French Left supported it in their key strongholds then they will have the ability to shut down Paris and other industrial cities. If people turn on them then you have a civil war in the industrial heart of France. Either way it seriously negatively impacts the French war effort. When the bloody defeat inevitably happens at the border the French Left ends up looking like they were right anyway.

I would have to disagree here. Even apart from the mutual hostility dating from 1870 there was the strength of the perversion of Darwin's ideas that were widely spread around the western world, being influential in the UK and US - albeit fortunately less badly than the continental powers. Not to mention that the entire German war plan OTL [and for about a decade] was 'if there's a major war we immediately launch a full scale invasion to conquer France.

This is aside from the more traditional issue of balance of power factors. If France stands aside in a German attack on Russia then it loses any credibility as an ally as well as its only significant ally while, assuming that the CPs are as successful as your assuming then they gain greatly in terms of territory and resources for minimal losses. This leaves France and every other power on the continent vulnerable to a German empire that prefers military force as its primary tool in setting differences.


I'm not clear on what you're meaning in the second sentence above. Economic controls that the French government will impose won't really help given their lack of cash to actually pay for things; per Hew Strachan's magisterial work on the finance of WW1 the French relied on British loans taken out from the US to finance their war effort, so without Britain being in the war and borrowing from the US on their behalf the French don't have the money to fight a long war, so even without the invasion damage they are still unable to import the necessary materials to fight the war unless Britain is willing to give them unsecured loans or buy a colony off of them. Not sure the British public would be keen on that given that they aren't officially allied, Britain is likely neutral given that their tripwire in Belgium hasn't been hit, and Russia is still a rival of Britain, so helping them defeat Germany isn't really in their interest either.

You misread my post. I mentioned German economic controls. In 1871 they imposed a huge indemnity of France with the expectation that it would prevent France regaining great power status for quite a while but the French actually paid that money and regained a significant military status very quickly. Here, assuming that France is crushed quickly we can expect an even large level of financial penalties as well as territorial annexations and probably attempts to restrict French military power as part of the peace treaty.

I was thinking that France, while not at the same level as Britain was a country with significant overseas assets. Plus in the proposed scenario its not, at least from the start going to lose a massive amount of territory including its industrial heartlands. Also like Germany it can use forced internal payments to meet its military costs for quite a while. Not to mention that Britain can probably play the OTL US role in this case, selling stuff to France to supplement their own massive military production.

Britain is probably neutral in the short term given that Belgium hasn't been invaded, presenting both an excuse for the government and a major motivator for public opinion, not least in Ireland. However while it has concerns with Russia it understands Germany as the primary threat. [Even if we take your assumption this was more due to propaganda than reality, which I don't think the evidence supports]. As such its definitely in Britain's interest to see that both France and Russia aren't heavily defeated and Germany emerges unchallenged on the continent.


Yes, because in 1915 they had that warning too and they got smashed despite being fully mobilized and Germany facing vastly heavier offensives in the west at the same time than the French could muster here. Oh and A-H was a basket case by 1915 and had to be propped up by Germany. So yeah all the advantages lie with the CPs, not Russia.

They had improved defenses in 1915 compared to 1914 not to mention vast combat experience and still they lost 1 million men and a huge swath of territory. So I have no idea why you think Russia would do so well in 1914 when basically facing 85% of the German and Austrian armies by itself. They'd be outnumbered and outgunned and those forts you think they can hide behind fell easily when actually attacked. If you want to see how quickly they could move and use their heavy artillery see the 1915 campaign and how quickly Russian forts fell:


That was while supported by field armies too.

I didn't say the firepower was insufficient at Verdun, I said the forts were useless when hit by the heavy artillery. It was the endless willingness to sacrifice men in trenches that decided Verdun, not the forts. The Russians did not display that same ability when defending their forts in 1915.


My suggestion is to check out the fighting in 1915 then, given that they had fully mobilization, actual combat experience to improve on their poor track record in 1914, and material aid from the US too. Still they were badly defeated even with the Austrians beaten to a pulp and Germany more than half tied down in the west repelling much heavier French and British offensives than the French mounted in 1914 at the border.

If what you claim is true, why did none of that work in 1915? Seems like you're pretending that the entire year of 1915 didn't exist for us to use as a model of what a Russian defensive posture performed like.

No as I said I'm working on the assumptions that:
a) The Germans strike east rather than west and
b) This is a decision made some years prior to the conflict which means that Russia will have some idea that its coming.

As such Russia has time to prepare more defences and upgrade obsolete fortresses. Also that they will change their war plans accordingly. As such instead of the position in OTL 1915 when they had already suffered huge losses and their front line against German was relatively thinly held because their attention was on the new offensive against Austria they will have something like their full strength and be more fully prepared for a CP offensive. [Note that an Austrian offensive seeking to strike through the Carpathians, which will probably strain their logistics further is likely to suffer badly, even assuming their avoided Conrad and the idea that they could wage war on two fronts, attacking both Serbia and Russia.]

As I said I expect the Russians to lose heavily and be forced back. However its likely to cost the Germans as well as the further east they go the further they strain their own logistics. There will still be serious problems with the incompetent Russian hierarchy, which rivaled that of Austria


Which they had and did spend at blockade pricing (i.e. much higher than they would pay if they could trade freely with the US rather than having to smuggle things through neutrals) and with British purchasing driving up prices. The Germans actually had more cash on hand than the French (this isn't WW2 where everyone but the French were short on gold) and they took over the gold reserves of Austria and the Ottomans to purchase for the alliance since they had more leverage in trading.

Russia was able to trade with the outside world IOTL and had loans from the US as well and purchasing from Japan (all those Arisaka rifles and ammo led Fedorov using the 6.5mm cartridge and barrel for his Avtomat rifle), but that didn't really make a difference.

I highly doubt US merchant ships would get involved in the Archangelsk run. Britain very well might if Russia is purchasing, which Germany would have to accept given the worse problem of British entry into the war. Besides it wouldn't be necessary to even try to stop given how poorly the Russians did on the defensive.

Germany was overall more populous and more industrially developed that France but it still had limitations and it didn't have the same depth of foreign reserves as France while as I mention above Britain is likely to be friendly to the EPs. As such its likely to be a long war, especially if the Russians don't collapse a lot faster as your expecting. Also given a long two front war I wouldn't rule out Germany making the mistake of getting someone like Ludendorff taking over and massively over-emphasising military production over everything else. Plus given their Atlantic ports France would still have superior access to overseas markets to Germany - at least unless Germany starts an USW camaign, which is likely to be disastrous to them as OTL.

Russia was able to trade with the outside world but once the Turks closed the straits they lost their primary lines of access as well as one of their biggest export earners in terms of their grain exports. The Siberian route was limited by the capacity of a single railway line while the Murmansk route had to be pretty much developed from scratch. As such Russia was seriously limited by what it could both export and import in WWI. Its still going to be a serious limitation here.

I was thinking that the US might seek to export to Russia given their hostility towards any restrictions on their exports to belligerence with at times threats of military intervention against the British distant blockade. Even through Britain would have advantages being closer and probably making less ruinous loan terms I suspect there will be markets for US goods in wartime Russia and while those might be carried on British or other neutral shipping some US ones might be involved.


Historically the Germans did treat the natives better than the Russians:






Remember the Russian empire was an absolute monarchy and quite violent at maintaining its rule:

Germany generally treated the non-Germans under their rule better than the Russians - albeit once they get into the Orthodox regions of the empire that balance is likely to change. Austria was the least unpopular occupier of Poland but the Poles didn't like any of the three powers.

Yes imperial Russia was too often a brutal regime but none of the great powers were that good in treating their colonial populations. The Jews and Poles suffered especially badly here. Russia was worse than any of the combantants other than the Ottomans but also they were different times. The Russian burnt earth policy in the retreat in 1915 was very bad for the people affected, but in this TL it might be less chaotic as there's more time and possibly even some coherent planning in advance.

Google translate. I'm not aware of any maps being present in the memo.
The US ones just have 'possible maps' from modern interpretations. Also note the only part of the East that is even mentioned in the English version only mentions Poland as an associated state.
The OTL 1918 situation ended up being very different from what the Septemberprogramm talked about.

I'll try and have a look at it but is there any evidence that the German wiki is any more accurate than the English speaking one?

The US didn't really care if the CPs and Russia fight and if France invades. They were just upset about Germany fighting Britain and invading Belgium. British politicians might care, but the average Brit did not. In fact were it not for Grey and Asquith's backroom dealing Britain might not have gone to war in 1914 at all.

I'm not assuming that the US would have any political interest in the war other than as OTL when it affects their trade or the welfare of their citizens or when someone takes actions against the US as OTL Germany did.

Actually as mentioned above the average Brit, apart from the concern about German behaviour pre-war, was strongly influenced by the German invasion of Belgium and their actions there.

France couldn't really be conquered and would likely just cut a deal in conjunction with Russian as soon as it was clear Russia was beaten, so that means losses to France and Russia would likely be minimized. Likely Britain would encourage a deal sooner rather than later to ensure to avoid the balance of power being disrupted too much. That likely means there isn't going to be a long war that would disrupt things too much, as no one really wanted a long costly war and Russia/France would be worried about internal stability if things go on for long given the unique issue TTL presents them. So no major need to really have continued long term mobilization if it is a relatively short war; occupation of Lithuania and Poland would just mean peacetime garrisons are set up in those areas rather than in Germany, much like how the US and UK stationed troops in Germany during the Cold War without major issue.

That assumes that not only do the CPs make the quick and relatively easy gains you predict but that they are then willing to limit their territory and other gains. Again this could well be doubtful. Thinking of both them being influenced by the early successes and also the German hostility towards Russia. If their made the effort to fight a big war and are winning why stop now and allow both opponents to maintain their core territories and be able to rebuild and still be able to defend themselves in the future?


There never was a naval threat to Britain from Germany, that was just fearmongering the RN did to get parliament to spend on the navy to replace the BB fleet given that the Dreadnought obsoleted the entire world's BB fleet overnight.

And don't forget that Britain initiated the race and was planning on blockading Germany long before the German fleet became a threat:

Funny, just after the Dreadnought was launched in 1905 and the German naval bill provided for funding a new class of BBs to match them while the Liberal government in Britain was planning on cutting the naval budget...

Actually of course Tirpitz had been Naval Minister for quite a while before Dreadnought was launched and made no secret of his programme being directed at Britain. Britain didn't initiate the race. Similarly when Britain produced the Dreadnought and then the early BCs - as they were rather inaccurately called Germany escalated by not only stepping up their own programme but converted their own armoured cruisers to much larger BCs.

The Dreadnought, although it faced institutional hostility within the Admiralty, was pretty much inevitable as similar designs were already planned in a couple of other countries. Britain just had the capacity to produce it quickly. Also it was actually cheaper than a pre-dread, which was an important selling point to the government. Note also it was a single ship. It was only when the Germans started ordering their own classes that Britain started laying down more.

That's the problem, the older stuff written in English about the war was heavily influenced by British propaganda before and during the war.

Bias prior to the war and in the aftermath was a common issue on all sides. However I'm doubtful it was still a significant factor in the 1980's and 90'.

I also don't think you realize just how much of the continent was dominated by specific ethnicities that forced their rule on others; the French for instance worked very hard to crush regionalism and dialects to the point that by the end of WW1 they were virtually wiped out other than Breton identities. Russia was an entire empire set up to dominant dozens of groups. Meanwhile Germany had the Sorbs who were pretty happy with being German; the Poles of course wanted their own country, but the great majority were dominated by Russia, while those in Austria were generally happy with the arrangement as it was other than some nationalists who joined the Polish legion under Austrian control.

Germany was not an autocracy and no more militaristic than any other state of the era with the exception of perhaps France given its strong left wing movement. Russia was the most autocratic and militaristic of the European states of the time, which British politicians didn't mind supporting despite their colonial rivalries. Also the British weren't exactly above a fuck ton of militarism and imperialism. They weren't exactly known for their honest and moral deals with colonial native populations either.

The French sought to standardise language, just as Germany and other countries did, although I have also read that it was only during WWI this really came into effect. However all those groups - including many of the German speaking population of Alsace - had still thought of themselves as French - some of the latter moving to avoid German occupation after 1871. Germany also sought to suppress the Polish language but with less impact as the Poles identified themselves as a nation.

Germany in its higher government was definitely more militaristic than most/all its neighbours. The fact that the German parliament couldn't influence military spending shows this. Russia was more brutal and autocratic in many ways but not sure about more militaristic.

Yes all the great powers had nasty histories, with the worst probably being the Ottomans and US but so what? Times were changing, albeit slowly and the question was less about behaviour outside Europe than the primary causes of WWI.



So yeah history is a lot more complicated even that what you present above.

Can you understand why I think the same?
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
I'll read it some day :)
(y)

I can't quote figures against it as what I've read was online, on boards like this. The arguments I've seen is that "no US loans means end of current modus operandi", there being alternatives.
Yeah, having had these arguments a lot on forums like this I've found that most people haven't really read more in depth histories and they're more arguing from bias than knowledge on issues like this. The few financial histories of the conflict are pretty clear about the limitations of Entente finances though and what the consequences would have been without US supplies/cash. For some reason there are a class of posters on these forums who just cannot accept that the Entente and CP situations were just different and sometimes there aren't really things that could be done differently without dramatically bad consequences to their war effort.

In all armies 1914 was all about attack. Also, Russia was treaty bound to attack Germany (the politicians demanded, the military was unhappy though).
I imagine the strike against A-H starting off as in OTL.
The PODs begin with the 2nd Army being slaughtered to the north of Warsaw. The 9th Army is thrown against the Germans advancing from East Prussia towards Warsaw or through Ossowiec (IIRC there were exactly THREE railways between Germany and Russia east of the Vistula - Mława (Danzig-Warsaw line), Grajewo (East Prussia-Belostok) and Kovno - to Koenigsberg). With fewer reserves sent south against A-H forces I expect the pressure from both south and north to make the Russians fall back to the Bug-Nieman line (the idea en vigour between 1905 and 1912).
Modlin - and everything else - holds out for as long as the 305mm Skoda mortars by Porsche do not make an appearance. Modlin, however, performs better than in OTL as it held by trained fortress troops who know the layout.

I'd not be surprised if the front is on the Niemen-Bug line by end of September.
Sounds plausible. Don't forget the German siege train:

Skoda guns were quite a bit lighter and more maneuverable, but the German big guns did much of the smashing of forts IOTL, including around Antwerp. The Skoda guns were made famous on purpose to hide the German ones from the press, since they were considered a state secret.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
I would have to disagree here. Even apart from the mutual hostility dating from 1870 there was the strength of the perversion of Darwin's ideas that were widely spread around the western world, being influential in the UK and US - albeit fortunately less badly than the continental powers. Not to mention that the entire German war plan OTL [and for about a decade] was 'if there's a major war we immediately launch a full scale invasion to conquer France.

This is aside from the more traditional issue of balance of power factors. If France stands aside in a German attack on Russia then it loses any credibility as an ally as well as its only significant ally while, assuming that the CPs are as successful as your assuming then they gain greatly in terms of territory and resources for minimal losses. This leaves France and every other power on the continent vulnerable to a German empire that prefers military force as its primary tool in setting differences.
Per the OP the invasion of France is off the table and by the time Russia is dealt with it wouldn't likely even be a viable option to try and invade given French defenses and mobilization, plus the likely chance that Russia and France would negotiate as a bloc to get the best deal possible with strong British encouragement.

Again you're talking about the way politicians thought about these issues, not the average person or the average socialist. Most of them weren't thinking in that direction, especially given that they didn't see the benefit of dying for the Russian Czar, regardless of balance of power concepts that historians, generals, and politicians concerned themselves with.

Also Power Politics was hardly confined to Germany it would just be the situation that France would have a hard time playing that game without a powerful Russia, which generally would suit the average socialist just fine; why wage wars of aggression for the aggrandizement of politicians?

You misread my post. I mentioned German economic controls. In 1871 they imposed a huge indemnity of France with the expectation that it would prevent France regaining great power status for quite a while but the French actually paid that money and regained a significant military status very quickly. Here, assuming that France is crushed quickly we can expect an even large level of financial penalties as well as territorial annexations and probably attempts to restrict French military power as part of the peace treaty.

I was thinking that France, while not at the same level as Britain was a country with significant overseas assets. Plus in the proposed scenario its not, at least from the start going to lose a massive amount of territory including its industrial heartlands. Also like Germany it can use forced internal payments to meet its military costs for quite a while. Not to mention that Britain can probably play the OTL US role in this case, selling stuff to France to supplement their own massive military production.

Britain is probably neutral in the short term given that Belgium hasn't been invaded, presenting both an excuse for the government and a major motivator for public opinion, not least in Ireland. However while it has concerns with Russia it understands Germany as the primary threat. [Even if we take your assumption this was more due to propaganda than reality, which I don't think the evidence supports]. As such its definitely in Britain's interest to see that both France and Russia aren't heavily defeated and Germany emerges unchallenged on the continent.
Guess that indemnity wasn't huge if the French were able to pay it off quickly. Sounds more like it was a reasonable price for a war France started, much like the response to the Napoleonic wars and quite a bit different than the ToV. Why would we see France crushed quickly? They'd be defeated at the German border per OTL and probably keep bashing away until it became politically unacceptable. Russia would be smashed and France would probably try to negotiate then and deal with the political fallout of the defeat. Given that Germany too didn't want a long war they'd probably just demand some border adjustments or colonies for peace and recognition of the annexation of Luxembourg. That and maybe destruction of the border forts. Not unreasonable. Unlike OTL without a major invasion of France imposing anything resembling the Septemberprogramm.

France was a country with colonies, but it had a lot of investments that weren't liquid cash; in fact much of France's capital was tied in its Russian investments. The issue with France isn't their ability to finance purchasing within the country it is their ability to pay for imports from others. They could perhaps get lines of credit from Britain, though that is debatable, which gets them coal and whatever else Britain has to export, but the important stuff like food and oil will have to come from the US. So unless Britain is willing to provide dollars to a country which might well be unable to pay it back given the war situation, France is going to be in a very tough spot once their initial invasion fails and their political issues play out. French military production wasn't really all that impressive until 1916 btw, which is likely well after the war would be decided.

Britain still has the home rule crisis to deal with if they don't participate in the war:

So they might well end up in a semi-civil war ITTL. Specific British politicians and naval officers might have thought Germany the main threat, but Britain wasn't a dictatorship, so don't expect that absent Belgium being invaded that they'd be able to do much other than financial support for the Entente to a limited degree and putting onerous terms for their neutrality on Germany (entirely denying the English Channel to German warships but not French ones for instance). Again you're viewing this through the lens of politicians and high level officers rather than the average person who wouldn't have any interest in a shit-fight among continentals that didn't really involve their immediate interests.


No as I said I'm working on the assumptions that:
a) The Germans strike east rather than west and
b) This is a decision made some years prior to the conflict which means that Russia will have some idea that its coming.

As such Russia has time to prepare more defences and upgrade obsolete fortresses. Also that they will change their war plans accordingly. As such instead of the position in OTL 1915 when they had already suffered huge losses and their front line against German was relatively thinly held because their attention was on the new offensive against Austria they will have something like their full strength and be more fully prepared for a CP offensive. [Note that an Austrian offensive seeking to strike through the Carpathians, which will probably strain their logistics further is likely to suffer badly, even assuming their avoided Conrad and the idea that they could wage war on two fronts, attacking both Serbia and Russia.]

As I said I expect the Russians to lose heavily and be forced back. However its likely to cost the Germans as well as the further east they go the further they strain their own logistics. There will still be serious problems with the incompetent Russian hierarchy, which rivaled that of Austria
It is actually possible for the Germans to switch their plans quite quickly if needed. HL did point that out and I have seen the argument before, so they don't need to do it years in advance. But if you want to discuss that scenario we can. So Russia and France know that Germany is headed East...so what? As I pointed out in 1915 that was the case and the Russians were unable to stop a much weaker German force. IOTL only about 45% of the German army was in the East including the 11th army in 1915, while ITTL it would be more like 80-85% of the German army. In IOTL 1914 it was only about 10% in the first couple of months of the war and they wiped out the Russian 2nd army despite being grossly outnumbered. What do you think is going to happen with 800% more troops and the entire CP siege train?

What more preparations do you think they could do with the forts? They were already building them up from 1912 onwards! Once the war starts there will be no time for building of major earthworks either, so what sort of defenses are you thinking they could conjure up?

As to the 1915 situation both Germany and Russia had suffered heavy losses already and Germany was mostly tied down in the west and was facing heavy assaults that very nearly cracked their line in 1915 while they were attacking in the east, so I don't see where Russia was worse off in 1915 than they would be ITTL 1914. Also the German offensive was launched in the Austrian sector in 1915 with Austrian troops (Gorlice-Tarnow), so I don't get where you think that the situation in the German sector mattered.

What are you taking about with an Austrian offensive through the Carpathians? The 1914 offensive they launched was in Galicia, beyond the Carpathians. They already had major rail lines through the passes, so OTL offensives were logistically fully supported without trouble. The issue was the gap in rail lines between Russia and Galicia on the Russian side of the border. That didn't stop the Austrians from trouncing both the 4th and 5th Russian armies in August; it was only the lack of German troops to draw off the Russian reserves as had been promised IOTL that ended up screwing the Austrians. Had they had the bulk of the German army in support in 1914 then their August victories would be compounded and the Russians decisively beaten since the Russians would lack reserves to stop them. That is even with the diversion to Serbia and Conrad's OTL stupidity in deployments in Galicia.

No doubt the CPs would take losses in their offensives, the question is relatively how much. IOTL the Germans were able to attack and defeat the Russians even in prepared defensive positions in prime defensive terrain without much issue:
Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes - Wikipedia

Even in the battles where the Russians won it took them outnumbering CP forces more than 3:1 and they still took more than 2:1 casualties to do so!:

And then went on to smash the Russians once again:

Germany was overall more populous and more industrially developed that France but it still had limitations and it didn't have the same depth of foreign reserves as France while as I mention above Britain is likely to be friendly to the EPs. As such its likely to be a long war, especially if the Russians don't collapse a lot faster as your expecting. Also given a long two front war I wouldn't rule out Germany making the mistake of getting someone like Ludendorff taking over and massively over-emphasising military production over everything else. Plus given their Atlantic ports France would still have superior access to overseas markets to Germany - at least unless Germany starts an USW camaign, which is likely to be disastrous to them as OTL.
What foreign reserves do you think France had? They had colonies, but their capital was tied up in loans to Russia.
Britain might well not be all that favorable to the Entente either if they think going to war would cause them to lose. Without Belgium and British entry into the war it is unlikely the British would think the Entente could win and that by going to war it would be foolish since Russia would end up getting smashed up in the process and upsetting the balance of power.

Not sure why you'd think this would be a long war without Britain as an active participant given that France will likely have major internal issues stemming from this being viewed as a war of aggression by socialists who were planning on major strikes to stop intervention and Russia very likely getting defeated early and repeatedly without French armies being able to achieve much. Even with British financing this is a nightmare scenario for the Entente, as the French can't really break the German border defenses thanks to terrain, prepared defenses, and lack of heavy artillery, nor can they use their full strength given the length of frontage, and the Russians get trounced by 80-85% of Austrian and German forces. Once that becomes clear and the Entente realizes it is going to not be able to win, perhaps even more clear once the Ottomans and Italians join in, they're probably try to get out at the first chance to minimize their losses.

BTW I've completely forgotten that Italy would be treaty bound to participate in the war given that France would be attacking Germany first. So that means France has to deal with Italy too and Austria is freed up of having to worry about Italian entry. IOTL Italy was able to wiggle out of their obligations because Germany declared war first on France and Italy had a treaty with France that either would stay neutral if the other was attacked first. So France would actively court war with Italy, which likely means Italy then attack Tunisia (a major source of tension between them), drawing off major forces from France and creating even more political problems for France internally and the Entente in general.

Russia was able to trade with the outside world but once the Turks closed the straits they lost their primary lines of access as well as one of their biggest export earners in terms of their grain exports. The Siberian route was limited by the capacity of a single railway line while the Murmansk route had to be pretty much developed from scratch. As such Russia was seriously limited by what it could both export and import in WWI. Its still going to be a serious limitation here.
Sure.

I was thinking that the US might seek to export to Russia given their hostility towards any restrictions on their exports to belligerence with at times threats of military intervention against the British distant blockade. Even through Britain would have advantages being closer and probably making less ruinous loan terms I suspect there will be markets for US goods in wartime Russia and while those might be carried on British or other neutral shipping some US ones might be involved.
I'm sure there will be, but again what money did Russia have to pay for it? How much do you think the British public would tolerate being loaned out by the government, especially once Russia starts losing? Would the US support Russia at all without the Germans invading western Europe? Remember the Russians are the autocrats here and the least liked by Democracies.

Germany generally treated the non-Germans under their rule better than the Russians - albeit once they get into the Orthodox regions of the empire that balance is likely to change. Austria was the least unpopular occupier of Poland but the Poles didn't like any of the three powers.

Yes imperial Russia was too often a brutal regime but none of the great powers were that good in treating their colonial populations. The Jews and Poles suffered especially badly here. Russia was worse than any of the combantants other than the Ottomans but also they were different times. The Russian burnt earth policy in the retreat in 1915 was very bad for the people affected, but in this TL it might be less chaotic as there's more time and possibly even some coherent planning in advance.
So yeah, a CP occupation is actually going to be an improvement for many of the natives except perhaps the Russians themselves, but then those areas are unlikely to be occupied by the time Russia cuts a deal. The Poles of course wouldn't be happy with anything but self rule, but with a Kingdom of Poland with just a foreign monarch they should be pretty happy (other than the power seeking nationalist leaders) since they would have the most self rule in several hundred years.

If the Russians start retreating they'll go full scorched earth as that was their traditional tactic; more organized in the retreat just means more scorched earth.

I'll try and have a look at it but is there any evidence that the German wiki is any more accurate than the English speaking one?
It is more detailed and since it is their history they would have more context for it. Plus since modern Germans are probably the most critical of their past I'd say they're more likely if anything to be even less inclined to be sympathetic to their ancestors' leadership.

I'm not assuming that the US would have any political interest in the war other than as OTL when it affects their trade or the welfare of their citizens or when someone takes actions against the US as OTL Germany did.
So basically little to no interest other than making money. Still given that there were a lot more Germans, Austro-Hungarians, Jews, and Italians in the US than Russians and French there might even be political pressure to support Germany in some way.

Actually as mentioned above the average Brit, apart from the concern about German behaviour pre-war, was strongly influenced by the German invasion of Belgium and their actions there.
Right, so the average Brit would be interested in staying out of the war and probably more concerned with the Irish situation.

That assumes that not only do the CPs make the quick and relatively easy gains you predict but that they are then willing to limit their territory and other gains. Again this could well be doubtful. Thinking of both them being influenced by the early successes and also the German hostility towards Russia. If their made the effort to fight a big war and are winning why stop now and allow both opponents to maintain their core territories and be able to rebuild and still be able to defend themselves in the future?
What would limit the CP gains is the Entente negotiating before things got too bad for them. Honestly though I think in this situation the Entente would be stupid to go to war if they know the Germans are heading east and Britain won't be able to participate on their side and Italy will have to join the CPs.

Germany didn't want a long war either, just to win a quick series of victories, humiliate their foes, and prepare for the next round. That was the entire basis of the Schlieffen Plan because they knew that in a long war it would be rather ruinous for them and perhaps eventually incite the German Left to get more politically active (as did happen).


Actually of course Tirpitz had been Naval Minister for quite a while before Dreadnought was launched and made no secret of his programme being directed at Britain. Britain didn't initiate the race. Similarly when Britain produced the Dreadnought and then the early BCs - as they were rather inaccurately called Germany escalated by not only stepping up their own programme but converted their own armoured cruisers to much larger BCs.

The Dreadnought, although it faced institutional hostility within the Admiralty, was pretty much inevitable as similar designs were already planned in a couple of other countries. Britain just had the capacity to produce it quickly. Also it was actually cheaper than a pre-dread, which was an important selling point to the government. Note also it was a single ship. It was only when the Germans started ordering their own classes that Britain started laying down more.
Sure and they had been building ships, but Britain didn't care. It was only after the threat of having budget cuts by the liberals for more social spending and the need to build a new BB fleet after the Dreadnought that suddenly German naval spending became a problem. Britain did initiate the race by declaring German spending on a modern fleet a danger to them and then spending a lot more than the Germans. The Germans even sought to make a treaty to stop a race and Britain told them to eff-off because they had the 'nerve' to ask Britain to not join in on an attack on Germany:
In 1912, German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg ended the naval arms race. His aim was to secure an understanding with the British to end the increasingly isolated position of Germany. Russian military expansion compelled the Germans to prioritise spending on their army and therefore less on the navy. The initiative led to the Haldane Mission in which Germany offered to accept British naval superiority in exchange for British neutrality in a war in which Germany could not be said to be the aggressor. The proposal was rejected, as Britain felt that it had nothing to gain by such a treaty since its naval superiority was secure, but the British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey favoured a more assertive policy against Germany.[11]

How is Germany the problem there?

Bias prior to the war and in the aftermath was a common issue on all sides. However I'm doubtful it was still a significant factor in the 1980's and 90'.
I'm still surprised how some 21st century books still have that bias. Certainly we're seeing much more balanced works out there now, but in the 1980s-90s the problem was most certainly still there.

The French sought to standardise language, just as Germany and other countries did, although I have also read that it was only during WWI this really came into effect. However all those groups - including many of the German speaking population of Alsace - had still thought of themselves as French - some of the latter moving to avoid German occupation after 1871. Germany also sought to suppress the Polish language but with less impact as the Poles identified themselves as a nation.
They sought to break regional identities:

The movement of population after 1871 from A-L was mostly French settlers and government officials who returned to France proper. Some ethnic Germans did move too, but that those were a minority of those who did move. You're right those that they didn't necessarily feel German, but their local language was a German dialect, so it was only French that was done away with.

Germany did nothing similar with their own regional languages (couldn't due to the political structure of Germany). They did of course try to suppress the Polish separate identity however, but that was linked to Polish support of France in the Franco-Prussian war:
Christopher Clark argues that Prussian policy changed radically in the 1870s in the face of highly visible Polish support for France in the Franco-Prussian war.[89] Polish demonstrations made clear the Polish nationalist feeling, and calls were also made for Polish recruits to desert from the Prussian Army – though these went unheeded. Bismarck was outraged, telling the Prussian cabinet in 1871: From the Russian border to the Adriatic Sea we are confronted with the combined propaganda of Slavs, ultramontanes, and reactionaries, and it is necessary openly to defend our national interests and our language against such hostile actions.[90] Therefore, in the Province of Posen the Kulturkampf took on a much more nationalistic character than in other parts of Germany.[91]

The Kulturkampf though only lasted from 1872-78, so some of that ended, though part of it continued to WW1.

Germany in its higher government was definitely more militaristic than most/all its neighbours. The fact that the German parliament couldn't influence military spending shows this. Russia was more brutal and autocratic in many ways but not sure about more militaristic.

Yes all the great powers had nasty histories, with the worst probably being the Ottomans and US but so what? Times were changing, albeit slowly and the question was less about behaviour outside Europe than the primary causes of WWI.
You're basing that on...?
What do you mean the Reichstag couldn't influence military spending? They literally made the budget! They just spent more because of the threat of Russia was growing due to their military expansion, which they once again boosted in 1914 in the largest spending increase on an army in Europe during the entire arms race to that point.

Russia was just as militaristic and in fact initiated a major military spending in 1913:
In 1913, the Tsar approved a "great army programme". This included an increase in the size of the Russian Army by nearly 500,000 men as well as an extra 11,800 officers. It is claimed that Russia had the largest army in the world. This was made up of 115 infantry and 38 cavalry divisions. The Russian estimated manpower resource included more than 25 million men of combat age. (6)

This trend forced France and Russia to respond. France raised army strength nearly 40 percent to 850,000 in 1914 - passing Germany at 811,000 - mainly by extending tours of duty from two to three years in 1913. With more increases in the following years, Germany would fall even farther behind. While still possessing the superior 75-mm gun, France also cut into Germany’s by now extensive lead in heavier caliber field artillery. The number of 155-mm field guns rose to 104, versus 400 German 150-mm pieces, which had to cover two fronts.

The Russian “Great Program” of June 1914 proved more worrisome in Berlin, however, for peacetime army size would rise 45 percent to 1,885,000 by 1917. Russian forces would also improve qualitatively by expanding rapid-firing field guns to 8,358, dwarfing Germany’s total of 6,004 in 1914. Chief of the German General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke (1848-1916), was somewhat consoled that artillery strength per corps would still be greater, but all things considered, writes Norman Stone, “the pointers for the future were unmistakable.”[30]

Can you understand why I think the same?
Of course.
 
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Buba

A total creep
b) This is a decision made some years prior to the conflict which means that Russia will have some idea that its coming.
This is a point I have some issues with. And this leading to greater and/or earlier expansion of fortifications in Kingdom of Poland.
Germany always had two war plans - mostly east and mostly west. Both periodically updated. Which was simply natural and Russia knew this perfectly well.
And in OTL the chaotic Germans still could had decided to "go east", Moltke outright lying to Wilhelm that an ostaufmarsch was not possible.
Hence two Russian warplans - G and A - respectively meaning "Germany does not go west so we need an extra Army against it" and "Germany goes west so the extra Army will be used against Austria instead". BTW - IMO Plan A adhered to the French-Russian military pact in an Obi-Wan sort of way ...

The fortresses along the western border, from Kovno down to Rovne, were built at the worst possible moment, namely in the very late '80s. Just before smokeless power was invented (IIRC in 1886, actually) and before "recoiless" artillery (popularised early XXth). This term at that time meant recoil recuperating - i.e. the gun did not run several metres back after firing, hence increase in range and ROF. Look at the terms RF and QF - rapid and quick firing - invented by the British for such guns.
Those '80s fortresses were earth and brick jobbies, following different construction constraints and filiosophies, e.g. fortified ammunition magazines between the forts due to volatility of gunpowder stored in barrels. Metal cases with smokeless powder in it were a revolution of their own ...
Back to fortifications - by the end of the century these were brand new but obsolete - try selling wholesale modernisation and building de facto new fortresses to the Treasury.
I have some knowledge of Modlin - the new line of forts from 1912 runs 4-6km outside previous ring, thus not 4-6km from citadel but 10-12km, needing c.20 forts versus previous 6. I'd wager same to apply to other fortresses.
So, "brand new" fortresses and then the Manchurian War and the Revolution. Aware of its weaknesses (obsolecy of fortresses too, I suppose, in light of happened at Port Artur) and possibility of German attack the military "abandoned" Poland and - liked I said - moved the initial deployment of armies to the line of the Niemen and Bug Rivers.
Only by 1912 did Russia feel stronger and "moved back", militarily, into Poland again.
I see very little scope for earlier, i.e. pre-1912 expansion of fortifications in Poland, summarising:
- cost
- internal turmoil lasting into 1907
- development of new tech
A German ostaufmarsh plan does not figure into it, as such a possibility was always there.

Hence in my opinion there should be no change to Russian fortifications.
 

stevep

Well-known member
Per the OP the invasion of France is off the table and by the time Russia is dealt with it wouldn't likely even be a viable option to try and invade given French defenses and mobilization, plus the likely chance that Russia and France would negotiate as a bloc to get the best deal possible with strong British encouragement.

Again you're talking about the way politicians thought about these issues, not the average person or the average socialist. Most of them weren't thinking in that direction, especially given that they didn't see the benefit of dying for the Russian Czar, regardless of balance of power concepts that historians, generals, and politicians concerned themselves with.

Also Power Politics was hardly confined to Germany it would just be the situation that France would have a hard time playing that game without a powerful Russia, which generally would suit the average socialist just fine; why wage wars of aggression for the aggrandizement of politicians?


Guess that indemnity wasn't huge if the French were able to pay it off quickly. Sounds more like it was a reasonable price for a war France started, much like the response to the Napoleonic wars and quite a bit different than the ToV. Why would we see France crushed quickly? They'd be defeated at the German border per OTL and probably keep bashing away until it became politically unacceptable. Russia would be smashed and France would probably try to negotiate then and deal with the political fallout of the defeat. Given that Germany too didn't want a long war they'd probably just demand some border adjustments or colonies for peace and recognition of the annexation of Luxembourg. That and maybe destruction of the border forts. Not unreasonable. Unlike OTL without a major invasion of France imposing anything resembling the Septemberprogramm.

France was a country with colonies, but it had a lot of investments that weren't liquid cash; in fact much of France's capital was tied in its Russian investments. The issue with France isn't their ability to finance purchasing within the country it is their ability to pay for imports from others. They could perhaps get lines of credit from Britain, though that is debatable, which gets them coal and whatever else Britain has to export, but the important stuff like food and oil will have to come from the US. So unless Britain is willing to provide dollars to a country which might well be unable to pay it back given the war situation, France is going to be in a very tough spot once their initial invasion fails and their political issues play out. French military production wasn't really all that impressive until 1916 btw, which is likely well after the war would be decided.

Britain still has the home rule crisis to deal with if they don't participate in the war:

So they might well end up in a semi-civil war ITTL. Specific British politicians and naval officers might have thought Germany the main threat, but Britain wasn't a dictatorship, so don't expect that absent Belgium being invaded that they'd be able to do much other than financial support for the Entente to a limited degree and putting onerous terms for their neutrality on Germany (entirely denying the English Channel to German warships but not French ones for instance). Again you're viewing this through the lens of politicians and high level officers rather than the average person who wouldn't have any interest in a shit-fight among continentals that didn't really involve their immediate interests.



It is actually possible for the Germans to switch their plans quite quickly if needed. HL did point that out and I have seen the argument before, so they don't need to do it years in advance. But if you want to discuss that scenario we can. So Russia and France know that Germany is headed East...so what? As I pointed out in 1915 that was the case and the Russians were unable to stop a much weaker German force. IOTL only about 45% of the German army was in the East including the 11th army in 1915, while ITTL it would be more like 80-85% of the German army. In IOTL 1914 it was only about 10% in the first couple of months of the war and they wiped out the Russian 2nd army despite being grossly outnumbered. What do you think is going to happen with 800% more troops and the entire CP siege train?

What more preparations do you think they could do with the forts? They were already building them up from 1912 onwards! Once the war starts there will be no time for building of major earthworks either, so what sort of defenses are you thinking they could conjure up?

As to the 1915 situation both Germany and Russia had suffered heavy losses already and Germany was mostly tied down in the west and was facing heavy assaults that very nearly cracked their line in 1915 while they were attacking in the east, so I don't see where Russia was worse off in 1915 than they would be ITTL 1914. Also the German offensive was launched in the Austrian sector in 1915 with Austrian troops (Gorlice-Tarnow), so I don't get where you think that the situation in the German sector mattered.

What are you taking about with an Austrian offensive through the Carpathians? The 1914 offensive they launched was in Galicia, beyond the Carpathians. They already had major rail lines through the passes, so OTL offensives were logistically fully supported without trouble. The issue was the gap in rail lines between Russia and Galicia on the Russian side of the border. That didn't stop the Austrians from trouncing both the 4th and 5th Russian armies in August; it was only the lack of German troops to draw off the Russian reserves as had been promised IOTL that ended up screwing the Austrians. Had they had the bulk of the German army in support in 1914 then their August victories would be compounded and the Russians decisively beaten since the Russians would lack reserves to stop them. That is even with the diversion to Serbia and Conrad's OTL stupidity in deployments in Galicia.

No doubt the CPs would take losses in their offensives, the question is relatively how much. IOTL the Germans were able to attack and defeat the Russians even in prepared defensive positions in prime defensive terrain without much issue:
Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes - Wikipedia

Even in the battles where the Russians won it took them outnumbering CP forces more than 3:1 and they still took more than 2:1 casualties to do so!:

And then went on to smash the Russians once again:


What foreign reserves do you think France had? They had colonies, but their capital was tied up in loans to Russia.
Britain might well not be all that favorable to the Entente either if they think going to war would cause them to lose. Without Belgium and British entry into the war it is unlikely the British would think the Entente could win and that by going to war it would be foolish since Russia would end up getting smashed up in the process and upsetting the balance of power.

Not sure why you'd think this would be a long war without Britain as an active participant given that France will likely have major internal issues stemming from this being viewed as a war of aggression by socialists who were planning on major strikes to stop intervention and Russia very likely getting defeated early and repeatedly without French armies being able to achieve much. Even with British financing this is a nightmare scenario for the Entente, as the French can't really break the German border defenses thanks to terrain, prepared defenses, and lack of heavy artillery, nor can they use their full strength given the length of frontage, and the Russians get trounced by 80-85% of Austrian and German forces. Once that becomes clear and the Entente realizes it is going to not be able to win, perhaps even more clear once the Ottomans and Italians join in, they're probably try to get out at the first chance to minimize their losses.

BTW I've completely forgotten that Italy would be treaty bound to participate in the war given that France would be attacking Germany first. So that means France has to deal with Italy too and Austria is freed up of having to worry about Italian entry. IOTL Italy was able to wiggle out of their obligations because Germany declared war first on France and Italy had a treaty with France that either would stay neutral if the other was attacked first. So France would actively court war with Italy, which likely means Italy then attack Tunisia (a major source of tension between them), drawing off major forces from France and creating even more political problems for France internally and the Entente in general.


Sure.


I'm sure there will be, but again what money did Russia have to pay for it? How much do you think the British public would tolerate being loaned out by the government, especially once Russia starts losing? Would the US support Russia at all without the Germans invading western Europe? Remember the Russians are the autocrats here and the least liked by Democracies.


So yeah, a CP occupation is actually going to be an improvement for many of the natives except perhaps the Russians themselves, but then those areas are unlikely to be occupied by the time Russia cuts a deal. The Poles of course wouldn't be happy with anything but self rule, but with a Kingdom of Poland with just a foreign monarch they should be pretty happy (other than the power seeking nationalist leaders) since they would have the most self rule in several hundred years.

If the Russians start retreating they'll go full scorched earth as that was their traditional tactic; more organized in the retreat just means more scorched earth.


It is more detailed and since it is their history they would have more context for it. Plus since modern Germans are probably the most critical of their past I'd say they're more likely if anything to be even less inclined to be sympathetic to their ancestors' leadership.


So basically little to no interest other than making money. Still given that there were a lot more Germans, Austro-Hungarians, Jews, and Italians in the US than Russians and French there might even be political pressure to support Germany in some way.


Right, so the average Brit would be interested in staying out of the war and probably more concerned with the Irish situation.


What would limit the CP gains is the Entente negotiating before things got too bad for them. Honestly though I think in this situation the Entente would be stupid to go to war if they know the Germans are heading east and Britain won't be able to participate on their side and Italy will have to join the CPs.

Germany didn't want a long war either, just to win a quick series of victories, humiliate their foes, and prepare for the next round. That was the entire basis of the Schlieffen Plan because they knew that in a long war it would be rather ruinous for them and perhaps eventually incite the German Left to get more politically active (as did happen).



Sure and they had been building ships, but Britain didn't care. It was only after the threat of having budget cuts by the liberals for more social spending and the need to build a new BB fleet after the Dreadnought that suddenly German naval spending became a problem. Britain did initiate the race by declaring German spending on a modern fleet a danger to them and then spending a lot more than the Germans. The Germans even sought to make a treaty to stop a race and Britain told them to eff-off because they had the 'nerve' to ask Britain to not join in on an attack on Germany:


How is Germany the problem there?


I'm still surprised how some 21st century books still have that bias. Certainly we're seeing much more balanced works out there now, but in the 1980s-90s the problem was most certainly still there.


They sought to break regional identities:

The movement of population after 1871 from A-L was mostly French settlers and government officials who returned to France proper. Some ethnic Germans did move too, but that those were a minority of those who did move. You're right those that they didn't necessarily feel German, but their local language was a German dialect, so it was only French that was done away with.

Germany did nothing similar with their own regional languages (couldn't due to the political structure of Germany). They did of course try to suppress the Polish separate identity however, but that was linked to Polish support of France in the Franco-Prussian war:


The Kulturkampf though only lasted from 1872-78, so some of that ended, though part of it continued to WW1.


You're basing that on...?
What do you mean the Reichstag couldn't influence military spending? They literally made the budget! They just spent more because of the threat of Russia was growing due to their military expansion, which they once again boosted in 1914 in the largest spending increase on an army in Europe during the entire arms race to that point.

Russia was just as militaristic and in fact initiated a major military spending in 1913:





Of course.
This is a point I have some issues with. And this leading to greater and/or earlier expansion of fortifications in Kingdom of Poland.
Germany always had two war plans - mostly east and mostly west. Both periodically updated. Which was simply natural and Russia knew this perfectly well.
And in OTL the chaotic Germans still could had decided to "go east", Moltke outright lying to Wilhelm that an ostaufmarsch was not possible.
Hence two Russian warplans - G and A - respectively meaning "Germany does not go west so we need an extra Army against it" and "Germany goes west so the extra Army will be used against Austria instead". BTW - IMO Plan A adhered to the French-Russian military pact in an Obi-Wan sort of way ...

The fortresses along the western border, from Kovno down to Rovne, were built at the worst possible moment, namely in the very late '80s. Just before smokeless power was invented (IIRC in 1886, actually) and before "recoiless" artillery (popularised early XXth). This term at that time meant recoil recuperating - i.e. the gun did not run several metres back after firing, hence increase in range and ROF. Look at the terms RF and QF - rapid and quick firing - invented by the British for such guns.
Those '80s fortresses were earth and brick jobbies, following different construction constraints and filiosophies, e.g. fortified ammunition magazines between the forts due to volatility of gunpowder stored in barrels. Metal cases with smokeless powder in it were a revolution of their own ...
Back to fortifications - by the end of the century these were brand new but obsolete - try selling wholesale modernisation and building de facto new fortresses to the Treasury.
I have some knowledge of Modlin - the new line of forts from 1912 runs 4-6km outside previous ring, thus not 4-6km from citadel but 10-12km, needing c.20 forts versus previous 6. I'd wager same to apply to other fortresses.
So, "brand new" fortresses and then the Manchurian War and the Revolution. Aware of its weaknesses (obsolecy of fortresses too, I suppose, in light of happened at Port Artur) and possibility of German attack the military "abandoned" Poland and - liked I said - moved the initial deployment of armies to the line of the Niemen and Bug Rivers.
Only by 1912 did Russia feel stronger and "moved back", militarily, into Poland again.
I see very little scope for earlier, i.e. pre-1912 expansion of fortifications in Poland, summarising:
- cost
- internal turmoil lasting into 1907
- development of new tech
A German ostaufmarsh plan does not figure into it, as such a possibility was always there.

Hence in my opinion there should be no change to Russian fortifications.

Bubba

Interesting. I was working on the assumption that Russia would heavily defend the Polish salient for political reasons. However a withdrawal to "the line of the Niemen and Bug Rivers" would probably suit the Russians better in this scenario as it shortens both their lines and their logistics while the Germans have the corresponding problems. Thanks.

Steve
 

stevep

Well-known member
Per the OP the invasion of France is off the table and by the time Russia is dealt with it wouldn't likely even be a viable option to try and invade given French defenses and mobilization, plus the likely chance that Russia and France would negotiate as a bloc to get the best deal possible with strong British encouragement.

Again you're talking about the way politicians thought about these issues, not the average person or the average socialist. Most of them weren't thinking in that direction, especially given that they didn't see the benefit of dying for the Russian Czar, regardless of balance of power concepts that historians, generals, and politicians concerned themselves with.

Also Power Politics was hardly confined to Germany it would just be the situation that France would have a hard time playing that game without a powerful Russia, which generally would suit the average socialist just fine; why wage wars of aggression for the aggrandizement of politicians?

I'm talking about the way a lot of people thought at that time. We could argue whether this was based on facts or propaganda but there were fears on all sides about aggression and the CP aggression here would have triggered a lot of feeling in the EP. Partly it was a perversion of Darwin's ideas on evolution, partly that some recent wars, especially those during German unification under Prussia had been quick and decisive, generally being won by fast offensive action but Europe was a powder keg.

This is demonstrated by reports about the massed popular support early in the war on all sides. Also while there was a lot of arguments by assorted socialist groups calling for their people to oppose a war none of this actually happened and very quickly those groups became fully supportive of their nations war aims.

Similarly French socialists might not support Russian military aggression but they don't want Germany military aggression either and anyone but an idiot would realise that allowing Germany and Austria to attack and defeat Russia would be a serious threat to France.



Guess that indemnity wasn't huge if the French were able to pay it off quickly. Sounds more like it was a reasonable price for a war France started, much like the response to the Napoleonic wars and quite a bit different than the ToV. Why would we see France crushed quickly? They'd be defeated at the German border per OTL and probably keep bashing away until it became politically unacceptable. Russia would be smashed and France would probably try to negotiate then and deal with the political fallout of the defeat. Given that Germany too didn't want a long war they'd probably just demand some border adjustments or colonies for peace and recognition of the annexation of Luxembourg. That and maybe destruction of the border forts. Not unreasonable. Unlike OTL without a major invasion of France imposing anything resembling the Septemberprogramm.

The indemnity was meant to be crippling but Bismarck underestimated France's capacity at the time. Don't forget that at the time France was still a markedly greater industrial power and possibly also demographically as well. Possibly also the sheer capacity of industrial production, which might have lead to the size of the later indemnity on Germany after WWI. [What would have happened if the Germans had been willing to make a serious effort to pay that off we will never know of course].


France was a country with colonies, but it had a lot of investments that weren't liquid cash; in fact much of France's capital was tied in its Russian investments. The issue with France isn't their ability to finance purchasing within the country it is their ability to pay for imports from others. They could perhaps get lines of credit from Britain, though that is debatable, which gets them coal and whatever else Britain has to export, but the important stuff like food and oil will have to come from the US. So unless Britain is willing to provide dollars to a country which might well be unable to pay it back given the war situation, France is going to be in a very tough spot once their initial invasion fails and their political issues play out. French military production wasn't really all that impressive until 1916 btw, which is likely well after the war would be decided.

France had a fair amount of overseas investment, albeit much of this in recent years had been in Russia and hence was harder to liquidate as Britain's had been. Also without the devastation of OTL I think their going to be a lot better off in terms of food production, at least unless they drastically over-militarize as Germany did OTL and which would be a danger for France in this scenario.

From sources I've seen France was probably a bigger military producer than Britain in WWI and this was despite losing their industrial heartland, which won't happen in this scenario. It will take them time to adjust but with a different scenario they shouldn't have more problems than other powers had initially. I.e. massive shortages of shells, demand for heavy field artillery and far more guns of all sorts, items like barbed wire and assuming it still goes that way chemicals for the production of poisonous gas.

As such the primary needs for France would probably be:
a) Oil, for which the US is likely to be the primary source but isn't the only one.
b) If they didn't have a suitable Haber-Bosch capacity then the importation of nitrates from S America
c) Possibly some food
d) Cash to pay for shipping.

The last is mentioned as with Britain being neutral and assuming no one attacks its shipping it's merchant fleet is available and able to move mass amounts of goods quickly and cheaply. Furthermore with British shipping being protected from arbitary attack some of those other items can be imported from areas other than the US such as British dominions, S America and the French colonies. As you mentioned yourself the UK imported heavily from the US in WWII not because it was the cheapest but because it was the closest and with Britain under blockade and its shipping under heavy pressure. Here its not the case.

b) above also applies to Germany. I have seen sources that the crunch on powder production for them until they get their Haber process fully set up would have been even worse without their seizure of a large amount of nitrates from Antwerp. Which isn't going to happen TTL although there could be some interesting activity as assorted powers try to purchase those stockpiles or at least deny them to other parties.


Britain still has the home rule crisis to deal with if they don't participate in the war:

So they might well end up in a semi-civil war ITTL. Specific British politicians and naval officers might have thought Germany the main threat, but Britain wasn't a dictatorship, so don't expect that absent Belgium being invaded that they'd be able to do much other than financial support for the Entente to a limited degree and putting onerous terms for their neutrality on Germany (entirely denying the English Channel to German warships but not French ones for instance). Again you're viewing this through the lens of politicians and high level officers rather than the average person who wouldn't have any interest in a shit-fight among continentals that didn't really involve their immediate interests.

As I say your underestimating national feeling at the time. Also a massive war on the continent would have a direct impact on Britain both good [trade rivals being distracted] and bad [with much European trade disrupted] as well as reports of the horrendous death and destruction that the war brings and fear that British interests will be attacked if not Britain itself as war tends to spread like any infection.

Britain has a vested interest in protecting its vital sea trade so I can see it declaring areas, most especially the channel and parts of the SW N Sea to be no go areas for belligerents. Plus without control of most of Belgium I doubt that Germany would seek to attack French ports in the channel which could also be dangerous for the German forces attempting such even without any British intervention.

There is the issue of what happens in Ireland with the danger of serious unrest in Ulster and parts of the military in opposition to Home Rule. However there is the chance that this could be a long running issue rather than over relatively quickly. The Irish extremists are still likely to seek full independence but if they try something like the OTL Easter coup its likely not only to be a fiasco as OTL but also see a very strong back-lash against them.


It is actually possible for the Germans to switch their plans quite quickly if needed. HL did point that out and I have seen the argument before, so they don't need to do it years in advance. But if you want to discuss that scenario we can. So Russia and France know that Germany is headed East...so what? As I pointed out in 1915 that was the case and the Russians were unable to stop a much weaker German force. IOTL only about 45% of the German army was in the East including the 11th army in 1915, while ITTL it would be more like 80-85% of the German army. In IOTL 1914 it was only about 10% in the first couple of months of the war and they wiped out the Russian 2nd army despite being grossly outnumbered. What do you think is going to happen with 800% more troops and the entire CP siege train?


What more preparations do you think they could do with the forts? They were already building them up from 1912 onwards! Once the war starts there will be no time for building of major earthworks either, so what sort of defenses are you thinking they could conjure up?

As to the 1915 situation both Germany and Russia had suffered heavy losses already and Germany was mostly tied down in the west and was facing heavy assaults that very nearly cracked their line in 1915 while they were attacking in the east, so I don't see where Russia was worse off in 1915 than they would be ITTL 1914. Also the German offensive was launched in the Austrian sector in 1915 with Austrian troops (Gorlice-Tarnow), so I don't get where you think that the situation in the German sector mattered.


From what I've read, apart form the Russian losses, which were much heavier among their full time forces than what Germany suffered, they don't seem to have expected a major German offensive. You actually had commanders withdrawing troops from front line units because their local commanders were preparing defensive positions on the argument that if you have trenches you need less men to hold the line.

I was aware that the Russian fortifications in the region were obsolete and not properly manned. I wasn't aware I admit that they had started efforts to change this. Assuming that if its clear Germany's main offensive would be eastwards then they would start earlier or with more determination. Alternatively as Bubba has just suggested they don't have time to boost their fortifications and their plan in the event of a German offensive is to withdraw to the Niemen and Bug River position. Either way as you said Verdun for instance showed that positions could be held even when the primary forts themselves were largely destroyed.

As I have repeatedly said I don't expect the Russians to win smashing victories. I expect them to be forced backwards. However its going to be more costly to the Austrians and Germans than OTL when much of the fighting on the eastern front was with poorly equipped and led Russian offensives. Plus the further back their pushed the more difficulties the CP logistics will cause.



What are you taking about with an Austrian offensive through the Carpathians? The 1914 offensive they launched was in Galicia, beyond the Carpathians. They already had major rail lines through the passes, so OTL offensives were logistically fully supported without trouble. The issue was the gap in rail lines between Russia and Galicia on the Russian side of the border. That didn't stop the Austrians from trouncing both the 4th and 5th Russian armies in August; it was only the lack of German troops to draw off the Russian reserves as had been promised IOTL that ended up screwing the Austrians. Had they had the bulk of the German army in support in 1914 then their August victories would be compounded and the Russians decisively beaten since the Russians would lack reserves to stop them. That is even with the diversion to Serbia and Conrad's OTL stupidity in deployments in Galicia.

I possibly phased my wording poorly, in which case I apologize. The Austrians start north of the Carpathians but their dependent on a relatively few passes and railway line through those mountains which limit their logistics is what I meant.

Yes if the bulk of the German army had been attacking Russia then the Austrians wouldn't have been mauled as badly as they were OTL. However their still likely to suffer heavy losses if they try attacks against even relatively lightly prepared defnesive positions. Neither of the eastern autocrats were in particularly good shape military, although in part this was because of abysmal leadership.


No doubt the CPs would take losses in their offensives, the question is relatively how much. IOTL the Germans were able to attack and defeat the Russians even in prepared defensive positions in prime defensive terrain without much issue:
Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes - Wikipedia

Even in the battles where the Russians won it took them outnumbering CP forces more than 3:1 and they still took more than 2:1 casualties to do so!:

And then went on to smash the Russians once again:

We're the Russians in anything like prepared defensive positions in either Masurian Lake battle? They were meant to be on the offensive and just pausing because of the abysmal state of Russian logistics. Also they were in German lands and rough terrain which enabled the Germans to use their greater mobility and control of railway lines - plus the idiotic hostility between the two Russian commanders - to attack and defeat each of the Russian armies in detail.


What foreign reserves do you think France had? They had colonies, but their capital was tied up in loans to Russia.
Britain might well not be all that favorable to the Entente either if they think going to war would cause them to lose. Without Belgium and British entry into the war it is unlikely the British would think the Entente could win and that by going to war it would be foolish since Russia would end up getting smashed up in the process and upsetting the balance of power.

I've mentioned French resources above. In terms of Britain's actions given the behaviour of Austria in starting the entire mess and the concern about German war aims then the issue is not the possibility of the EPs winning but the fear that they will be heavily defeated and the resultant imbalance of power. As such since Germany is determined on a major war then seeking to maintain a balance of power is definitely in Britain's interest.


Not sure why you'd think this would be a long war without Britain as an active participant given that France will likely have major internal issues stemming from this being viewed as a war of aggression by socialists who were planning on major strikes to stop intervention and Russia very likely getting defeated early and repeatedly without French armies being able to achieve much. Even with British financing this is a nightmare scenario for the Entente, as the French can't really break the German border defenses thanks to terrain, prepared defenses, and lack of heavy artillery, nor can they use their full strength given the length of frontage, and the Russians get trounced by 80-85% of Austrian and German forces. Once that becomes clear and the Entente realizes it is going to not be able to win, perhaps even more clear once the Ottomans and Italians join in, they're probably try to get out at the first chance to minimize their losses.

The problem is your assuming that the Germans want a limited victory. It takes two to make peace. What is Germany's motive, especially since their been expressing concerns for years that Russia is going to become too powerful, to have a costly but limited war. The entire strategy, both of Germany in Bismarck's war and it was adopted by most great powers afterwards was a decisive victory.

BTW I've completely forgotten that Italy would be treaty bound to participate in the war given that France would be attacking Germany first. So that means France has to deal with Italy too and Austria is freed up of having to worry about Italian entry. IOTL Italy was able to wiggle out of their obligations because Germany declared war first on France and Italy had a treaty with France that either would stay neutral if the other was attacked first. So France would actively court war with Italy, which likely means Italy then attack Tunisia (a major source of tension between them), drawing off major forces from France and creating even more political problems for France internally and the Entente in general.


Actually not. Austria has made extreme demands on Serbia that shocked the neutrals. The Serbs conceded all bar one of those demands - a hell of a concession - but Austria made clear it was intent on war. Russia started mobilising in support of Serbia but in this case the 1st fighting in the east is likely to be a German attack on Russia. [Based on the general desire for a quick victory, German greater capacity for quick mobilization and their historical actions in 1914]. France then declares war in support of their ally. Italy is in a similar position to OTL, the only significant differences being no direct attack on a neutral and as a result Britain is neutral.

Italy will do what it sees as in its interests. Going to war with France in the Alps is unlikely to be this. At least unless and until it sees how things are going. Given that its main aims are on Austrian territory and that France won't suffer the OTL territorial losses and probably less military losses than OTL in 1914 this is unlikely to change in the short term.



I'm sure there will be, but again what money did Russia have to pay for it? How much do you think the British public would tolerate being loaned out by the government, especially once Russia starts losing? Would the US support Russia at all without the Germans invading western Europe? Remember the Russians are the autocrats here and the least liked by Democracies.

Money, with the grain trade through the straits cut off will be the big issue. Not sure what other cash export products Russia had at this time and its likely to be a major constraint but as OTL Russia is likely to seek military equipment.

So yeah, a CP occupation is actually going to be an improvement for many of the natives except perhaps the Russians themselves, but then those areas are unlikely to be occupied by the time Russia cuts a deal. The Poles of course wouldn't be happy with anything but self rule, but with a Kingdom of Poland with just a foreign monarch they should be pretty happy (other than the power seeking nationalist leaders) since they would have the most self rule in several hundred years.

They won't be happy with anything other than independence of course but in the short term their unlikely to be too upset. However if Germany starts making demands in terms of forces and supplies for operations further east that could change.

If the Russians start retreating they'll go full scorched earth as that was their traditional tactic; more organized in the retreat just means more scorched earth.

The basic issuse is that if its actually planned rather than thrown together as hoc as the front collapses then it could be less destructive both for the people involved and the Russian economy generally. I have to say could given the poor competence of much of the Russian government especially at higher levels.

It is more detailed and since it is their history they would have more context for it. Plus since modern Germans are probably the most critical of their past I'd say they're more likely if anything to be even less inclined to be sympathetic to their ancestors' leadership.

OK will try and have a look.

So basically little to no interest other than making money. Still given that there were a lot more Germans, Austro-Hungarians, Jews, and Italians in the US than Russians and French there might even be political pressure to support Germany in some way.

That was the basic interest for the US in WWI anyway until continued German action prompted them to join the war. I'm not assuming anything else.


Right, so the average Brit would be interested in staying out of the war and probably more concerned with the Irish situation.

What would limit the CP gains is the Entente negotiating before things got too bad for them. Honestly though I think in this situation the Entente would be stupid to go to war if they know the Germans are heading east and Britain won't be able to participate on their side and Italy will have to join the CPs.

Germany didn't want a long war either, just to win a quick series of victories, humiliate their foes, and prepare for the next round. That was the entire basis of the Schlieffen Plan because they knew that in a long war it would be rather ruinous for them and perhaps eventually incite the German Left to get more politically active (as did happen).

Britain will be interested in its own issues but a massive war on the continent and the possibility of an hostile and aggressively militaristic power gaining dominance there will be important.

I'm not sure Russia could desert Serbia and France would be very exposed if it deserted Russia and both knew that. Also as pointed out Italy doesn't have to join the CPs any more than OTL.

Germany didn't want a long war because it thought it couldn't win it. [Which may have been erroneous in hindsight given how long it took to defeat Germany although it could be argued that the allies made even more/worse mistakes than the CPs]. However they didn't want to humilate their opponents they wanted to crush them decisively. That was the entire purpose of the OTL attack in the west, to crush France before anyone could support them so they could then turn east to defeat the Russians.


Sure and they had been building ships, but Britain didn't care. It was only after the threat of having budget cuts by the liberals for more social spending and the need to build a new BB fleet after the Dreadnought that suddenly German naval spending became a problem. Britain did initiate the race by declaring German spending on a modern fleet a danger to them and then spending a lot more than the Germans. The Germans even sought to make a treaty to stop a race and Britain told them to eff-off because they had the 'nerve' to ask Britain to not join in on an attack on Germany:

How is Germany the problem there?

That is your interpretation of the issue. If that was the case why did Germany keep building a large fleet that easily outclassed that of France and forced most of the British construction to keep ahead of it. Britain needed to control the seas around its coasts, both to protect against invasion and the vital overseas trade. Germany didn't need a massive fleet, the 2nd largest in the war in 1914 and it was a substantial drain on its resources, as well as poisoning relations with Britain. A drain that took assets away from its army.

If your interpretation is accurate then the logical thing for Germany to do was ignore the British naval programme and just build to meet their own needs. Instead of continued public statements that the German navy was aimed at Britain and a massive programme to continue to challenge the RN. This also forced the ententes with 1st France and then Russia as before it came up much of Britain's battle fleet was deployed around the world and the premier post for a fleet admiral was in charge of the Med fleet, not the Home Fleet.

If Germany had done that rather than the bombastic statements and continued shipbuilding then what would have happened? If your assumption is right Germany saves a hell of a lot of resources and the RN faction look stupid.

The issue is not that Britain refused to rule out an attack on Germany. Its that Britain would stay neutral in a continental war regardless of whom started it. Which obviously is something that Britain couldn't agree with and the suggest was enough to raise further concerns in Britain about German intent.

You can see this from one of your own links - Naval race and German suggestion of British neutrality in a continetal war
In 1909 Germany offered to slow down shipbuilding if Britain first promised to maintain neutrality in any continental conflagration. Britain insisted that the tempo slow first before any political agreement, and that such an agreement could not include a pledge of neutrality that would allow Germany to defeat France and Russia

Note that while Germany wants a free hand on the continent Britain is concerned that it couldn't allow Germany to defeat France and Russia. That doesn't mean it would support those powers in an aggressive war or that it would support Germany being defeated. Just that it wasn't willing to see one power/bloc overwhelmingly dominate the continent.

Germany did nothing similar with their own regional languages (couldn't due to the political structure of Germany). They did of course try to suppress the Polish separate identity however, but that was linked to Polish support of France in the Franco-Prussian war:

Actually I looked at this link and your rather done a HL there by quoting it selectively. The actual section states, see Anti-Polish_aspect_of_Kulturkampf.

Studies that analyze the nationalist aspect of Kulturkampf point out its anti-Polish character and Bismarck's attempt to Germanize Polish provinces in the German Empire.[84][85] The Poles had already suffered from discrimination and numerous oppressive measures in Germany long before unification. These measures were intensified after the German Empire was formed[86] and Bismarck was known to be particularly hostile towards the Poles
.[87][88] Christopher Clark argues that Prussian policy changed radically in the 1870s in the face of highly visible Polish support for France in the Franco-Prussian war.[89] Polish demonstrations made clear the Polish nationalist feeling, and calls were also made for Polish recruits to desert from the Prussian Army – though these went unheeded. Bismarck was outraged, telling the Prussian cabinet in 1871: From the Russian border to the Adriatic Sea we are confronted with the combined propaganda of Slavs, ultramontanes, and reactionaries, and it is necessary openly to defend our national interests and our language against such hostile actions.[90] Therefore, in the Province of Posen the Kulturkampf took on a much more nationalistic character than in other parts of Germany.[91] Not an adamant supporter of the Liberal's general Kulturkampf goals, Bismarck did recognize the potential in some of them for subduing Polish national aspirations and readily made use of it. While the Liberals main objective was the separation of state and church as essential for a democratic and liberal society, Bismarck saw its use in separating the Polish population from the only supporter and guardian of its national identity. Prussian authorities imprisoned 185 priests and forced hundreds of others into exile. Among the imprisoned was the Primate of Poland Archbishop Mieczysław Ledóchowski. A large part of the remaining Catholic priests had to continue their service in hiding from the authorities. Although most of the 185 imprisoned were finally set free by the end of the decade, those who were released emigrated.[citation needed] The anti-Polish aspects of Kulturkampf remained in place in Polish provinces of the German Empire until the First World War.[85]

I.e. one source suggests that Polish hostility towards the German empire was increased by the Franco-Prussian war and also the German reaction but the problem of German abuse of the Poles existed for a long period before and also continued until 1914.

You're basing that on...?
What do you mean the Reichstag couldn't influence military spending? They literally made the budget! They just spent more because of the threat of Russia was growing due to their military expansion, which they once again boosted in 1914 in the largest spending increase on an army in Europe during the entire arms race to that point.

Russia was just as militaristic and in fact initiated a major military spending in 1913:



They had limited control of the military budget from Bismarck's time and Tirpitz had managed to get his naval programmes tied into law so it was impossible for the civil government to restrict them in any way.

All the continental great powers were militaristic in 1914 and fearful of their neighbours.

Steve

PS I managed to get a quote and unquote in the middle of the post replying about the Polish aspect of the Kulturkampf and the damned system won't let me remove that. Apologies about that. :(
 
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Buba

A total creep
I was working on the assumption that Russia would heavily defend the Polish salient for political reasons. However a withdrawal to "the line of the Niemen and Bug Rivers" would probably suit the Russians better in this scenario
Going by very hazy memory (hence caveat emptor!) there was an - what's the idiom? ebb and flow? - of "defend salient" versus "concentrate beyond the Niemen and Bug" strategies, depending on the strength of "Russia stronk" sentiment ATM in Sankt Peterburg dating back to the Crimean War or so.

Of course the policy of 1907-12 would had served Russia in an ostaufmarsch scenario better.
But unless said ostaufmarsch was set in stone and Russia had a Colonel Riedl equivalent in Berlin, I see no reason for Russia not sticking its pee-pee between the door and doorframe.
The only change - I think I'm repeating myself - is that Deployment Plan G is used, once Russia catches whiff that less than expected of the German army is being used in the west.


Also I appologise for an error as to Plan G - I thought that the difference concerned not the 4th but the 9th Army (raised a month after D-Day), and that it still was to be deployed in the salient.
Hence plan G looks better for Russia in the ostaufmarsch scenario than I thought. Ehh, faulty memory ...
Eastern_Front%2C_1914.jpg

the problem of German abuse of the Poles existed for a long period before and also continued until 1914.
Of, yes!
By 1914, 100 years after the Congress of Vienna, Prussia's treatment of Polish population had gone from middling to definitely the worst of the three Partitioning Powers. In 1913 or '14 the Prussian Parliament had just passed a Bill wherein being Polish was cause enough for eminent domain seizure of property. Or so I've seen claimed by Polish sources.
 
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sillygoose

Well-known member
Going by very hazy memory (hence caveat emptor!) there was an - what's the idiom? ebb and flow? - of "defend salient" versus "concentrate beyond the Niemen and Bug" strategies, depending on the strength of "Russia stronk" sentiment in Sankt Peterburg dating back to the Crimean War or so.

Of course the policy of 1907-12 would had served Russia in an ostaufmarsch scenario better.
But unless said ostaufmarsch was set in stone and Russia had a Colonel Rield equivalent in Berlin, I see no reason for Russia not sticking its pee-pee between the door and doorframe.
The only change - I think I'm repeating myself - is that Deployment Plan G is used, once Russia catches whiff that less than expected of the German army is being used in the west:


Also I appologise for an error as to Plan G - I thought that the difference concerned not the 4th but the 9th Army (raised a month after D-Day), and that it still was to be deployed in the salient.
Hence plan G looks better for Russia in the ostaufmarsch scenario than I thought. Ehh, faulty memory ...
Eastern_Front%2C_1914.jpg


Of, yes!
I forgot about the G variant of the Russian war plan. That guarantees the Austrians do very well then in 1914. The Russian 5th army is likely screwed even with Conrad's major mistakes. Dankl's 1st army basically has zero resistance when it advances, which means the Russian 9th army is going to have a bad time while still mobilizing and Ivangorod and Lublin probably fall quickly as a result, especially if there is German assistance; undoubtedly the Skoda mortars are going to be used on that fort. That renders the Polish salient indefensible, so likely the Russians have to abandon their forts anyway and pull back to a defensive line at least on the Niemen if not a full 1915 style Great Retreat scenario which will not help morale at all, especially if the still mobilizing armies get overrun in the process.

That's basically a nightmare scenario for the Russians whether or not their general staff is aware of it, because the Austrians won't be beaten to a pulp like in OTL, so can actually pull their weight through the destruction of the Russian 9th and 5th armies in August and perhaps even ripping up the 3rd and 8th armies in East Galicia once the Austrian 1st and 2nd armies arrive in full force. How long is the Czar going to want to fight it out after losing multiple armies, Poland, the fortress barrier, and the French are stopped on the German frontier while Paris and perhaps several other industrial cities are in a general strike? Oh and Italy DoWs France per their treaty obligations while Britain is still officially neutral.


By 1914, 100 years after the Congress of Vienna, Prussia's treatment of Polish population had gone from middling to definitely the worst of the three Partitioning Powers. In 1913 or '14 the Prussian Parliament had just passed a Bill wherein being Polish was cause enough for eminent domain seizure of property. Or so I've seen claimed by Polish sources.
There is quite a bit of nuance there:
The most extreme German land measures against the Poles of Prussian Poland were "the exceptional laws" passed at the turn of the century, allowing expropriation of Polish-held land. However, this was used very rarely because it met with strong opposition from German landowners in other parts of the Empire, who saw it as a dangerous precedent that could be used against them.
Another measure often used against Poles was to forbid them, once they bought land, to live in houses allegedly unfit for sanitary or other reasons, or even to build a house on their land without prior approval by local authorities - who generally refused such permits. The most famous case of resistance to this law is known as "Drzymala's (pron. Dzhymahlah's) Caravan" (1904). A Polish peasant farmer, Edward Drzymala, was refused a building permit, so he lived with his family in a circus caravan, and when he was refused permission to do that, they moved to a dugout . They were finally left in peace.
In 1904, the Prussian government made another move against the Poles, this time in the schools. It decreed that religion was now to be taught in German. Children were also beaten for speaking Polish in breaks. These measures led to the school strikes of 1901-07, that were ruthlessly put down, which provoked protests in other parts of Poland as well as in the Western press.
All these measures provoked widespread Polish resistance and therefore the spread of national consciousness on all levels of Polish society in Prussian Poland. It is not surprising that the National Democratic Party (Dmowski), which saw Germany as the Poles' enemy no.1 had it largest following in Prussian Poland.
So yes the laws existed, but mostly weren't enforced due to strong opposition even on the part of German landowners and it causing the rise of organized Polish resistance and an increase in their national identity and political activism.
Also they came closer to the turn of the century, not 1914.

Edit
Much more info:
Polish organizations were actually defeating a lot of the efforts by Prussia to settle the area with Germans and they used legal methods to do so. Guess Prussia was somewhat less authoritarian than commonly thought given that a politically disempowered ethnic minority could effectively defeat the state by politically organizing.
By 1918, the total ethnic Polish population was greater than when the Commission began operations. Between 1918 and 1939, the German population in these areas declined by another 70%, and the land owned by Germans by 45%.
 
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Buba

A total creep
That's basically a nightmare scenario for the Russians whether or not their general staff is aware of it,

Beating children for speaking the wrong language in school was normal for that those times - France and Britain both did it.

Having more Poles in situ than before the Hakata (that's the Polish name for the collonisation commission) started to work is not so much the effect of Polish resistance but of the Ostflucht.
The local Germans were slightly richer than the local Poles and could afford to emigrate in larger numbers. The Poles were too poor for that, they could only go Sachsengangen (seasonal farm work in richer areas, back home by the autumn).
See piss poor Italy - the slightly less piss poor Italians from the north emigrated to South America (hence the image of Italians being tall, blue eyed, pollenta eaters in Brazil and Argentina), while the really piss poor ones who could afford only the cheapest tickets emigrated to the USA, giving it its Sicilian mafia etc.

And thanks for finally teaching me about the "the exceptional laws" - I've read about them 3rd/4th hand only previously.

BTW - I know that "German/Germany" is a convenient form of mental shorthand - but IMO we need to remember that there was German i.e. Federal (Imperial) Law and Prussian i.e. State Law.
 
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sillygoose

Well-known member

Beating children for speaking the wrong language in school was normal for that those times - France and Britain both did it.

Having more Poles in situ than before the Hakata (that's the Polish name for the collonisation commission) started to work is not so much the effect of Polish resistance but of the Ostflucht.
If you read the one link the commission ended up mostly (like 70% or so) buying German owned land because Poles wouldn't sell and couldn't be legally compelled to. So that was a pretty big part of the effectiveness of the resistance movement. And increased Polish population had nothing to do with the leaving of the Germans, since it just refers to their overall number, not proportion relative to Germans. I've seen it claimed elsewhere (a book called "Orphans of Versailles" which is well reviewed academically and uses Polish sources) that Polish land ownership actually increased in the areas affected by the Commission by 10% during this period in addition to the population increase.

As to the Ostflucht it included Poles:
Most of the migrants were ethnic Germans, but many migrants to the Ruhr were of Polish ethnicity, later known as Ruhrpolen.
This migration wave, known as the Ostflucht, began in the late 19th century, with most of the Ruhrpolen arriving around the 1870s. The migrants found employment in the mining, steel and construction industries. In 1913 there were between 300,000 and 350,000 Poles and 150,000 Masurians. Of those, one-third were born in the Ruhr area.[5] The Protestant Masurians did not accept being identified with Catholic Poles and underlined their loyalty to Prussia and the German Empire.[6]
Interestingly not all the Slavs in the area of Prussia identified with Poland.

The local Germans were slightly richer than the local Poles and could afford to emigrate in larger numbers. The Poles were too poor for that, they could only go Sachsengangen (seasonal farm work in richer areas, back home by the autumn).
See piss poor Italy - the slightly less piss poor Italians from the north emigrated to South America (hence the image of Italians being tall, blue eyed, pollenta eaters in Brazil and Argentina), while the really piss poor ones who could afford only the cheapest tickets emigrated to the USA, giving it its Sicilian mafia etc.
Don't forget the emigration of Poles to the US as well, my Polish ancestors came over in 1900.
1.5 million Poles came over in the early 20th century pre-WW1:
The polish immigrant movement was primarily in the early 20th century; at this time, Ellis Island recorded over 1.5 million Polish Immigrants had come through and moved into the nation.

Polish immigration began en masse from Prussia in 1870 following the Franco-Prussian War. Prussia retaliated against Polish support for France with increasing Germanization following the war.

So I guess those with enough money just left Europe. I thought there was more who had moved to Britain or France, but those were in the low 10,000s each pre-WW1.

And thanks for finally teaching me about the "the exceptional laws" - I've read about them 3rd/4th hand only previously.
No problem, your comment gave me a reason to read up on it.

BTW - I know that "German/Germany" is a convenient form of mental shorthand - but IMO we need to remember that there was German i.e. Federal (Imperial) Law and Prussian i.e. State Law.
Indeed.
 
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Buba

A total creep
Don't forget the emigration of Poles to the US as well,
Oh, yes, I oversimplified the issue!
:)
Interestingly not all the Slavs in the area of Prussia identified with Poland.
It is not healthy to say that out loud within hearing of mainstream Polish historians, educators, politicians ...
:)
I'm one of those who - GASP! - thinks that Kashubian is a separate language. Or who does not consider it strange that Masurians or Silesians were not interested in Polishness.

Ostflucht etc. is complicated (like most things). To some degree the poor Germans and Poles leaving the area were replaced by even poorer Poles from Congress Kingdom or Galicia moving in. BTW - this is repeated ATM by Poles moving to UK or Germany to work and being replaced in Poland by Ukrainians.
I'm not denying Polish resistance to Prussian oppression/harrasment - simply I'm so sick of having it overblown and rammed down my throat by loudmouth ignorants that I'm a bit allergic to such claims.

But back to topic - once Russia folds, after two years or so, France asks for terms?
Or does the UK - regardles of internal issues - prop up the French and Russians because balance of power? The propping up can be mostly financial, and may also involve bribing other countries to be anti-CP. Here I see Italy as a possibility, same as in OTL. Britain can promise Italy more than the CP and has naval and economic blockade as a bargaining chip.
Sadly I know too little of French internal politics of the era ...
 
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sillygoose

Well-known member
Oh, yes, I oversimplified the issue!
:)
Most of these issues are overly complicated, especially the historiography!

It is not healthy to say that out loud within hearing of mainstream Polish historians, educators, politicians ...
:)
I'm one of those who - GASP! - thinks that Kashubian is a separate language. Or who does not consider it strange that Masurians or Silesians were not interested in Polishness.
Haha, yes, I've run into that problem before.
You are a rare breed.

Ostflucht etc. is complicated (like most things). To some degree the poor Germans and Poles leaving the area were replaced by even poorer Poles from Congress Kingdom or Galicia moving in. BTW - this is repeated ATM by Poles moving to UK or Germany to work and being replaced in Poland by Ukrainians.
I'm not denying Polish resistance to Prussian oppression/harrasment - simply I'm so sick of having it overblown and rammed down my throat by loudmouth ignorants that I'm a bit allergic to such claims.
That's interesting, I didn't know that Ukrainians were moving to Poland. I thought the historical friction would potentially make them look for other countries to move to.
Overblown how? I've not actually come across that issue before.

But back to topic - once Russia folds, after two years or so, France asks for terms?
I think it might even be over sooner, like 12 months or so. Likely I think France and Russia would ask together so they could negotiate as a bloc to get the best terms; if Russia folds independent of France, then I think France panics and is willing to make rather large concessions. What sort of terms do you think they'd offer in either circumstance?

Or does the UK - regardles of internal issues - prop up the French and Russians because balance of power? The propping up can be mostly financial, and may also involve bribing other countries to be anti-CP. Here I see Italy as a possibility, same as in OTL. Britain can promise Italy more than the CP and has naval and economic blockade as a bargaining chip.
Sadly I know too little of French internal politics of the era ...
I'm of the opinion the British government would try to politically, financially, and through putting onerous terms on their neutrality on the CPs support the Entente, but might well push them to negotiate sooner rather than later if things start going bad quickly.

Britain cannot leverage a blockade while being neutral and everyone knows it, they'd have to be an active belligerent.

As to Italy's likely position, looking at their actual declared reason for staying neutral they'd probably pull the same stunt and claim because they weren't consulted or compensated for the actions against Serbia per the treaty that they weren't bound but the 'purely' defensive alliance. I don't think the Entente or a neutral Britain could afford Italy's price to join the Entente though, especially if Austria defeats major Russian forces in Galicia in August-September. Any humiliations against Serbia wouldn't then matter. In fact if Russia is on the ropes early on in the East and loses Poland Italy would stay neutral and start seeing what chance there was to get French territory. With Britain neutral and Russia losing quickly, plus the initial French invasion failing and perhaps there being a Socialist strike, I don't see how Italy doesn't eventually side with the CPs when the time is right for them. Italian entry then might well be the catalyst for peace negotiations.

What did you want to know about French internal politics?
 

Buba

A total creep
Overblown how? I've not actually come across that issue before.
Overblown as in "everybody in Poland conspired and prayed on an everyday basis for Restoration. And everybody was into the resistance to the Partitioning Powers and their actions were 100% effective."
I'd not be surprised if the Irish had similar mythos.

Ukranians working in Poland - there is over a million of them at any moment. In lower paid/nastier jobs it is difficult to find a Pole at times. My son - a trashman - often has to speak a broken Russian-Ukranian mix (he never learned Ukrainian) or English (those from Morroco, Togo, Egypt ... ) with his co-workers. He jokes that he gets to speak Polish only when back home.

I think that Russia will hold for at least two years - in OTL it took three years of being soundly beaten.

France and Russia asking for terms together would be the sensible thing to do. Yet OTL WWI is full of stupid actions on both sides.
Russia and peace - the problem here is that idiot Nicholas - he will not ask for terms as long as France does not. So he has to get palace-couped or overthrown together with the monarchy (or autocracy at least). And here Russia could ask for terms separately.

What did you want to know about French internal politics?
I don't know what I want to know :) because I know nothing about them. I've no idea what political groups there were, with what agendas. I'm not ever sure how extensive the rabid revanchism was, of how much of it has been oxagerrated post-WWI as part of the national mythos.

Britain - I still think that it would become a belligerent in 1914, by 1915 latest.

Italy - I fully agree on its neutrality. The way I see things Italy was in the CP as deterrent against France, as it did not have any beef with Russia and was too tied to Britain or dependent on its goodwill. It simply was not in the CP to take on Britain. Hence a Britain at war, or even simply neutral-yet-hostile towards the CP makes Italian belligerency against France very unlikely (though again, look at OTL 1940).

Lots of loose canons to follow here :)
 
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stevep

Well-known member
Overblown as in "everybody in Poland conspired and prayed on an everyday basis for Restoration. And everybody was into the resistance to the Partitioning Powers and their actions were 100% effective."
I'd not be surprised if the Irish had similar mythos.

Very true. I have seen it suggested, albeit by someone with some serious hates towards certain figures, including one with the initials LG, ;) that the primary reason that SF was so successful in the 1918 election was because so many loyalists and moderate Catholic Irish were unable to vote because they were still in the army on the continent. That may or may not be accurate of course.

Ukranians working in Poland - there is over a million of them at any moment. In lower paid/nastier jobs it is difficult to find a Pole at times. My son - a trashman - often has to speak a broken Russian-Ukranian mix (he never learned Ukrainian) or English (those from Morroco, Togo, Egypt ... ) with his co-workers. He jokes that he gets to speak Polish only when back home.

Despressing story but while Poles have often been victims of abuse by their neighbours they have a nasty history themselves at time. :(

I think that Russia will hold for at least two years - in OTL it took three years of being soundly beaten.

That would be my feeling as well, especially since they would be doing a lot less attacking and are more likely to withdraw sooner from the exposed salient. They might suffer serious defeats and possibly some political collapse earlier but would expect it still takes until 1916 or possibly 1917 before there's a political change forced on them like OTL.

France and Russia asking for terms together would be the sensible thing to do. Yet OTL WWI is full of stupid actions on both sides.
Russia and peace - the problem here is that idiot Nicholas - he will not ask for terms as long as France does not. So he has to get palace-couped or overthrown together with the monarchy (or autocracy at least). And here Russia could ask for terms separately.

True on both points. Plus as I've said elsewhere if the EPs powers seek peace after say 18-24 months of very bloody fighting how likely is it that Germany especially will agree terms that leaves both of them still capable of being great powers?

I don;t know what I wat to know :) beacuse I know nothing about them. I've no idea what political groups there were, with what agendas. I'm not ever sure how extensive the rabid revanchism was, of how much of it has been overblown post WWI as part of the national mythos.

You get so many different stories on points like this. Have read suggestions that increasing numbers of French were becoming resigned to the post-1871 border but there were still a lot who for whatever reason wanted to regain the two provinces. I think the primary motive here for France however was that they couldn't afford to see Russia seriously weakened and baring them trying their own left hook through Belgium - which seems unlikely - its the only location they can directly fight Germany - other than some minor colonial clashes.


Britain - I still think that it would become a belligerent in 1914, by 1915 latest.

It would probably depend on the circumstances. Even OTL with the invasion of Belgium giving a clear reason for a dow and a strong public motive for the war I think 2-3 cabinet ministers resigned over the issue. Unless it looked like the CPs would win quickly, generating a Europe clearly dominated by Germany then I suspect Britain might delay any dow. After all they would want minimal interruption to their own trade and also some basis of neutrality for their attempts to negotiate an end to the war.

The other factor that might influence an early British dow could be the Ottoman dow on Russia. Both because it greatly weakens the latter but also it raises issues about Egypt and Cyprus, which were still technically tributary states of the Ottoman empire.

Italy - I fully agree on its neutrality. The way I see things Italy was in the CP as deterrent against France, as it did not have any beef with Russia and was too tied to Britain or dependent on its goodwill. It simply was not in the CP to take on Britain. Hence a Britain at war, or even simply neutral-yet-hostile towards the CP makes Italian belligerency against France very unlikely (though again, look at OTL 1940).

Agreed.

Lots of loose canons to follow here :)

Very true. One other factor is what does Japan do? OTL, with the alliance with Britain as an excuse they joined the allies and mopped up a lot of German possessions in the Pacific/Far East, prompting in return Australia and New Zealand with some British support to seize the more southernly possessions in part to keep them out of Japanese hands. Japan might do the same here as they can gain a lot of territory fairly cheaply and even if the EPs lose Germany could have problems demanding the return of such possessions given the would lack any bases within range.

I suspect Japan wouldn't join the CPs because that would mean a war with Russia which would be costly for them and gain relatively little of value as they had already secured domination of Manchuria which was their primarily concern in 1904. Plus it would alienate Britain who was the main Japanese ally. Its possibly they simply remain neutral however and as OTL made a good profit in selling weapons and other stuff to Russia.

Steve
 

Buba

A total creep
while Poles have often been victims of abuse by their neighbours they have a nasty history themselves at time. :(
Yup.
I was disgusted at my last workplace at the nastiness towards Ukrainians displayed by some of my co-workers. Some of whom - those Polish co-workers, I mean - having a history of being guest workers in the UK, France or Germany and being abused there.

by someone with some serious hates towards certain figures, including one with the initials LG
We hates him too, my Precious, we does!
LG is the one of "granting Silesia to Poland is like giving a clock to a monkey" fame.
Although the more I learn about the Polish 2nd Republic the more I am ready to grudgingly agree that he possibly might have made a good point ...

Japan - definitely neutral or a Russo-French ally.

Interesting point about the Ottomans - in OTL, in October, when the final decision was made - they were looking at France beaten up by Germany and A-H beaten up by Russia and Britain being in the EP.
How much do the stolen battleships figure in this I do not know - I wonder how much of the "they do not matter and Turkey threw its lot with the CP before the battleships were siezed" is whitewashing the bumbling fat drunk with his moment of glory in 1940. Here the battleships should be delivered to the Turks (but you never know with the British Liberal Cabinet of 1914). Would this make them happy?
 

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